Evaluating Physical Unclonable Functions
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Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2016
The microelectronics industry seeks screening tools that can be used to verify the origin of and track integrated circuits (ICs) throughout their lifecycle. Embedded circuits that measure process variation of an IC are well known. This paper adds to previous work using these circuits for studying manufacturer characteristics on final product ICs, particularly for the purpose of developing and verifying a signature for a microelectronics manufacturing facility (fab). We present the design, measurements and analysis of 159 silicon ICs which were built as a proof of concept for this purpose. 80 copies of our proof of concept IC were built at one fab, and 80 more copies were built across two lots at a second fab. Using these ICs, our prototype circuits allowed us to distinguish these two fabs with up to 98.7% accuracy and also distinguish the two lots from the second fab with up to 98.8% accuracy.
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Proceedings - International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology
The globalization of today's supply chains (e.g., information and communication technologies, military systems, etc.) has created an emerging security threat that could degrade the integrity and availability of sensitive and critical government data, control systems, and infrastructures. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and even government-off-the-self (GOTS) products often are designed, developed, and manufactured overseas. Counterfeit items, from individual chips to entire systems, have been found in commercial and government sectors. Supply chain attacks can be initiated at any point during the product or system lifecycle, and can have detrimental effects to mission success. To date, there is a lack of analytics and decision support tools used to analyze supply chain security holistically, and to perform tradeoff analyses to determine how to invest in or deploy possible mitigation options for supply chain security such that the return on investment is optimal with respect to cost, efficiency, and security. This paper discusses the development of a supply chain decision analytics framework that will assist decision makers and stakeholders in performing risk-based cost-benefit prioritization of security investments to manage supply chain risk. Key aspects of our framework include the hierarchical supply chain representation, vulnerability and mitigation modeling, risk assessment and optimization. This work is a part of a long term research effort on supply chain decision analytics for trusted systems and communications research challenge.
On September 5th and 6th, 2012, the Dynamic Defense Workshop: From Research to Practice brought together researchers from academia, industry, and Sandia with the goals of increasing collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories and external organizations, de ning and un- derstanding dynamic, or moving target, defense concepts and directions, and gaining a greater understanding of the state of the art for dynamic defense. Through the workshop, we broadened and re ned our de nition and understanding, identi ed new approaches to inherent challenges, and de ned principles of dynamic defense. Half of the workshop was devoted to presentations of current state-of-the-art work. Presentation topics included areas such as the failure of current defenses, threats, techniques, goals of dynamic defense, theory, foundations of dynamic defense, future directions and open research questions related to dynamic defense. The remainder of the workshop was discussion, which was broken down into sessions on de ning challenges, applications to host or mobile environments, applications to enterprise network environments, exploring research and operational taxonomies, and determining how to apply scienti c rigor to and investigating the eld of dynamic defense.
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