This report is based upon a workshop, called 'CyberFest', held at Sandia National Laboratories on May 27-30, 2008. Participants in the workshop came from organizations both outside and inside Sandia. The premise of the workshop was that thinking about cyber security from a metaphorical perspective could lead to a deeper understanding of current approaches to cyber defense and perhaps to some creative new approaches. A wide range of metaphors was considered, including those relating to: military and other types of conflict, biological, health care, markets, three-dimensional space, and physical asset protection. These in turn led to consideration of a variety of possible approaches for improving cyber security in the future. From the proposed approaches, three were formulated for further discussion. These approaches were labeled 'Heterogeneity' (drawing primarily on the metaphor of biological diversity), 'Motivating Secure Behavior' (taking a market perspective on the adoption of cyber security measures) and 'Cyber Wellness' (exploring analogies with efforts to improve individual and public health).
The Advanced Concepts Group at Sandia National Laboratory and the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State University convened a workshop in May 2006 to explore the potential policy implications of technologies that might enhance human cognitive abilities. The group's deliberations sought to identify core values and concerns raised by the prospect of cognitive enhancement. The workshop focused on the policy implications of various prospective cognitive enhancements and on the technologies/nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science--that enable them. The prospect of rapidly emerging technological capabilities to enhance human cognition makes urgent a daunting array of questions, tensions, ambitions, and concerns. The workshop elicited dilemmas and concerns in ten overlapping areas: science and democracy; equity and justice; freedom and control; intergenerational issues; ethics and competition; individual and community rights; speed and deliberations; ethical uncertainty; humanness; and sociocultural risk. We identified four different perspectives to encompass the diverse issues related to emergence of cognitive enhancement technologies: (1) Laissez-faire--emphasizes freedom of individuals to seek and employ enhancement technologies based on their own judgment; (2) Managed technological optimism--believes that while these technologies promise great benefits, such benefits cannot emerge without an active government role; (3) Managed technological skepticism--views that the quality of life arises more out of society's institutions than its technologies; and (4) Human Essentialism--starts with the notion of a human essence (whether God-given or evolutionary in origin) that should not be modified. While the perspectives differ significantly about both human nature and the role of government, each encompasses a belief in the value of transparency and reliable information that can allow public discussion and decisions about cognitive enhancement. The practical question is how to foster productive discussions in a society whose attention is notably fragmented and priorities notably diverse. The question of what to talk about remains central, as each of the four perspectives is concerned about different things. Perhaps the key issue for initial clarification as a condition for productive democratic discussion has to do with the intended goals of cognitive enhancement, and the mechanisms for allowing productive deliberation about these goals.
On April 22 and 23, 2004, a diverse group of 14 policymakers, modelers, analysts, and scholars met with some 22 members of the Sandia National Laboratories staff to explores ways in which the relationships between modelers and policymakers in the energy and environment fields (with an emphasis on energy) could be made more productive for both. This report is not a transcription of that workshop, but draws very heavily on its proceedings. It first describes the concept of modeling, the varying ways in which models are used to support policymaking, and the institutional context for those uses. It then proposes that the goal of modelers and policymakers should be a relationship of mutual trust, built on a foundation of communication, supported by the twin pillars of policy relevance and technical credibility. The report suggests 20 guidelines to help modelers improve the relationship, followed by 10 guidelines to help policymakers toward the same goal.
This report originates in a workshop held at Sandia National Laboratories, bringing together a variety of external experts with Sandia personnel to discuss 'The Implications of Global Climate Change for International Security.' Whatever the future of the current global warming trend, paleoclimatic history shows that climate change happens, sometimes abruptly. These changes can severely impact human water supplies, agriculture, migration patterns, infrastructure, financial flows, disease prevalence, and economic activity. Those impacts, in turn, can lead to national or international security problems stemming from aggravation of internal conflicts, increased poverty and inequality, exacerbation of existing international conflicts, diversion of national and international resources from international security programs (military or non-military), contribution to global economic decline or collapse, or international realignments based on climate change mitigation policies. After reviewing these potential problems, the report concludes with a brief listing of some research, technology, and policy measures that might mitigate them.
On May 19 and 20, 2003, thirty-some members of Sandia staff and management met to discuss the long-term connections between energy and national security. Three broad security topics were explored: I. Global and U.S. economic dependence on oil (and gas); II. Potential security implications of global climate change; and III. Vulnerabilities of the U.S. domestic energy infrastructure. This report, rather than being a transcript of the workshop, represents a synthesis of background information used in the workshop, ideas that emerged in the discussions, and ex post facto analysis of the discussions. Each of the three subjects discussed at this workshop has significant U.S. national security implications. Each has substantial technology components. Each appears a legitimate area of concern for a national security laboratory with relevant technology capabilities. For the laboratory to play a meaningful role in contributing to solutions to national problems such as these, it needs to understand the political, economic, and social environments in which it expects its work to be accepted and used. In addition, it should be noted that the problems of oil dependency and climate change are not amenable to solution by the policies of any one nation--even the one that is currently the largest single energy consumer. Therefore, views, concerns, policies, and plans of other countries will do much to determine which solutions might work and which might not.
Despite the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia continue to maintain their ICBMs and many SLBMs in a highly alerted state--they are technically prepared to launch the missiles within minutes of a command decision to do so. Some analysts argue that, particularly in light of the distressed condition of the Russian military, these high alert conditions are tantamount to standing on the edge of a nuclear cliff from which we should now step back. They have proposed various bilateral ''de-alerting'' measures, to be taken prior to and outside the context of the formal strategic arms reduction treaty (START) process. This paper identifies several criteria for a stable de-alerting regime, but fails to find de-alerting measures that convincingly satisfy the criteria. However, some de-alerting measures have promise as de-activation measures for systems due for elimination under the START II and prospective START III treaties. Moreover, once these systems are deactivated, a considerable part of the perceived need to keep nuclear forces on high alert as a survivability hedge will be reduced. At the same time, the U.S. and Russia could consider building on their earlier cooperative actions to reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear war by enhancing their communications links and possibly joining in efforts to improve early warning systems.