Information Assurance Considerations for Safeguards Equipment
Abstract not provided.
Publications
CoCIM Data Authentication
Abstract not provided.
Trusting Embedded Hardware and Software in Treaty Verification Systems
Abstract not provided.
Trusting Embedded Hardware and Software in Treaty Verification Systems
Abstract not provided.
Non-RF Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) Development Report
The Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) developed by Sandia National Laboratories is one of the most mature and well-studied active seals for use in containment applications for arms control treaty verification and international nuclear safeguards. However, its typical design includes wireless communications provided by a radio frequency (RF) transmitter and receiver. While this provides flexibility of movement for many applications, it is unnecessary and undesired for some treaty verification applications. This report details the design and construction of two variants of the CoCIM that remove the RF transmission capability in favor of directly connected wired and short-range infrared communications, as well as a new coordinator that is used to interface the CoCIM to a computer, and new interface software that is simplified for a likely inspection use case.
Development and Demonstration of a Buddy-Tag Prototype
Abstract not provided.
Criteria for Comparative Evaluations of Treaty Verification Systems
Abstract not provided.
Criteria for Comparative Evaluation of Treaty Verification Monitoring Systems
Abstract not provided.
Non-RF Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) User Manual
This User Manual contains a description of the wired and infrared (IR) variants of the Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM), the Coordinator for reading stored messages, and the inspector Message Viewer user interface (UI) software, as well as instructions for use. This manual does not include descriptions or use instructions for the radio frequency (RF) variant of the CoCIM. The intended audience is planners and participants in treaty verification exercises where chain of custody (CoC) elements are required.
FPGA Authentication Methods
One of the greatest challenges facing designers of equipment to be used in a nuclear arms control treaty is how to convince the other party in the treaty to trust its results and functionality. Whether the host provides equipment meant to prove treaty obligations and the inspector needs to gain that trust (commonly referred to as authentication), or the inspector provides this equipment and the host needs to gain this trust (commonly considered to be included in certification), one party generally has higher confidence in the equipment at the start of a treaty regime and the other party needs to gain that confidence prior to use. While we focus on authentication in this document—that is, the inspector gaining confidence in host-provided equipment—our conclusions will likely apply to host certification of inspector-provided equipment.
Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept
Abstract not provided.
Authenticating Treaty Processor Systems: An Evaluation Framework
Abstract not provided.
Sandia/NM Available Mock Warhead Container Inventory
The real H1514 Shipping and Storage Container is an environmentally sealed and desiccated aluminum drum-type container designed to transport the W88/Mk5 Reentry Body Assembly. The H1514 is cylindrical except for a portion of its base, which is 36" square and 3" high and contains the forklift openings. Our mock H1514 retains the dimensions and shape of the real H1514 in a lighter form that is not sealed and does not have ports for desiccation.
Proposed Use Cases for Augmented Reality for Nuclear Nonproliferation Verification and Training
Abstract not provided.
Framework for Evaluating Authentication Methods for Treaty-Related Computer Processing Systems
PROPOSED USE CASES FOR AUGMENTED REALITY FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION VERIFICATION AND TRAINING
Abstract not provided.
Buddy Tag CONOPS and Requirements
This document defines the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the requirements for the Buddy Tag, which is conceived and designed in collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories and Princeton University under the Department of State Key VerificationAssets Fund. The CONOPS describe how the tags are used to support verification of treaty limitations and is only defined to the extent necessary to support a tag design. The requirements define the necessary functions and desired non-functional features of the Buddy Tag at a high level
Systems Engineering and the Design of Arms Control Monitoring Regimes
Abstract not provided.
Systems Engineering and the Design of Arms Control Monitoring Regimes
Abstract not provided.
A Comparison of Approaches to Short-Range Wireless Communications in Nuclear Facilities
Abstract not provided.
A Comparison of Approaches to Short-Range Wireless Communications in Nuclear Facilities
Abstract not provided.
The Future of Nuclear Arms Control Verification: Generating Confidence in Warhead Accounting
Abstract not provided.
Key Management Strategies for Safeguards Authentication and Encryption
Abstract not provided.
Key Management Strategies for Safeguards Authentication and Encryption
Abstract not provided.
Prototype Hardware and Software for the Secure Branching of Facility Instrumentation
Abstract not provided.
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