Nuclear power plant (NPP) risk assessment is broadly separated into disciplines of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Different analysis methods and computer models have been constructed to analyze each of these as separate disciplines. However, due to the complexity of NPP systems, there are risks that can span all these disciplines and require consideration of safety-security (2S) interactions which allows a more complete understanding of the relationship among these risks. In this work, a novel leading simulator/trailing simulator (LS/TS) method is introduced to integrate multiple generic safety and security computer models into a single, holistic 2S analysis. A case study is performed using this novel method to determine its effectiveness. The case study shows that the LS/TS method avoided introducing errors in simulation, compared to the same scenario performed without the LS/TS method. A second case study is then used to illustrate an integrated 2S analysis which shows that different levels of damage to vital equipment from sabotage at a NPP can affect accident evolution by several hours.
Risk assessment of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is commonly driven by computer modeling which tracks the evolution of NPP events over time. To capture interactions between nuclear safety and nuclear security, multiple system codes each of which specializes on one space may need to be linked with information transfer among the codes. A systems analysis based on fixed length time blocks is proposed to allow for such a linking within the ADAPT framework without needing to predetermine in which order the safety/security codes interact. A case study using two instances of the Scribe3D code demonstrates the concept and shows agreement with results from a direct solution.
This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.
This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.