Publications

Finch, Robert F.; Chernikova, Dina C.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Hildingsson, Lars H.; Haddal, Risa H.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Finch, Robert F.; Haddal, Risa H.

Abstract not provided.

Horowitz, Steven M.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Deland, Sharon M.; Wallace, Eric A.; Koskelo, Markku J.; Swanson, Meili C.; Hernandez, Tina H.

Abstract not provided.

Haddal, Risa H.; Forden, Geoffrey E.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Ohlinger, John O.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Benz, Jacob B.; MacDougal, Matthew M.

Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of spent fuel throughout its life cycle is a key objective of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report describes a project in which two specific technologies, cameras with infrared (IR) imaging capabilities and imaging sonar, were tested to determine their effectiveness in augmenting optical surveillance cameras currently used for maintaining CoK for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) staged in spent fuel pools. Furthermore, the project identifies any modifications required to the technologies to facilitate deployment for international safeguards purposes. This report presents results for the imaging sonar tested at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in a mockup spent nuclear fuel pool and for the IR-capable cameras tested by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the Oregon State University Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) research reactor.

Finch, Robert F.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Haddal, Risa H.

Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

Deland, Sharon M.; Reimold, Benjamin R.; Brotz, Jay K.; Deland, Sharon M.; Glaser, Alexander G.; Hepler, Michael H.; Kim, Andrew K.; Schaffner, Thomas S.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Steingart, Dan S.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Benz, Jacob B.

Abstract not provided.

Finch, Robert F.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Haddal, Risa H.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Matzen, Laura E.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Horak, Karl E.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Haass, Michael J.

Abstract not provided.

ESARDA Bulletin

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Matzen, Laura E.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Horak, Karl E.; Moyer, Eric; St. Pierre, Matthew E.

Today’s international nuclear safeguards inspectors have access to an increasing volume of supplemental information about the facilities under their purview, including commercial satellite imagery, nuclear trade data, open source information, and results from previous safeguards activities. In addition to completing traditional in-field safeguards activities, inspectors are now responsible for being able to act upon this growing corpus of supplemental safeguards-relevant data and for maintaining situational awareness of unusual activities taking place in their environment. However, cognitive science research suggests that maintaining too much information can be detrimental to a user’s understanding, and externalizing information (for example, to a mobile device) to reduce cognitive burden can decrease cognitive function related to memory, navigation, and attention. Given this dichotomy, how can international nuclear safeguards inspectors better synthesize information to enhance situational awareness, decision making, and performance in the field? This paper examines literature from the fields of cognitive science and human factors in the areas of wayfinding, situational awareness, equipment and technical assistance, and knowledge transfer, and describes the implications for the provision of, and interaction with, safeguards-relevant information for international nuclear safeguards inspectors working in the field.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Benz, Jacob B.

Abstract not provided.

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Matzen, Laura E.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Horak, Karl E.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Moyer, Eric

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Matzen, Laura E.; Moyer, Eric; Horak, Karl E.

Abstract not provided.

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Matzen, Laura E.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Horak, Karl E.; Moyer, Eric

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.

This purpose of this document is to provide an overview of Chain of Custody (CoC) technology options that could be made available for the LETTERPRESS exercise as part of the Quad Working Group. The Quad Working Group comprises five sub-working groups (Management, Protocol, Simulation, Technology, and Training) with members from the U.S., U.K., Norway, and Sweden having the goal of providing a repeatable, realistic arms control exercise (dubbed LETTERPRESS) to be executed in representative facilities and using non-proliferative but representative treaty items. The Technology Working Group is responsible for supporting the technology requirements of the LETTERPRESS exercise and as such the technologies presented here are possible options to meet those requirements.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Romero, Juan A.; Custer, Joyce O.; Hymel, Ross W.; Krementz, Dan K.; Gobin, Derek G.; harpring, larry h.; Martinez-Rodriguez, Michael M.; Varble, Don V.; DiMaio, Jeff D.; Hudson, Stephen H.

Containment/Surveillance (C/S) measures are critical to any verification regime in order to maintain Continuity of Knowledge (CoK). The Ceramic Seal project is research into the next generation technologies to advance C/S, in particular improving security and efficiency. The Ceramic Seal is a small form factor loop seal with improved tamper-indication including a frangible seal body, tamper planes, external coatings, and electronic monitoring of the seal body integrity. It improves efficiency through a self-securing wire and in-situ verification with a handheld reader. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), under sponsorship from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D), have previously designed and have now fabricated and tested Ceramic Seals. Tests have occurred at both SNL and SRNL, with different types of tests occurring at each facility. This interim report will describe the Ceramic Seal prototype, the design and development of a handheld standalone reader and an interface to a data acquisition system, fabrication of the seals, and results of initial testing.

Langlois, Eric L.; Pillars, Jamin R.; Monson, Todd M.; Arrington, Christian L.; Finnegan, Patrick S.; St John, Christopher S.; Smartt, Heidi A.

The ability to track nuclear material is a challenge for resiliency of complex systems, e.g., harsh environments. RF tags, frequently used in national security applications, cannot be used for technological, operational, or safety reasons. Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) is a novel tag technology based on magnetoelastic sensing that circumvents these issues. This technology is enabled by a new, cost-effective, batch manufacturing electrochemical deposition (ECD) process. This new advancement in fabrication enables multi-frequency tags capable of providing millions of possible codes for tag identification unlike existing theft deterrent tags that can convey only a single bit of information. Magnetostrictive 70% Co: 30% Fe was developed as the base alloy comprising the magnetoelastic resonator transduction element. Saturation magnetostriction, S , has been externally measured by the Naval Research Laboratory to be as high as 78 ppm. Description of a novel MEMS variable capacitive test structure is described for future measurements of this parameter.

Smartt, Heidi A.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Romero, Juan A.; Custer, Joyce O.; Hymel, Ross W.; Krementz, Dan K.; Gobin, Derek G.; harpring, larry h.; Martinez-Rodriguez, Michael M.; Varble, Don V.; DiMaio, Jeff D.; Hudson, Stephen H.

Abstract not provided.

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Baldwin, George T.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.

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Smartt, Heidi A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.

Abstract not provided.

Smartt, Heidi A.; Romero, Juan A.; Custer, Joyce O.; Krementz, Dan K.; harpring, larry h.; Martinez-Rodriguez, Michael M.

Abstract not provided.