Publications

Durbin, S.G.; Bernstein, Robert B.; Glover, Steven F.; Neely, Jason C.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Sabotage of spent nuclear fuel casks remains a concern nearly forty years after attacks against shipment casks were first analyzed and has a renewed relevance in the post-9/11 environment. A limited number of full-scale tests and supporting efforts using surrogate materials, typically depleted uranium dioxide (DUO2), have been conducted in the interim to more definitively determine the source term from these postulated events. In all the previous studies, the postulated attack of greatest interest was by a conical shape charge (CSC) that focuses the explosive energy much more efficiently than bulk explosives. However, the validity of these large-scale results remain in question due to the lack of a defensible Spent Fuel Ratio (SFR), defined as the amount of respirable aerosol generated by an attack on a mass of spent fuel compared to that of an otherwise identical DUO2 surrogate. Previous attempts to define the SFR have resulted in estimates ranging from 0.42 to 12 and include suboptimal experimental techniques and data comparisons. Different researchers have suggested using SFR values of 3 to 5.6. Sound technical arguments exist that the SFR does not exceed a value of unity. A defensible determination of the SFR in this lower range would greatly reduce the calculated risk associated with the transport and dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Currently, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is in possession of several samples of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that were used in the original SFR studies in the 1980s and were intended for use in a modern effort at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in the 2000s. A portion of these samples are being used for a variety of research efforts. However, the entirety of SNF samples at ORNL is scheduled for disposition at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) by approximately the end of 2015. If a defensible SFR is to be determined for use in storage and transportation security analyses, the need to begin this effort is urgent in order to secure the only known available SNF samples with a clearly defined path to disposal.

Durbin, S.G.

Assessing the risk to the public and the environment from a release of radioactive material produced by accidental or purposeful forces/environments is an important aspect of the regulatory process in many facets of the nuclear industry. In particular, the transport and storage of radioactive materials is of particular concern to the public, especially with regard to potential sabotage acts that might be undertaken by terror groups to cause injuries, panic, and/or economic consequences to a nation. For many such postulated attacks, no breach in the robust cask or storage module containment is expected to occur. However, there exists evidence that some hypothetical attack modes can penetrate and cause a release of radioactive material. This report is intended as an unclassified overview of the methodology for release estimation as well as a guide to useful resource data from unclassified sources and relevant analysis methods for the estimation process.

Durbin, S.G.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Morrow, Charles W.

The resulting dose consequences from releases of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) residing in a dry storage casks are examined parametrically. The dose consequences are characterized by developing dose versus distance curves using simplified bounding assumptions. The dispersion calculations are performed using the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS2) code. Constant weather and generic system parameters were chosen to ensure that the results in this report are comparable with each other and to determine the relative impact on dose of each variable. Actual analyses of site releases would need to accommodate local weather and geographic data. These calculations assume a range of fuel burnups, release fractions (RFs), three exposure scenarios (2 hrs and evacuate, 2 hrs and shelter, and 24 hrs exposure), two meteorological conditions (D-4 and F-2), and three release heights (ground level 1 meter (m), 10 m, and 100 m). This information was developed to support a policy paper being developed by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff on an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) and monitored retrievable storage installation (MRS) security rulemaking.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

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Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

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Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

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Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Abstract not provided.

Lindgren, Eric R.; Durbin, S.G.

This project seeks to provide vital data required to assess the consequences of a terrorist attack on a spent fuel transportation cask. One such attack scenario involves the use of conical shaped charges (CSC), which are capable of damaging a spent fuel transportation cask. In the event of such an attack, the amount of radioactivity that may be released as respirable aerosols is not known with great certainty. Research to date has focused on measuring the aerosol release from single short surrogate fuel rodlets subjected to attack by a small CSC device in various aerosol chamber designs. The last series of three experiments tested surrogate fuel rodlets made with depleted uranium oxide ceramic pellets in a specially designed double chamber aerosol containment apparatus. This robust testing apparatus was designed to prevent any radioactive release and allow high level radioactive waste disposal of the entire apparatus following testing of actual spent fuel rodlets as proposed. DOE and Sandia reviews of the project to date identified a number of issues. The purpose of this supplemental report is to address and document the DOE review comments and to resolve the issues identified in the Sandia technical review.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.; Wagner, Kenneth C.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Wagner, Kenneth C.

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Brown, Kevin H.; Morrow, Charles W.; Durbin, S.G.

This document provides general guidance for the design and analysis of bolted joint connections. An overview of the current methods used to analyze bolted joint connections is given. Several methods for the design and analysis of bolted joint connections are presented. Guidance is provided for general bolted joint design, computation of preload uncertainty and preload loss, and the calculation of the bolted joint factor of safety. Axial loads, shear loads, thermal loads, and thread tear out are used in factor of safety calculations. Additionally, limited guidance is provided for fatigue considerations. An overview of an associated Mathcad{copyright} Worksheet containing all bolted joint design formulae presented is also provided.

Lindgren, Eric R.; Durbin, S.G.

Abstract not provided.

Transactions of the American Nuclear Society

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Abstract not provided.

Transactions of the American Nuclear Society

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.; Wagner, K.C.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.

Abstract not provided.

Durbin, S.G.; Lindgren, Eric R.; Wagner, Kenneth C.

Abstract not provided.

Cleary, Virginia D.; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Guild-Bingham, Avery G.; Cook, Jason T.; Durbin, S.G.; Keith, Rodney L.; Morrow, Charles W.; Rochau, Gary E.; Turgeon, Matthew C.; Young, Michael F.

Due to increasing concerns over the buildup of long-lived transuranic isotopes in spent nuclear fuel waste, attention has been given in recent years to technologies that can burn up these species. The separation and transmutation of transuranics is part of a solution to decreasing the volume and heat load of nuclear waste significantly to increase the repository capacity. A fusion neutron source can be used for transmutation as an alternative to fast reactor systems. Sandia National Laboratories is investigating the use of a Z-Pinch fusion driver for this application. This report summarizes the initial design and engineering issues of this ''In-Zinerator'' concept. Relatively modest fusion requirements on the order of 20 MW can be used to drive a sub-critical, actinide-bearing, fluid blanket. The fluid fuel eliminates the need for expensive fuel fabrication and allows for continuous refueling and removal of fission products. This reactor has the capability of burning up 1,280 kg of actinides per year while at the same time producing 3,000 MWth. The report discusses the baseline design, engineering issues, modeling results, safety issues, and fuel cycle impact.

Olson, Craig L.; McConnell, Paul E.; Rochau, Gary E.; Vigil, Virginia L.; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Rodriguez, Salvador B.; Morrow, Charles W.; Farnum, Cathy O.; Durbin, S.G.; Aragon, Dannelle S.

This report summarizes the work conducted for the Z-inertial fusion energy (Z-IFE) late start Laboratory Directed Research Project. A major area of focus was on creating a roadmap to a z-pinch driven fusion power plant. The roadmap ties ZIFE into the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) initiative through the use of high energy fusion neutrons to burn the actinides of spent fuel waste. Transmutation presents a near term use for Z-IFE technology and will aid in paving the path to fusion energy. The work this year continued to develop the science and engineering needed to support the Z-IFE roadmap. This included plant system and driver cost estimates, recyclable transmission line studies, flibe characterization, reaction chamber design, and shock mitigation techniques.