Publications

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We review Sandia's silicon photonics platform for national security applications. Silicon photonics offers the potential for extensive size, weight, power, and cost (SWaP-c) reductions compared to existing III-V or purely electronics circuits. Unlike most silicon photonics foundries in the US and internationally, our silicon photonics is manufactured in a trusted environment at our Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Application (MESA) facility. The Sandia fabrication facility is certified as a trusted foundry and can therefore produce devices and circuits intended for military applications. We will describe a variety of silicon photonics devices and subsystems, including both monolithic and heterogeneous integration of silicon photonics with electronics, that can enable future complex functionality in aerospace systems, principally focusing on communications technology in optical interconnects and optical networking.

The last two decades have seen an explosion in worldwide R&D, enabling fundamentally new capabilities while at the same time changing the international technology landscape. The advent of technologies for continued miniaturization and electronics feature size reduction, and for architectural innovations, will have many technical, economic, and national security implications. It is important to anticipate possible microelectronics development directions and their implications on US national interests. This report forecasts and assesses trends and directions for several potentially disruptive microfabrication capabilities and device architectures that may emerge in the next 5-10 years.

The last two decades have seen an explosion in worldwide R&D, enabling fundamentally new capabilities while at the same time changing the international technology landscape. The advent of technologies for continued miniaturization and electronics feature size reduction, and for architectural innovations, will have many technical, economic, and national security implications. It is important to anticipate possible microelectronics development directions and their implications on US national interests. This report forecasts and assesses trends and directions for several potentially disruptive microfabrication capabilities and device architectures that may emerge in the next 5-10 years.

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Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) make use of the measurable intrinsic randomness of physical systems to establish signatures for those systems. PUFs provide a means to generate unique keys that don't need to be stored in nonvolatile memory, and they offer exciting opportunities for new authentication and supply chain security technologies.

Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) make use of the measurable intrinsic randomness of physical systems to establish signatures for those systems. Thus, PUFs provide a means to generate unique keys that don't need to be stored in nonvolatile memory, and they offer exciting opportunities for new authentication and supply chain security technologies.

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We are using the DoD MIL-STD as our guide for microelectronics aging (MIL-STD 883J, Method 1016.2: Life/Reliability Characterization Tests). In that document they recommend aging at 3 temperatures between 200-300C, separated by at least 25C, with the supply voltage at the maximum recommended voltage for the devices at 125C (3.6V in our case). If that voltage causes excessive current or power then it can be reduced and the duration of the tests extended. The MIL-STD also recommends current limiting resistors in series with the supply. Since we don’t have much time and we may not have enough ovens and other equipment, two temperatures separated by at least 50C would be an acceptable backup plan. To ensure a safe range of conditions is used, we are executing 24-hour step tests. For these, we will apply the stress for 24 hours and then measure the device to make sure it wasn’t damaged. During the stress the PUFs should be exercised, but we don’t need to measure their response. Rather, at set intervals our devices should be returned to nominal temperature (under bias), and then measured. The MIL-STD puts these intervals at 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512 and 1000 hours, although the test can be stopped early if 75% of the devices have failed. A final recommendation per the MIL-STD is that at least 40 devices should be measured under each condition. Since we only have 25 parts, we will place 10 devices in each of two stress conditions.

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