On Thursday August 11, 2022, a series of explosive demonstration tests were conducted at the Sandia National Laboratories 9920 Test Complex for the 2022 DOE Packaging Certification Program Explosives Engineering class. Class participants included both SNL engineering student interns as well as SNL and LANL staff members. The test series was designed by the class instructor, W. Gary Rivera Org. 6626, and 9920 site test engineer, Marissa Martinez Org. 6648, with help from Michelle Chatter Org 6514 and Luke Gilbert Org 6815.
Physical protection of public buildings has long been a concern of police and security services where a balance of facility security and personnel safety is vital. Due to the nature of public spaces, the use of permanently installed and deploy-on-demand physical barrier systems must be safe for the legitimate occupants and visitors of that space. Such systems must seek to mitigate the personal and organizational consequences of unintentionally seriously injuring or killing an innocent bystander by slamming a heavy, rigid, and quick-deploying barrier into place. Consideration and implementation of less-than-lethal technologies is necessary to reduce risk to visitors and building personnel. One potential barrier solution is a fast-acting, high-strength, composite airbag barrier system for doorways and hallways to quickly deploy a less-than-lethal barrier at entry points as well as isolate intruders who have already gained access. This system is envisioned to be stored within an architecturally attractive selectively frangible shell that could be permanently installed at a facility or installed in remote or temporary locations as dictated by risk. The system would be designed to be activated remotely (hardwired or wireless) from a Central Alarm Station (CAS) or other secure location.
The charter for adversarial delay is to hinder access to critical resources through the use of physical systems increasing an adversarys task time. The traditional method for characterizing access delay has been a simple model focused on accumulating times required to complete each task with little regard to uncertainty, complexity, or decreased efficiency associated with multiple sequential tasks or stress. The delay associated with any given barrier or path is further discounted to worst-case, and often unrealistic, times based on a high-level adversary, resulting in a highly conservative calculation of total delay. This leads to delay systems that require significant funding and personnel resources in order to defend against the assumed threat, which for many sites and applications becomes cost prohibitive. A new methodology has been developed that considers the uncertainties inherent in the problem to develop a realistic timeline distribution for a given adversary path. This new methodology incorporates advanced Bayesian statistical theory and methodologies, taking into account small sample size, expert judgment, human factors and threat uncertainty. The result is an algorithm that can calculate a probability distribution function of delay times directly related to system risk. Through further analysis, the access delay analyst or end user can use the results in making informed decisions while weighing benefits against risks, ultimately resulting in greater system effectiveness with lower cost.