Publications

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U.S. knowledge in deep geologic disposal in crystalline rock is advanced and growing. U.S. status and recent advances related to crystalline rock are discussed throughout this report. Brief discussions of the history of U.S. disposal R&D and the accumulating U.S. waste inventory are presented in Sections 3.x.2 and 3.x.3. The U.S. repository concept for crystalline rock is presented in Section 3.x.4. In Chapters 4 and 5, relevant U.S. research related to site characterization and repository safety functions are discussed. U.S. capabilities for modelling fractured crystalline rock and performing probabilistic total system performance assessments are presented in Chapter 6.

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In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities (and the associated suite of risks) around the world, this effort provides an evaluation of systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multi-modal (land and water), and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrates interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards (3S) risks is inherent in NFC activities that can go unidentified when each “S” is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques, dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA), provide integrated 3S analysis to address these interdependencies. This research suggests a need (and provides a way) to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global SNF transportation risks. Note: This paper is a summary of the final results found in Reference [1].

Current practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States of America (US) includes storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage cask systems at nuclear power plants. Most storage pools are filled to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler fuel from pools into dry storage. In the absence of a repository that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 134,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage by mid-century when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for storage systems rely on large dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters that are not optimized for disposal. Various options exist in the US for improving integration of management practices across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

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To support more rigorous analysis on global security issues at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), there is a need to develop realistic data sets without using "real" data or identifying "real" vulnerabilities, hazards or geopolitically embarrassing shortcomings. In response, an interdisciplinary team led by subject matter experts in SNL's Center for Global Security and Cooperation (CGSC) developed a hypothetical case description. This hypothetical case description assigns various attributes related to international SNF transportation that are representative, illustrative and indicative of "real" characteristics of "real" countries. There is no intent to identify any particular country and any similarity with specific real-world events is purely coincidental. To support the goal of this report to provide a case description (and set of scenarios of concern) for international SNF transportation inclusive of as much "real-world" complexity as possible -- without crossing over into politically sensitive or classified information -- this SAND report provides a subject matter expert-validated (and detailed) description of both technical and political influences on the international transportation of spent nuclear fuel.

The experimental breeder reactor (EBR-II) used fuel with a layer of sodium surrounding the uranium-zirconium fuel to improve heat transfer. Disposing of EBR-II fuel in a geologic repository without treatment is not prudent because of the potentially energetic reaction of the sodium with water. In 2000, the US Department of Energy (DOE) decided to treat the sodium-bonded fuel with an electrorefiner (ER), which produces metallic uranium product, a metallic waste, mostly from the cladding, and the salt waste in the ER, which contains most of the actinides and fission products. Two waste forms were proposed for disposal in a mined repository; the metallic waste, which was to be cast into ingots, and the ER salt waste, which was to be further treated to produce a ceramic waste form. However, alternative disposal pathways for metallic and salt waste streams may reduce the complexity. For example, performance assessments show that geologic repositories can easily accommodate the ER salt waste without treating it to form a ceramic waste form. Because EBR-II was used for atomic energy defense activities, the treated waste likely meets the definition of transuranic waste. Hence, disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southern New Mexico, may be feasible. This report reviews the direct disposal pathway for ER salt waste and describes eleven tasks necessary for implementing disposal at WIPP, provided space is available, DOE decides to use this alternative disposal pathway in an updated environmental impact statement, and the State of New Mexico grants permission.

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In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.

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Disposal of high-level radioactive waste in a deep geological repository in crystalline host rock is one of the potential options for long term isolation. Characterization of the natural barrier system is an important component of the disposal option. In this study we present numerical modeling of flow and transport in fractured crystalline rock using an updated fracture continuum model (FCM). The FCM is a stochastic method that maps the permeability of discrete fractures onto a regular grid. The original method [1] has been updated to provide capabilities that enhance representation of fractured rock. A companion paper [2] provides details of the methods for generating fracture network. In this paper use of the fracture model for the simulation of flow and transport is presented. Simulations were conducted to estimate flow and transport using an enhanced FCM method. Distributions of fracture parameters were used to generate a selected number of realizations. For each realization FCM produced permeability and porosity fields. The PFLOTRAN code [3] was used to simulate flow and transport. Simulation results and analysis are presented. The results indicate that the FCM approach is a viable method to model fractured crystalline rocks. The FCM is a computationally efficient way to generate realistic representation of complex fracture systems. This approach is of interest to nuclear waste disposal modeling applied over large domains.

Transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to increase in the future, as the nuclear fuel infrastructure continues to expand and fuel takeback programs increase in popularity. Analysis of potential risks and threats to SNF shipments is currently performed separately for safety and security. However, as SNF transportation increases, the plausible threats beyond individual categories and the interactions between them become more apparent. A new approach is being developed to integrate safety, security, and safeguards (3S) under a system-theoretic framework and a probabilistic risk framework. At the first stage, a simplified scenario will be implemented using a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) method. This scenario considers a rail derailment followed by an attack. The consequences of derailment are calculated with RADTRAN, a transportation risk analysis code. The attack scenarios are analyzed with STAGE, a combat simulation model. The consequences of the attack are then calculated with RADTRAN. Note that both accident and attack result in SNF cask damage and a potential release of some fraction of the SNF inventory into the environment. The major purpose of this analysis was to develop the input data for DPRA. Generic PWR and BWR transportation casks were considered. These data were then used to demonstrate the consequences of hypothetical accidents in which the radioactive materials were released into the environment. The SNF inventory is one of the most important inputs into the analysis. Several pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel burnups and discharge times were considered for this proof-of-concept. The inventory was calculated using ORIGEN (point depletion and decay computer code, Oak Ridge National Laboratory) for 3 characteristic burnup values (40, 50, and 60 GWD/MTU) and 4 fuel ages (5, 10, 25 and 50 years after discharge). The major consequences unique to the transportation of SNF for both accident and attack are the results of the dispersion of radionuclides in the environment. The dynamic atmospheric dispersion model in RADTRAN was used to calculate these consequences. The examples of maximum exposed individual (MEI) dose, early mortality and soil contamination are discussed to demonstrate the importance of different factors. At the next stage, the RADTRAN outputs will be converted into a form compatible with the STAGE analysis. As a result, identification of additional risks related to the interaction between characteristics becomes a more straightforward task. In order to present the results of RADTRAN analysis in a framework compatible with the results of the STAGE analysis, the results will be grouped into three categories: • Immediate negative harms •Future benefits that cannot be realized •Additional increases in future risk By describing results within generically applicable categories, the results of safety analysis are able to be placed in context with the risk arising from security events.

Understanding subsurface fracture network properties at the field scale is important for a number of environmental and economic problems, including siting of spent nuclear fuel repositories, geothermal exploration, and many others. This typically encompasses large volumes of fractured rocks with the properties inferred from the observations at rock outcrops and, if available, from the measurements in exploratory boreholes, quarries, and tunnels. These data are inherently spatially limited and a stochastic model is required to extrapolate the fracture properties over the large volumes of rocks. This study (1) describes three different methods of generating fracture networks developed for use in the fractured continuum model (FCM) and (2) provides a few examples of how these methods impact the predictions of simulated groundwater transport. A detailed analysis of the transport simulations using FCM is provided in the separate paper by the same authors (to be presented at IHLRWM 2017 conference). FCM is based on the effective continuum approaches modified to represent fractures. The permeability of discrete fractures is mapped onto a regular three-dimensional grid. The x-, y-, and z effective permeability values of a grid block are calculated from the tensor. The tensor parameters are fracture aperture, dip, strike, and number of fractures in the grid block (spacing). All three methods use the fracture properties listed above to generate corresponding permeability fields. However, the assumptions and conceptual representation of fracture network from which these properties are derived are very different. The Sequential Gaussian Simulation (SGSim) method does not require an assumption regarding the fracture shape. Fracture aperture, spacing, and orientation are defined based on the field observations. Spatially correlated features (continuation of fracture in the direction of the orientation) are created using spatially correlated random numbers generated with SGSIM code. With this method an exact number of fractures cannot be generated. The Ellipsim method assumes that the fractures are two-dimensional elliptical shapes that can be described with radius and aspect ratio. The knowledge of the fracture (ellipse) radius probability distribution is required. The fracture aperture is calculated from the ellipse radius. For this option an exact number of fractures can be generated. The fracture networks generated with SGSim and Ellipsim are not necessarily connected. The connectivity is achieved indirectly via matrix permeability that can be viewed as the permeability of much smaller fractions. The discrete fracture network (DFN) generator assumes elliptical fracture shapes and requires the same parameters as Ellipsim. The principal difference is in connectivity. The DFN method creates the fracture network connectivity via an iterative process in which not connected clusters of fractures are removed. The permeability fields were generated with FCM using three different methods and the same fracture data set loosely based on the data from an existing site in granite rocks. A few examples of transport simulations are provided to demonstrate the major findings of the comparison.

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