Emulytics? at Sandia National Laboratories
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Packet switched data communications networks that use distributed processing architectures have the potential to simplify the design and development of new, increasingly more sophisticated satellite payloads. In addition, the use of reconfigurable logic may reduce the amount of redundant hardware required in space-based applications without sacrificing reliability. These concepts were studied using software modeling and simulation, and the results are presented in this report. Models of the commercially available, packet switched data interconnect SpaceWire protocol were developed and used to create network simulations of data networks containing reconfigurable logic with traffic flows for timing system distribution.
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Proceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM
Cyber security analysis tools are necessary to evaluate the security, reliability, and resilience of networked information systems against cyber attack. It is common practice in modern cyber security analysis to separately utilize real systems computers, routers, switches, firewalls, computer emulations (e.g., virtual machines) and simulation models to analyze the interplay between cyber threats and safeguards. In contrast, Sandia National Laboratories has developed new methods to combine these evaluation platforms into a cyber Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) testbed. The combination of real, emulated, and simulated components enables the analysis of security features and components of a networked information system. When performing cyber security analysis on a target system, it is critical to represent realistically the subject security components in high fidelity. In some experiments, the security component may be the actual hardware and software with all the surrounding components represented in simulation or with surrogate devices. Sandia National Laboratories has developed a cyber LVC testbed that combines modeling and simulation capabilities with virtual machines and real devices to represent, in varying fidelity, secure networked information system architectures and devices. Using this capability, secure networked information system architectures can be represented in our testbed on a single computing platform. This provides an "experiment-in-a-box" capability. The result is rapidly produced, large scale, relatively low-cost, multi-fidelity representations of networked information systems. These representations enable analysts to quickly investigate cyber threats and test protection approaches and configurations.
Cyber security analysis tools are necessary to evaluate the security, reliability, and resilience of networked information systems against cyber attack. It is common practice in modern cyber security analysis to separately utilize real systems of computers, routers, switches, firewalls, computer emulations (e.g., virtual machines) and simulation models to analyze the interplay between cyber threats and safeguards. In contrast, Sandia National Laboratories has developed novel methods to combine these evaluation platforms into a hybrid testbed that combines real, emulated, and simulated components. The combination of real, emulated, and simulated components enables the analysis of security features and components of a networked information system. When performing cyber security analysis on a system of interest, it is critical to realistically represent the subject security components in high fidelity. In some experiments, the security component may be the actual hardware and software with all the surrounding components represented in simulation or with surrogate devices. Sandia National Laboratories has developed a cyber testbed that combines modeling and simulation capabilities with virtual machines and real devices to represent, in varying fidelity, secure networked information system architectures and devices. Using this capability, secure networked information system architectures can be represented in our testbed on a single, unified computing platform. This provides an 'experiment-in-a-box' capability. The result is rapidly-produced, large-scale, relatively low-cost, multi-fidelity representations of networked information systems. These representations enable analysts to quickly investigate cyber threats and test protection approaches and configurations.
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Proceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM
Tools are necessary for the DoD to analyze their information system's security, reliability, and resilience against cyber attack. Today's security analysis utilize real systems such as computers, network routers and other network equipment, computer emulations (e.g., virtual machines) and simulation models separately to analyze interplay between threats and safeguards. In contrast, we are developing new methods to combine these three approaches to provide hybrid Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA) environments. Sandia Labs' current SEPIA environment enables simulated networks to pass network traffic and perform, from the outside, like real networks. We connect both emulated and physical routers and computers to the simulated networks. This provides higher fidelity representations of key network nodes while still leveraging the scalability and cost advantages of simulation tools. SEPIA includes tools that facilitate rapid configuration and deployment of experiments. The result is to rapidly produce large yet relatively low-cost multi-fidelity SEPIA networks of computers and routers that let analysts quickly investigate threats and test protection approaches. © 2009 IEEE.
This report describes recent progress made in developing and utilizing hybrid Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA) environments. Many organizations require advanced tools to analyze their information system's security, reliability, and resilience against cyber attack. Today's security analysis utilize real systems such as computers, network routers and other network equipment, computer emulations (e.g., virtual machines) and simulation models separately to analyze interplay between threats and safeguards. In contrast, this work developed new methods to combine these three approaches to provide integrated hybrid SEPIA environments. Our SEPIA environments enable an analyst to rapidly configure hybrid environments to pass network traffic and perform, from the outside, like real networks. This provides higher fidelity representations of key network nodes while still leveraging the scalability and cost advantages of simulation tools. The result is to rapidly produce large yet relatively low-cost multi-fidelity SEPIA networks of computers and routers that let analysts quickly investigate threats and test protection approaches.
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This document provides the status of the Virtual Control System Environment (VCSE) under development at Sandia National Laboratories. This development effort is funded by the Department of Energy's (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) Program. Specifically the document presents a Modeling and Simulation (M&S) and software interface capability that supports the analysis of Process Control Systems (PCS) used in critical infrastructures. This document describes the development activities performed through June 2006 and the current status of the VCSE development task. Initial activities performed by the development team included researching the needs of critical infrastructure systems that depend on PCS. A primary source describing the security needs of a critical infrastructure is the Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector. A literature search of PCS analysis tools was performed and we identified a void in system-wide PCS M&S capability. No existing tools provide a capability to simulate control system devices and the underlying supporting communication network. The design team identified the requirements for an analysis tool to fill this void. Since PCS are comprised of multiple subsystems, an analysis framework that is modular was selected for the VCSE. The need for a framework to support the interoperability of multiple simulators with a PCS device model library was identified. The framework supports emulation of a system that is represented by models in a simulation interacting with actual hardware via a System-in-the-Loop (SITL) interface. To identify specific features for the VCSE analysis tool the design team created a questionnaire that briefly described the range of potential capabilities the analysis tool could include and requested feedback from potential industry users. This initial industry outreach was also intended to identify several industry users that are willing to participate in a dialog through the development process so that we maximize usefulness of the VCSE to industry. Industry involvement will continue throughout the VCSE development process. The teams activities have focused on creating a modeling and simulation capability that will support the analysis of PCS. An M&S methodology that is modular in structure was selected. The framework is able to support a range of model fidelities depending on the analysis being performed. In some cases high-fidelity network communication protocol and device models are necessary which can be accomplished by including a high-fidelity communication network simulator such as OPNET Modeler. In other cases lower fidelity models could be used in which case the high-fidelity communication network simulator is not needed. In addition, the framework supports a range of control system device behavior models. The models could range from simple function models to very detailed vendor-specific models. Included in the FY05 funding milestones was a demonstration of the framework. The development team created two scenarios that demonstrated the VCSE modular framework. The first demonstration provided a co-simulation using a high-fidelity communication network simulator interoperating with a custom developed control system simulator and device library. The second scenario provided a system-in-the-loop demonstration that emulated a system with a virtual network segment interoperating with a real-device network segment.
This report describes an integrated approach for designing communication, sensing, and control systems for mobile distributed systems. Graph theoretic methods are used to analyze the input/output reachability and structural controllability and observability of a decentralized system. Embedded in each network node, this analysis will automatically reconfigure an ad hoc communication network for the sensing and control task at hand. The graph analysis can also be used to create the optimal communication flow control based upon the spatial distribution of the network nodes. Edge coloring algorithms tell us that the minimum number of time slots in a planar network is equal to either the maximum number of adjacent nodes (or degree) of the undirected graph plus some small number. Therefore, the more spread out that the nodes are, the fewer number of time slots are needed for communication, and the smaller the latency between nodes. In a coupled system, this results in a more responsive sensor network and control system. Network protocols are developed to propagate this information, and distributed algorithms are developed to automatically adjust the number of time slots available for communication. These protocols and algorithms must be extremely efficient and only updated as network nodes move. In addition, queuing theory is used to analyze the delay characteristics of Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) networks. This report documents the analysis, simulation, and implementation of these algorithms performed under this Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) effort.
Network-centric systems that depend on mobile wireless ad hoc networks for their information exchange require detailed analysis to support their development. In many cases, this critical analysis is best provided with high-fidelity system simulations that include the effects of network architectures and protocols. In this research, we developed a high-fidelity system simulation capability using an HLA federation. The HLA federation, consisting of the Umbra system simulator and OPNET Modeler network simulator, provides a means for the system simulator to both affect, and be affected by, events in the network simulator. Advances are also made in increasing the fidelity of the wireless communication channel and reducing simulation run-time with a dead reckoning capability. A simulation experiment is included to demonstrate the developed modeling and simulation capability.
Distributed denial of service (DoS) attacks on cyber-resources are complex problems that are difficult to completely define, characterize, and mitigate. We recognize the process-nature of DoS attacks and view them from multiple perspectives. Identification of opportunities for mitigation and further research may result from this attempt to characterize the DoS problem space. We examine DoS attacks from the point of view of (1) a high-level that establishes common terminology and a framework for discussing the DoS process, (2) layers of the communication stack, from attack origination to the victim of the attack, (3) specific network and computer elements, and (4) attack manifestations. We also examine DoS issues associated with wireless communications. Using this collection of views, one begins to see the DoS problem in a holistic way that may lead to improved understanding, new mitigation strategies, and fruitful research.
In high consequence systems, all layers of the protocol stack need security features. If network and data-link layer control messages are not secured, a network may be open to adversarial manipulation. The open nature of the wireless channel makes mobile wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) especially vulnerable to control plane manipulation. The objective of this research is to investigate MANET performance issues when cryptographic processing delays are applied at the data-link layer. The results of analysis are combined with modeling and simulation experiments to show that network performance in MANETs is highly sensitive to the cryptographic overhead.
In this paper, we discuss several specific threats directed at the routing data of an ad hoc network. We address security issues that arise from wrapping authentication mechanisms around ad hoc routing data. We show that this bolt-on approach to security may make certain attacks more difficult, but still leaves the network routing data vulnerable. We also show that under a certain adversarial model, most existing routing protocols cannot be secured with the aid of digital signatures.