Publications

Saltiel, David H.; Cleary, Virginia D.; Rexroth, Paul E.; Rochau, Gary E.

Abstract not provided.

Rochau, Gary E.; Farnum, Cathy O.; Cleary, Virginia D.; Graham, Sean R.

Abstract not provided.

Cleary, Virginia D.; Rochau, Gary E.; Vugrin, Eric D.; Vugrin, Kay E.

Proliferation resistance features that reduce the likelihood of diversion of nuclear materials from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle are critical for a global nuclear future. A framework that monitors process information continuously can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation by measuring and reducing diversion risk, thus ensuring the legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation makes this possible by generating instantaneous system state data that can be used to track and measure the status of the process and material at any given time. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) are working in cooperation to develop an advanced transparency framework capable of assessing diversion risk in support of overall plant transparency. The ''diversion risk'' quantifies the probability and consequence of a host nation diverting nuclear materials from a civilian fuel cycle facility. This document introduces the details of the diversion risk quantification approach to be demonstrated in the fuel handling training model of the MONJU Fast Reactor.

Rochau, Gary E.; Vugrin, Eric D.; Cleary, Virginia D.

Abstract not provided.

Cleary, Virginia D.; Rochau, Gary E.

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Rochau, Gary E.

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Cleary, Virginia D.; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Guild-Bingham, Avery G.; Cook, Jason T.; Durbin, S.G.; Keith, Rodney L.; Morrow, Charles W.; Rochau, Gary E.; Turgeon, Matthew C.; Young, Michael F.

Due to increasing concerns over the buildup of long-lived transuranic isotopes in spent nuclear fuel waste, attention has been given in recent years to technologies that can burn up these species. The separation and transmutation of transuranics is part of a solution to decreasing the volume and heat load of nuclear waste significantly to increase the repository capacity. A fusion neutron source can be used for transmutation as an alternative to fast reactor systems. Sandia National Laboratories is investigating the use of a Z-Pinch fusion driver for this application. This report summarizes the initial design and engineering issues of this ''In-Zinerator'' concept. Relatively modest fusion requirements on the order of 20 MW can be used to drive a sub-critical, actinide-bearing, fluid blanket. The fluid fuel eliminates the need for expensive fuel fabrication and allows for continuous refueling and removal of fission products. This reactor has the capability of burning up 1,280 kg of actinides per year while at the same time producing 3,000 MWth. The report discusses the baseline design, engineering issues, modeling results, safety issues, and fuel cycle impact.

Olson, Craig L.; McConnell, Paul E.; Rochau, Gary E.; Vigil, Virginia L.; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Rodriguez, Salvador B.; Morrow, Charles W.; Farnum, Cathy O.; Durbin, S.G.; Aragon, Dannelle S.

This report summarizes the work conducted for the Z-inertial fusion energy (Z-IFE) late start Laboratory Directed Research Project. A major area of focus was on creating a roadmap to a z-pinch driven fusion power plant. The roadmap ties ZIFE into the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) initiative through the use of high energy fusion neutrons to burn the actinides of spent fuel waste. Transmutation presents a near term use for Z-IFE technology and will aid in paving the path to fusion energy. The work this year continued to develop the science and engineering needed to support the Z-IFE roadmap. This included plant system and driver cost estimates, recyclable transmission line studies, flibe characterization, reaction chamber design, and shock mitigation techniques.

Rochau, Gary E.; Cleary, Virginia D.

Abstract not provided.

Cleary, Virginia D.; Rochau, Gary E.

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Rochau, Gary E.; Mendez Cruz, Carmen M.

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Mendez Cruz, Carmen M.; Saltiel, David H.; Rochau, Gary E.; Rexroth, Paul E.; Gastelum, Zoe N.

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Rochau, Gary E.; Mendez Cruz, Carmen M.

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Mendez Cruz, Carmen M.; Rochau, Gary E.

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Rochau, Gary E.; Mendez Cruz, Carmen M.

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Love, Tracia L.; McClellan, Yvonne M.; Rochau, Gary E.

A key objective to the global deployment of nuclear technology is maintaining transparency among nation-states and international communities. By providing an environment in which to exchange scientific and technological information regarding nuclear technology, the safe and legitimate use of nuclear material and technology can be assured. Many nations are considering closed or multiple-application nuclear fuel cycles and are subsequently developing advanced reactors in an effort to obtain some degree of energy self-sufficiency. Proliferation resistance features that prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material and reduce the likelihood of diversion from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle are critical for a global nuclear future. IAEA Safeguards have been effective in minimizing opportunities for diversion; however, recent changes in the global political climate suggest implementation of additional technology and methods to ensure the prompt detection of proliferation. For a variety of reasons, nuclear facilities are becoming increasingly automated and will require minimum manual operation. This trend provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring proliferation risk, especially in future facilities. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation associated with these activities. Additionally, a framework designed to monitor processes will ensure the legitimate use of nuclear material. This report describes recent efforts to develop a methodology capable of assessing proliferation risk in support of overall plant transparency. The framework may be tested at the candidate site located in Japan: the Fuel Handling Training Model designed for the Monju Fast Reactor at the International Cooperation and Development Training Center of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency.

Journal of Nuclear Materials

Tanaka, Tina J.; Rochau, Gary E.; Peterson, Robert R.; Olson, Craig L.

On a single-pulse basis, the tungsten armor for the chamber walls in a laser inertial fusion energy power plant must withstand X-ray fluences of 0.4-1.2 J/cm2 with almost no mass loss, and preferably no surface changes. We have exposed preheated tungsten samples to 0.27 and 0.9 J/cm 2 X-ray fluence from the Z accelerator at Sandia National Laboratories to determine the single-shot X-ray damage threshold. Earlier focused ion beam analysis has shown that rolled powdered metal formed tungsten and tungsten alloys, will melt when exposed to 2.3 J/cm2 on Z, but not at 1.3 J/cm2. Three forms of tungsten - single-crystal (SING), chemical-vapor-deposited (CVD), and rolled powdered metal (PWM) - were exposed to fluence levels of 0.9 J/cm2 without any apparent melting. However, the CVD and PWM sample surfaces were rougher after exposure than the SING sample, which was not roughened. BUCKY (1D) calculations show a threshold of 0.5 J/cm2 for melting on Z. The present experiments indicate no melting but limited surface changes occur with polycrystalline samples (PWM and CVD) at 0.9 J/cm2 and no surface changes other than debris for samples at 0.27 J/cm2. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary E.; York, David L.

Abstract not provided.

Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary E.; York, David L.

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Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary E.; York, David L.

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Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary E.; York, David L.

Nuclear fuel cycle transparency can be defined as a confidence building approach among political entities to ensure civilian nuclear facilities are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Transparency concepts facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology, as the current international political climate indicates a need for increased methods of assuring non-proliferation. This research develops a system which will augment current non-proliferation assessment activities undertaken by U.S. and international regulatory agencies. It will support the export of nuclear technologies, as well as the design and construction of Gen. IV energy systems. Additionally, the framework developed by this research will provide feedback to cooperating parties, thus ensuring full transparency of a nuclear fuel cycle. As fuel handling activities become increasingly automated, proliferation or diversion potential of nuclear material still needs to be assessed. However, with increased automation, there exists a vast amount of process data to be monitored. By designing a system that monitors process data continuously, and compares this data to declared process information and plant designs, a faster and more efficient assessment of proliferation risk can be made. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the transparency framework that has been developed. As shown in the figure, real-time process data is collected at the fuel cycle facility; a reactor, a fabrication plant, or a recycle facility, etc. Data is sent to the monitoring organization and is assessed for proliferation risk. Analysis and recommendations are made to cooperating parties, and feedback is provided to the facility. The analysis of proliferation risk is based on the following factors: (1) Material attractiveness: the quantification of factors relevant to the proliferation risk of a certain material (e.g., highly enriched Pu-239 is more attractive than that of lower enrichment) (2) The static (baseline) risk: the quantification of risk factors regarding the expected value of proliferation risk under normal (not proliferating) operations. (3) The dynamic (changing) risk: the quantification of risk factors regarding the observed value of proliferation risk, based on monitor signals from facility operations. This framework could be implemented at facilities which have been exported (for instance, to third world countries), or facilities located in sensitive countries. Sandia National Laboratories is currently working with the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) to implement a demonstration of nuclear fuel cycle transparency technology at the Fuel Handling Training Model designed for the Monju Fast Reactor at the International Cooperation and Development Training Center in Japan. This technology has broad applications, both in the U.S. and abroad. Following the demonstration, we expect to begin further testing of the technology at an Enrichment Facility, a Fast Reactor, and at a Recycle Facility.

York, David L.; Rochau, Gary E.; Love, Tracia L.

Concerns over the illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials were focused originally on the lack of security and accountability of such material throughout the former Soviet states. This is primarily attributed to the frequency of events that have occurred involving the theft and trafficking of critical material components that could be used to construct a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or even a rudimentary nuclear device. However, with the continued expansion of nuclear technology and the deployment of a global nuclear fuel cycle these materials have become increasingly prevalent, affording a more diverse inventory of dangerous materials and dual-use items. To further complicate the matter, the list of nuclear consumers has grown to include: (1) Nation-states that have gone beyond the IAEA agreed framework and additional protocols concerning multiple nuclear fuel cycles and processes that reuse the fuel through reprocessing to exploit technologies previously confined to the more industrialized world; (2) Terrorist organizations seeking to acquire nuclear and radiological material due to the potential devastation and psychological effect of their use; (3) Organized crime, which has discovered a lucrative market in trafficking of illicit material to international actors and/or countries; and (4) Amateur smugglers trying to feed their families in a post-Soviet era. An initial look at trafficking trends of this type seems scattered and erratic, localized primarily to a select group of countries. This is not necessarily the case. The success with which other contraband has been smuggled throughout the world suggests that nuclear trafficking may be carried out with relative ease along the same routes by the same criminals or criminal organizations. Because of the inordinately high threat posed by terrorist or extremist groups acquiring the ingredients for unconventional weapons, it is necessary that illicit trafficking of these materials be better understood as to prepare for the sustained global development of the nuclear fuel cycle. Conversely, modeling and analyses of this activity must not be limited in their scope to loosely organized criminal smuggling, but address the problem as a commercial, industrial project for the covert development of nuclear technologies and unconventional weapon development.

Rochau, Gary E.; Love, Tracia L.; York, David L.

Abstract not provided.

Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary E.; York, David L.

Abstract not provided.

Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary E.; York, David L.

Abstract not provided.