Regional Transparency and the Information Sharing Framework: An Overview
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To ensure the peaceful intent for production and processing of nuclear fuel, verifiable process monitoring of the fuel production cycle is required. As part of a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EURATOM collaboration in the field of international nuclear safeguards, the DOE Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Directorate General-Energy (DG-ENER) developed and demonstrated a new concept in process monitoring, enabling the use of operator process information by branching a second, authenticated data stream to the Safeguards inspectorate. This information would be complementary to independent safeguards data, improving the understanding of the plant's operation. The concept is called the Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS). EDAS transparently captures, authenticates, and encrypts communication data that is transmitted between operator control computers and connected analytical equipment utilized in nuclear processes controls. The intent is to capture information as close to the sensor point as possible to assure the highest possible confidence in the branched data. Data must be collected transparently by the EDAS: Operator processes should not be altered or disrupted by the insertion of the EDAS as a monitoring system for safeguards. EDAS employs public key authentication providing 'jointly verifiable' data and private key encryption for confidentiality. Timestamps and data source are also added to the collected data for analysis. The core of the system hardware is in a security enclosure with both active and passive tamper indication. Further, the system has the ability to monitor seals or other security devices in close proximity. This paper will discuss the EDAS concept, recent technical developments, intended application philosophy and the planned future progression of this system.
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One critical aspect of any denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) involves dismantlement of its nuclear facilities and management of their associated radioactive wastes. The decommissioning problem for its two principal operational plutonium facilities at Yongbyun, the 5MWe nuclear reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory reprocessing facility, alone present a formidable challenge. Dismantling those facilities will create radioactive waste in addition to existing inventories of spent fuel and reprocessing wastes. Negotiations with the DPRK, such as the Six Party Talks, need to appreciate the enormous scale of the radioactive waste management problem resulting from dismantlement. The two operating plutonium facilities, along with their legacy wastes, will result in anywhere from 50 to 100 metric tons of uranium spent fuel, as much as 500,000 liters of liquid high-level waste, as well as miscellaneous high-level waste sources from the Radiochemical Laboratory. A substantial quantity of intermediate-level waste will result from disposing 600 metric tons of graphite from the reactor, an undetermined quantity of chemical decladding liquid waste from reprocessing, and hundreds of tons of contaminated concrete and metal from facility dismantlement. Various facilities for dismantlement, decontamination, waste treatment and packaging, and storage will be needed. The shipment of spent fuel and liquid high level waste out of the DPRK is also likely to be required. Nuclear facility dismantlement and radioactive waste management in the DPRK are all the more difficult because of nuclear nonproliferation constraints, including the call by the United States for “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement,” or “CVID.” It is desirable to accomplish dismantlement quickly, but many aspects of the radioactive waste management cannot be achieved without careful assessment, planning and preparation, sustained commitment, and long completion times. The radioactive waste management problem in fact offers a prospect for international participation to engage the DPRK constructively. DPRK nuclear dismantlement, when accompanied with a concerted effort for effective radioactive waste management, can be a mutually beneficial goal.
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