Publications

Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Salerno, Reynolds M.

Abstract not provided.

Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Rivera, Susan B.

Abstract not provided.

Rivera, Susan B.; Caskey, Susan A.; Salerno, Reynolds M.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.

Abstract not provided.

Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Barnett, Natalie B.; Salerno, Reynolds M.

Abstract not provided.

Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Salerno, Reynolds M.

Biosecurity must be implemented without impeding biomedical and bioscience research. Existing security literature and regulatory requirements do not present a comprehensive approach or clear model for biosecurity, nor do they wholly recognize the operational issues within laboratory environments. To help address these issues, the concept of Biosecurity Levels should be developed. Biosecurity Levels would have increasing levels of security protections depending on the attractiveness of the pathogens to adversaries. Pathogens and toxins would be placed in a Biosecurity Level based on their security risk. Specifically, the security risk would be a function of an agent's weaponization potential and consequences of use. To demonstrate the concept, examples of security risk assessments for several human, animal, and plant pathogens will be presented. Higher security than that currently mandated by federal regulations would be applied for those very few agents that represent true weapons threats and lower levels for the remainder.

Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Rivera, Susan B.; Salerno, Reynolds M.

Abstract not provided.

Nonproliferation Review

Salerno, Reynolds M.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.

Abstract not provided.

Proposed for publication in Bioscience.

Salerno, Reynolds M.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.

Abstract not provided.

Salerno, Reynolds M.; Barnett, Natalie B.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Estes, Daniel P.

The threat from biological weapons is assessed through both a comparative historical analysis of the patterns of biological weapons use and an assessment of the technological hurdles to proliferation and use that must be overcome. The history of biological weapons is studied to learn how agents have been acquired and what types of states and substate actors have used agents. Substate actors have generally been more willing than states to use pathogens and toxins and they have focused on those agents that are more readily available. There has been an increasing trend of bioterrorism incidents over the past century, but states and substate actors have struggled with one or more of the necessary technological steps. These steps include acquisition of a suitable agent, production of an appropriate quantity and form, and effective deployment. The technological hurdles associated with the steps present a real barrier to producing a high consequence event. However, the ever increasing technological sophistication of society continually lowers the barriers, resulting in a low but increasing probability of a high consequence bioterrorism event.