Publications

There are approximately 500 self-shielded research irradiators used in various facilities throughout the U.S. These facilities use radioactive sources containing either 137Cs or 60Co for a variety of biological investigations. A report from the National Academy of Sciences[1] described the issues with security of particular radiation sources and the desire for their replacement. The participants in this effort prepared two peer-reviewed publications to document the results of radiobiological studies performed using photons from 320-kV x rays and 137Cs on cell cultures and mice. The effectiveness of X rays was shown to vary with cell type.

Millions of sealed radioactive sources (SRSs) are being used for a wide variety of beneficial purposes throughout the world. Security experts are now concerned that these beneficial SRSs could be used in a radiological dispersion device to terrorize and disrupt society. The greatest safety and security threat is from those highly radioactive Category 1 and 2 SRSs. Without adequate controls, it may be relatively easy to legally purchase a Category 1 or 2 SRS on the international market under false pretenses. Additionally, during transfer, SRSs are particularly susceptible to theft since the sources are in a shielded and mobile configuration, transportation routes are predictable, and shipments may not be adequately guarded. To determine if government controls on SRS are adequate, this study was commissioned to review the current SRS import and export controls of six countries. Canada, the Russian Federation, and South Africa were selected as the exporting countries, and Egypt, the Philippines, and the United States were selected as importing countries. A detailed review of the controls in each country is presented. The authors found that Canada and Russia are major exporters, and are exporting highly radioactive SRSs without first determining if the recipient is authorized by the receiving country to own and use the SRSs. Available evidence was used to estimate that on average there are tens to possibly hundreds of intercountry transfers of highly radioactive SRSs each day. Based on these and other findings, this reports recommends stronger controls on the export and import of highly radioactive SRSs.

Abstract not provided.

This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.