In this article, we examine the coupling into an electrically short azimuthal slot on a cylindrical cavity operating at fundamental cavity modal frequencies. We first develop a matched bound formulation through which we can gather information for maximum achievable levels of interior cavity fields. Actual field levels are below this matched bound; therefore, we also develop an unmatched formulation for frequencies below the slot resonance to achieve a better insight on the physics of this coupling. Good agreement is observed between the unmatched formulation, full-wave simulations, and experimental data, providing a validation of our analytical models. We then extend the unmatched formulation to treat an array of slots, found again in good agreement with full-wave simulations. These analytical models can be used to investigate ways to mitigate electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility effects within cavities.
Measurements performed on a population of electronic devices reveal part-to-part variation due to manufacturing process variation. Corner models are a useful tool for the designers to bound the effect of this variation on circuit performance. To accurately simulate the circuit level behavior, compact model parameters for devices within a circuit must be calibrated to experimental data. However, determination of the bounding data for corner model calibration is difficult, primarily because available tolerance bound calculation methods only consider variability along one dimension and, do not adequately consider the variabilities across both the current and voltage axes. This paper presents the demonstration of a novel functional data analysis approach to generate tolerance bounds on these two types of variability separately and these bounds are then transformed to be used in corner model calibration.
Nominal behavior selection of an electronic device from a measured dataset is often difficult. Device characteristics are rarely monotonic and choosing the single device measurement which best represents the center of a distribution across all regions of operation is neither obvious nor easy to interpret. Often, a device modeler uses a degree of subjectivity when selecting nominal device behavior from a dataset of measurements on a group of devices. This paper proposes applying a functional data approach to estimate the mean and nominal device of an experimental dataset. This approach was applied to a dataset of electrical measurements on a set of commercially available Zener diodes and proved to more accurately represent the average device characteristics than a point-wise calculation of the mean. It also enabled an objective method for selecting a nominal device from a dataset of device measurements taken across the full operating region of the Zener diode.
Instrumentation and control of nuclear power is transforming from analog to modern digital assets. These control systems perform key safety and security functions. This transformation is occurring in new plant designs as well as in the existing fleet of plants as the operation of those plants is extended to 60 years. This transformation introduces new and unknown issues involving both digital asset induced safety issues and security issues. Traditional nuclear power risk assessment tools and cyber security assessment methods have not been modified or developed to address the unique nature of cyber failure modes and of cyber security threat vulnerabilities. iii This Lab-Directed Research and Development project has developed a dynamic cyber-risk in- formed tool to facilitate the analysis of unique cyber failure modes and the time sequencing of cyber faults, both malicious and non-malicious, and impose those cyber exploits and cyber faults onto a nuclear power plant accident sequence simulator code to assess how cyber exploits and cyber faults could interact with a plants digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) system and defeat or circumvent a plants cyber security controls. This was achieved by coupling an existing Sandia National Laboratories nuclear accident dynamic simulator code with a cyber emulytics code to demonstrate real-time simulation of cyber exploits and their impact on automatic DI&C responses. Studying such potential time-sequenced cyber-attacks and their risks (i.e., the associated impact and the associated degree of difficulty to achieve the attack vector) on accident management establishes a technical risk informed framework for developing effective cyber security controls for nuclear power.
This report describes the methods, results, and conclusions of the analysis of 11 scenarios defined to exercise various options available in the xLPR (Extremely Low Probability of Rupture) Version 2 .0 code. The scope of the scenario analysis is three - fold: (i) exercise the various options and components comprising xLPR v2.0 and defining each scenario; (ii) develop and exercise methods for analyzing and interpreting xLPR v2.0 outputs ; and (iii) exercise the various sampling options available in xLPR v2.0. The simulation workflow template developed during the course of this effort helps to form a basis for the application of the xLPR code to problems with similar inputs and probabilistic requirements and address in a systematic manner the three points covered by the scope.