Exploring Vital Area Identification using Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis
Abstract not provided.
Publications
Insights for Systems Security Engineering from Multilayer Network Models
Abstract not provided.
Insights for Systems Security Engineering from Multilayer Network Models
Abstract not provided.
A Complex Systems Approach to Develop a Multilayer Network Model for High Consequence Facility Security
Springer Proceedings in Complexity
Protecting high consequence facilities (HCF) from malicious attacks is challenged by today’s increasingly complex, multi-faceted, and interdependent operational environments and threat domains. Building on current approaches, insights from complex systems and network science can better incorporate multidomain interactions observed in HCF security operations. These observations and qualitative HCF security expert data support invoking a multilayer modeling approach for HCF security to shift from a “reactive” to a “proactive” paradigm that better explores HCF security dynamics and resilience not captured in traditional approaches. After exploring these multi-domain interactions, this paper introduces how systems theory and network science insights can be leveraged to describe HCF security as complex, interdependent multilayer directed networks. A hypothetical example then demonstrates the utility of such an approach, followed by a discussion on key insights and implications of incorporating multilayer network analytical performance measures into HCF security.
High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design
The design and construction of a nuclear power plant must include robust structures and a security boundary that is difficult to penetrate. For security considerations, the reactors would ideally be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, which would be too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives. Additionally, all communications and power transfer lines would also be located underground and would be fortified against any possible design basis threats. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is a key aspect for determining response and staffing requirements. Considerations considered in a graded approach to physical protection are described.
High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design
Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.
High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design
Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.
Advanced Reactor Target Set Identification Using STPA on a Microreactor
Abstract not provided.
Systems Theory Principles and Complex Systems Engineering Concepts for Protection and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nuclear Sector
INSIGHT
Part of the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) (PPD 2013) mandate includes evaluating safety, security, and safeguards (or nonproliferation) mechanisms traditionally implemented within the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector of critical infrastructure—including a complex, dynamic set of risks and threats within an all-hazards approach. In response, research out of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) explores the ability of systems theory principles (hierarchy and emergence) and complex systems engineering concepts (multidomain interdependence) to better understand and address these risks and threats. Herein, this Sandia research explores the safety, safeguards, and security risks of three different nuclear sector-related activities—spent nuclear fuel transportation, small modular reactors, and portable nuclear power reactors—to investigate the complex and dynamic risk related to the PPD-21-mandated all-hazards approach. This research showed that a systems-theoretic approach can better identify inter-dependencies, conflicts, gaps, and leverage points across traditional safety, security, and safeguards hazard mitigation strategies in the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector. Resulting from this, mitigation strategies from applying systems theoretic principles and complex systems engineering concepts can be (1) designed to better capture interdependencies, (2) implemented to better align with real-world operational uncertainties, and (3) evaluated as a systems-level whole to better identify, characterize, and manage PPD-21's all hazards strategies.
Preliminary Results From Invoking Artificial Neural Networks To Measure Insider Threat Mitigation
Abstract not provided.
A multiplex complex systems model for engineering security systems
Systems Security Symposium, SSS 2020 - Conference Proceedings
Existing security models are highly linear and fail to capture the rich interactions that occur across security technology, infrastructure, cybersecurity, and human/organizational components. In this work, we will leverage insights from resilience science, complex system theory, and network theory to develop a next-generation security model based on these interactions to address challenges in complex, nonlinear risk environments and against innovative and disruptive technologies. Developing such a model is a key step forward toward a dynamic security paradigm (e.g., shifting from detection to anticipation) and establishing the foundation for designing next-generation physical security systems against evolving threats in uncontrolled or contested operational environments.
A Complex Systems Approach to Develop a Multilayer Network Model for High Consequence Facility Security (Slides)
Abstract not provided.
Graduate Nuclear Security Education Program
Abstract not provided.
Malicious Threat Anticipation using an Adaptive Complex Systems Approach
Abstract not provided.
Preliminary Results From Invoking Artificial Neural Networks To Measure Insider Threat Mitigation
Abstract not provided.
Empirical Insights for a Multi-Layered Network Complex Systems Model for Engineering Nuclear Security Systems
Abstract not provided.
Security Safety and Safeguards (3S) Risk Analysis for Portable Nuclear Reactors
Abstract not provided.
A New Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Lessons Learned from Counterintelligence Theory
Abstract not provided.
Graduate Nuclear Security Program
Abstract not provided.
Graduate Nuclear Security Education Program
Abstract not provided.
Security Safety and Safeguards (3S) Risk Analysis for Portable Nuclear Reactors-Slides
Abstract not provided.
Empirical Insights for a Multi-Layered Network Complex Systems Model for Engineering Nuclear Security Systems-Slides
Abstract not provided.
A Multiplex Complex Systems Model for Engineering Security Systems-Slides
Abstract not provided.
Malicious Threat Anticipation using an Adaptive Complex Systems Approach
Abstract not provided.
A New Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Lessons Learned from Counterintelligence Theory
Abstract not provided.
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