Antineutrino detection using inverse beta decay conversion has demonstrated the capability to measure nuclear reactor power and fissile material content for nuclear safeguards. Current efforts focus on aboveground deployment scenarios, for which highly efficient capture and identification of neutrons is needed to measure the anticipated antineutrino event rates in an elevated background environment. In this submission, we report on initial characterization of a new scintillation-based segmented design that uses layers of ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF and an integrated readout technique to capture and identify neutrons created in the inverse beta decay reaction. Laboratory studies with multiple organic scintillator and ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF configurations reliably identify {sup 6}Li neutron captures in 60 cm-long segments using pulse shape discrimination.
The current state-of-the-art in antineutrino detection is such that it is now possible to remotely monitor the operational status, power levels and fissile content of nuclear reactors in real-time. This non-invasive and incorruptible technique has been demonstrated at civilian power reactors in both Russia and the United States and has been of interest to the IAEA Novel Technologies Unit for several years. Expert's meetings were convened at IAEA headquarters in 2003 and again in 2008. The latter produced a report in which antineutrino detection was called a 'highly promising technology for safeguards applications' at nuclear reactors and several near-term goals and suggested developments were identified to facilitate wider applicability. Over the last few years, we have been working to achieve some of these goals and improvements. Specifically, we have already demonstrated the successful operation of non-toxic detectors and most recently, we are testing a transportable, above-ground detector system, which is fully contained within a standard 6 meter ISO container. If successful, such a system could allow easy deployment at any reactor facility around the world. As well, our previously demonstrated ability to remotely monitor the data and respond in real-time to reactor operational changes could allow the verification of operator declarations without the need for costly site-visits. As the global nuclear power industry expands around the world, the burden on maintaining operational histories and safeguarding inventories will increase greatly. Such a system for providing remote data to verify operator's declarations could greatly reduce the need for frequent site inspections while still providing a robust warning of anomalies requiring further investigation.
Antineutrino detection using inverse beta decay conversion has demonstrated the capability to measure nuclear reactor power and fissile material content for nuclear safeguards. Current efforts focus on aboveground deployment scenarios, for which highly efficient capture and identification of neutrons is needed to measure the anticipated antineutrino event rates in an elevated background environment. In this submission, we report on initial characterization of a new scintillation-based segmented design that uses layers of ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF and an integrated readout technique to capture and identify neutrons created in the inverse beta decay reaction. Laboratory studies with multiple organic scintillator and ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF configurations reliably identify {sup 6}Li neutron captures in 60 cm-long segments using pulse shape discrimination.
The current state-of-the-art in antineutrino detection is such that it is now possible to remotely monitor the operational status, power levels and fissile content of nuclear reactors in real-time. This non-invasive and incorruptible technique has been demonstrated at civilian power reactors in both Russia and the United States and has been of interest to the IAEA Novel Technologies Unit for several years. Expert's meetings were convened at IAEA headquarters in 2003 and again in 2008. The latter produced a report in which antineutrino detection was called a 'highly promising technology for safeguards applications' at nuclear reactors and several near-term goals and suggested developments were identified to facilitate wider applicability. Over the last few years, we have been working to achieve some of these goals and improvements. Specifically, we have already demonstrated the successful operation of non-toxic detectors and most recently, we are testing a transportable, above-ground detector system, which is fully contained within a standard 6 meter ISO container. If successful, such a system could allow easy deployment at any reactor facility around the world. As well, our previously demonstrated ability to remotely monitor the data and respond in real-time to reactor operational changes could allow the verification of operator declarations without the need for costly site-visits. As the global nuclear power industry expands around the world, the burden on maintaining operational histories and safeguarding inventories will increase greatly. Such a system for providing remote data to verify operator's declarations could greatly reduce the need for frequent site inspections while still providing a robust warning of anomalies requiring further investigation.
We describe an assembly of detectors that quantifies the background radiation present at potential above ground antineutrino detector development and deployment sites. Antineutrino detectors show great promise for safeguard applications in directly detecting the total fission rate as well as the change in fissile content of nuclear power reactors. One major technical challenge that this safeguard application must overcome is the ability to distinguish signals from antineutrinos originating in the reactor core from noise due to background radiation created by terrestrial and cosmogenic sources. To date, existing detectors increase their ability to distinguish antineutrino signals by being surrounded with significant shielding and being placed underground. For the safeguard's agency, this is less than optimal, increasing the overall size and limiting the placement of this system. For antineutrino monitoring to be a widely deployable solution, we must understand the backgrounds found above ground at nuclear power plants that can mimic the antineutrino signal so that these backgrounds can be easily identified, separated, and subtracted rather than shielded. The design, construction, calibration, and results from the deployment of these background detectors at a variety of sites will be presented.