Publications

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The TTP program is managed by DHS S&T Cyber Division and facilitates the transition of technology from the research lab to the Homeland Security Enterprise. It serves as a connection point for cyber security researchers, the Federal Government, and the private sector. Technologies targeted are those that are likely to transition successfully to the commercial market and expected to have notable impact on the cyber security of our Nation’s networks or systems. The test element of the TTP program aids in the technology transfer process and is not intended to be adversarial. Additional information on the TTP program and the iterative process used can be found in Appendix A - TTP Program Overview.

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Process Control System (PCS) security is critical to our national security. Yet, there are a number of technological, economic, and educational impediments to PCS owners implementing effective security on their systems. OPSAID (Open PCS Security Architecture for Interoperable Design), a project sponsored by the US Department of Energy's Office of Electricity Delivery and Reliability, aims to address this issue through developing and testing an open source architecture for PCS security. Sandia National Laboratories, along with a team of PCS vendors and owners, have developed and tested this PCS security architecture. This report describes their progress to date.2 AcknowledgementsThe authors acknowledge and thank their colleagues for their assistance with the OPSAID project.Sandia National Laboratories: Alex Berry, Charles Perine, Regis Cassidy, Bryan Richardson, Laurence PhillipsTeumim Technical, LLC: Dave TeumimIn addition, the authors are greatly indebted to the invaluable help of the members of the OPSAID Core Team. Their assistance has been critical to the success and industry acceptance of the OPSAID project.Schweitzer Engineering Laboratory: Rhett Smith, Ryan Bradetich, Dennis GammelTelTone: Ori Artman Entergy: Dave Norton, Leonard Chamberlin, Mark AllenThe authors would like to acknowledge that the work that produced the results presented in this paper was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy/Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE/OE) as part of the National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) Program. Executive SummaryProcess control systems (PCS) are very important for critical infrastructure and manufacturing operations, yet cyber security technology in PCS is generally poor. The OPSAID (Open PCS (Process Control System) Security Architecture for Interoperable Design) program is intended to address these security shortcomings by accelerating the availability and deployment of comprehensive security technology for PCS, both for existing PCS and inherently secure PCS in the future. All activities are closely linked to industry outreach and advisory efforts.Generally speaking, the OPSAID project is focused on providing comprehensive security functionality to PCS that communicate using IP. This is done through creating an interoperable PCS security architecture and developing a reference implementation, which is tested extensively for performance and reliability.This report first provides background on the PCS security problem and OPSAID, followed by goals and objectives of the project. The report also includes an overview of the results, including the OPSAID architecture and testing activities, along with results from industry outreach activities. Conclusion and recommendation sections follow. Finally, a series of appendices provide more detailed information regarding architecture and testing activities.Summarizing the project results, the OPSAID architecture was defined, which includes modular security functionality and corresponding component modules. The reference implementation, which includes the collection of component modules, was tested extensively and proved to provide more than acceptable performance in a variety of test scenarios. The primary challenge in implementation and testing was correcting initial configuration errors.OPSAID industry outreach efforts were very successful. A small group of industry partners were extensively involved in both the design and testing of OPSAID. Conference presentations resulted in creating a larger group of potential industry partners.Based upon experience implementing and testing OPSAID, as well as through collecting industry feedback, the OPSAID project has done well and is well received. Recommendations for future work include further development of advanced functionality, refinement of interoperability guidance, additional laboratory and field testing, and industry outreach that includes PCS owner education. 4 5 --This page intentionally left blank --

Due to ever-increasing quantities of information traversing networks, network administrators are developing greater reliance upon statistically sampled packet information as the source for their intrusion detection systems (IDS). Our research is aimed at understanding IDS performance when statistical packet sampling is used. Using the Snort IDS and a variety of data sets, we compared IDS results when an entire data set is used to the results when a statistically sampled subset of the data set is used. Generally speaking, IDS performance with statistically sampled information was shown to drop considerably even under fairly high sampling rates (such as 1:5). Characterizing and Improving Distributed Intrusion Detection Systems4AcknowledgementsThe authors wish to extend our gratitude to Matt Bishop and Chen-Nee Chuah of UC Davis for their guidance and support on this work. Our thanks are also extended to Jianning Mai of UC Davis and Tao Ye of Sprint Advanced Technology Labs for their generous assistance.We would also like to acknowledge our dataset sources, CRAWDAD and CAIDA, without which this work would not have been possible. Support for OC48 data collection is provided by DARPA, NSF, DHS, Cisco and CAIDA members.

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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for automation are very important for critical infrastructure and manufacturing operations. They have been implemented to work in a number of physical environments using a variety of hardware, software, networking protocols, and communications technologies, often before security issues became of paramount concern. To offer solutions to security shortcomings in the short/medium term, this project was to identify technologies used to secure "traditional" IT networks and systems, and then assess their efficacy with respect to SCADA systems. These proposed solutions must be relatively simple to implement, reliable, and acceptable to SCADA owners and operators. 4This page intentionally left blank.

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