Publications

Saltzstein, Sylvia J.; Sorenson, Ken B.; McConnell, Paul E.; Ammerman, Douglas J.

Abstract not provided.

Packaging, Transport, Storage and Security of Radioactive Material

Lopez, C.; Ammerman, Douglas J.; Figueroa, V.G.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently completed an updated Spent Fuel Transportation Risk Assessment, NUREG-2125. This assessment considered the response of three certified casks to a range of fire accidents in order to determine whether or not they would lose their ability to contain the spent fuel or maintain effective shielding. The casks consisted of a lead shielded rail cask that can be transported either with or without an inner welded canister, an all steel rail cask that is transported with an inner welded canister, and a DU shielded truck cask that is transported with directly loaded fuel. For the two rail casks, large pool fires that were concentric (fully engulfing), offset from the casks by 3 m, and offset from the cask by 18 m were analysed using the computational fluid dynamics CAFE-3D fire modelling code coupled with the finite element analysis PATRAN-Thermal heat transfer code. All of the fires were assumed to last for 3 h. In addition to these extraregulatory fires, the regulatory 30 min fire was analysed using both the regulatory uniform 800°C boundary condition and the more realistic CAFE-3D fire modelling code. For the truck cask, only the engulfing fire case was analysed using a 1 h fire duration. In all of the fire analyses, the seal region of the cask stayed below the failure temperature; therefore, there would be no release of radioactive material. In addition, the temperature of the fuel rods stayed below their burst rupture temperature, providing another barrier to release. For the lead shielded cask, very severe fires cause some of the lead to melt. There is no leak path for this molten lead to exit the shield region, but its expansion during the melting and subsequent contraction due to solidification during cool down results in a reduction in gamma shielding effectiveness. © W. S. Maney & Son Ltd 2014.

Packaging, Transport, Storage and Security of Radioactive Material

Ammerman, Douglas J.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently completed an updated Spent Fuel Transportation Risk Assessment, NUREG-2125. This assessment considered the response of three certified casks to a range of impact accidents in order to determine whether or not they would lose their ability to contain the spent fuel or maintain effective shielding. The casks consisted of a lead shielded rail cask that can be transported either with or without an inner welded canister, an all-steel rail cask that is transported with an inner welded canister, and a DU shielded truck cask that is transported with directly loaded fuel. Finite element analyses were performed for impacts at speeds of 48, 97, 145 and 193 kilometres per hour into a rigid target. Impacts in end-on, side-on, and CG-over-corner orientations were analysed for each cask and impact speed. Calculations were performed to equate these impacts onto rigid targets with higher speed impacts onto the yielding targets that exist in the real world. These analyses indicated that a cask with an inner welded canister or a truck cask would not release radioactive material in any impact accident and that only very high-speed impacts onto hard rock targets could result in either release of material or significant degradation of shielding for rail casks without an inner canister. Impacts other than those onto flat unyielding targets were also considered. Analyses show that an impact that bypasses the impact limiters on the ends of the casks does not result in seal failure and neither does an impact by a locomotive also between the impact limiters. © W. S. Maney & Son Ltd 2014.

Ammerman, Douglas J.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Lopez Mestre, Carlos L.; Lopez Mestre, Carlos L.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Lopez Mestre, Carlos L.

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Weiner, Ruth F.; Ammerman, Douglas J.

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McConnell, Paul E.; Ammerman, Douglas J.; Sorenson, Ken B.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.; Sorenson, Ken B.

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Bignell, John B.; Ammerman, Douglas J.; Flores, Gregg J.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.; Sorenson, Ken B.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Wheeler, Timothy A.; Burns, Shawn P.; Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Gauntt, Randall O.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Mattie, Patrick D.; Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Lopez Mestre, Carlos L.; Morrow, Charles W.; Ammerman, Douglas J.

Most of the regulatory agencies world-wide require that containers used for the transportation of natural UF6 and depleted UF6 must survive a fully-engulfing fire environment for 30 minutes as described in 10CFR71 and in TS-R-1. The primary objective of this project is to examine the thermo-mechanical performance of 48Y transportation cylinders when exposed to the regulatory hypothetical fire environment without the thermal protection that is currently used for shipments in those countries where required. Several studies have been performed in which UF6 cylinders have been analyzed to determine if the thermal protection currently used on UF6 cylinders of type 48Y is necessary for transport. However, none of them could clearly confirm neither the survival nor the failure of the 48Y cylinder when exposed to the regulatory fire environment without the additional thermal protection. A consortium of five companies that move UF6 is interested in determining if 48Y cylinders can be shipped without the thermal protection that is currently used. Sandia National Laboratories has outlined a comprehensive testing and analysis project to determine if these shipping cylinders are capable of withstanding the regulatory thermal environment without additional thermal protection. Sandia-developed coupled physics codes will be used for the analyses that are planned. A series of destructive and non-destructive tests will be performed to acquire the necessary material and behavior information to benchmark the models and to answer the question about the ability of these containers to survive the fire environment. Both the testing and the analysis phases of this project will consider the state of UF6 under thermal and pressure loads as well as the weakening of the steel container due to the thermal load. Experiments with UF6 are also planned to collect temperature- and pressure-dependent thermophysical properties of this material.

Ammerman, Douglas J.; Davie, Neil T.; Kalan, Robert K.

Sandia National Laboratories has constructed an unyielding target at the end of its 2000-foot rocket sled track. This target is made up of approximately 5 million pounds of concrete, an embedded steel load spreading structure, and a steel armor plate face that varies from 10 inches thick at the center to 4 inches thick at the left and right edges. The target/track combination will allow horizontal impacts at regulatory speeds of very large objects, such as a full-scale rail cask, or high-speed impacts of smaller packages. The load-spreading mechanism in the target is based upon the proven design that has been in use for over 20 years at Sandia's aerial cable facility. That target, with a weight of 2 million pounds, has successfully withstood impact forces of up to 25 million pounds. It is expected that the new target will be capable of withstanding impact forces of more than 70 million pounds. During construction various instrumentation was placed in the target so that the response of the target during severe impacts can be monitored. This paper will discuss the construction of the target and provide insights on the testing capabilities at the sled track with this new target.

Ammerman, Douglas J.

The ASME Task Group on Computational Mechanics for Explicit Dynamics is investigating the types of finite element models needed to accurately solve various problems that occur frequently in cask design. One type of problem is the 1-meter impact onto a puncture spike. The work described in this paper considers this impact for a relatively thin-walled shell, represented as a flat plate. The effects of mesh refinement, friction coefficient, material models, and finite element code will be discussed. The actual punch, as defined in the transport regulations, is 15 cm in diameter with a corner radius of no more than 6 mm. The punch used in the initial part of this study has the same diameter, but has a corner radius of 25 mm. This more rounded punch was used to allow convergence of the solution with a coarser mesh. A future task will be to investigate the effect of having a punch with a smaller corner radius. The 25-cm thick type 304 stainless steel plate that represents the cask wall is 1 meter in diameter and has added mass on the edge to represent the remainder of the cask. The amount of added mass to use was calculated using Nelm's equation, an empirically derived relationship between weight, wall thickness, and ultimate strength that prevents punch through. The outer edge of the plate is restrained so that it can only move in the direction parallel to the axis of the punch. Results that are compared include the deflection at the edge of the plate, the deflection at the center of the plate, the plastic strains at radius r=50 cm and r=100 cm , and qualitatively, the distribution of plastic strains. The strains of interest are those on the surface of the plate, not the integration point strains. Because cask designers are using analyses of this type to determine if shell will puncture, a failure theory, including the effect of the tri-axial nature of the stress state, is also discussed. The results of this study will help to determine what constitutes an adequate finite element model for analyzing the puncture hypothetical accident.

Morrow, Charles W.; Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.; Harding, David C.; Villa, Daniel V.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Miller, David R.; Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.

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Ammerman, Douglas J.

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