Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.
Management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste consists of three main phases – storage, transportation, and disposal – commonly referred to as the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Current practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States (US) includes temporary storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage systems at operating or shutdown nuclear power plants. Storage pools are filling to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler spent fuel from pools into dry storage. Unless a repository becomes available that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 136,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage systems by mid-century, when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for dry storage systems rely on large multi-assembly canisters, the most common of which are so-called “dual-purpose canisters” (DPCs). DPCs are certified for both storage and transportation, but are not designed or licensed for permanent disposal. The large capacity (greater number of spent fuel assemblies) of these canisters can lead to higher canister temperatures, which can delay transportation and/or complicate disposal. This current management practice, in which the utilities continue loading an ever-increasing inventory of larger DPCs, does not emphasize integration among storage, transportation, and disposal. This lack of integration does not cause safety issues, but it does lead to a suboptimal system that increases costs, complicates storage and transportation operations, and limits options for permanent disposal. This paper describes strategies for improving integration of management practices in the US across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The complex interactions between storage, transportation, and disposal make a single optimal solution unlikely. However, efforts to integrate various phases of nuclear waste management can have the greatest impact if they begin promptly and continue to evolve throughout the remaining life of the current fuel cycle. A key factor that influences the path forward for integration of nuclear waste management practices is the identification of the timing and location for a repository. The most cost-effective path forward would be to open a repository by mid-century with the capability to directly dispose of DPCs without repackaging the spent fuel into disposalready canisters. Options that involve repackaging of spent fuel from DPCs into disposalready canisters or that delay the repository opening significantly beyond mid-century could add 10s of billions of dollars to the total system life cycle cost.
This report represents completion of milestone deliverable M2SF-21SN010309012 “Annual Status Update for OWL and Waste Form Characteristics” that provides an annual update on status of fiscal year (FY 2020) activities for the work package SF-20SN01030901 and is due on January 29, 2021. The Online Waste Library (OWL) has been designed to contain information regarding United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE)-managed (as) high-level waste (DHLW), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and other wastes that are likely candidates for deep geologic disposal, with links to the current supporting documents for the data (when possible; note that no classified or official-use-only (OUO) data are planned to be included in OWL). There may be up to several hundred different DOE-managed wastes that are likely to require deep geologic disposal. This draft report contains versions of the OWL model architecture for vessel information (Appendix A) and an excerpt from the OWL User’s Guide (Appendix B and SNL 2020), which are for the current OWL Version 2.0 on the Sandia External Collaboration Network (ECN).
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operating repository 654 m below the surface in a thick salt formation in southeastern New Mexico. The DOE disposes transuranic (TRU) waste produced from atomic energy defense activities at the WIPP facility. A portion of the waste shipped to the WIPP facility contains TRU radionuclides co-mingled with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which fall under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations implementing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). This report documents the risks of PCBs co-mingled with TRU waste (hereafter designated as PCB/TRU waste) designated for disposal at the WIPP facility. This analysis is input to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) assessment by the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) for the proposed increase of the WIPP facility disposal area to include additional waste panels (but not to increase the legislated WIPP volume). This analysis is not a compliance calculation to support a certification renewal nor does it support a planned change request (PCR) or planned change notice (PCN) to be submitted to the EPA.
This report represents completion of milestone deliverable M2SF-19SNO10309013 "Online Waste Library (OWL) and Waste Forms Characteristics Annual Report" that reports annual status on fiscal year (FY) 2019 activities for the work package SF-19SN01030901 and is due on August 2, 2019. The online waste library (OWL) has been designed to contain information regarding United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE)-managed (as) high-level waste (DHLW), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and other wastes that are likely candidates for deep geologic disposal, with links to the current supporting documents for the data (when possible; note that no classified or official-use-only (OUO) data are planned to be included in OWL). There may be up to several hundred different DOE-managed wastes that are likely to require deep geologic disposal. This annual report on FY2019 activities includes evaluations of waste form characteristics and waste form performance models, updates to the OWL development, and descriptions of the management processes for the OWL. Updates to the OWL include an updated user's guide, additions to the OWL database content for wastes and waste forms, results of the beta testing and changes implemented from it. Also added are descriptions of the management/control processes for the OWL development, version control, and archiving. These processes have been implemented as part of the full production release of OWL (i.e., OWL Version 1.0), which has been developed on, and will be hosted and managed on, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) systems. The version control/update processes will be implemented for updates to the OWL in the future. Additionally, another process covering methods for interfacing with the DOE SNF Database (DOE 2007) at Idaho National Laboratory on the numerous entries for DOE-managed SNF (DSNF) has been pushed forward by defining data exchanges and is planned to be implemented sometime in FY2020. The INL database is also sometimes referred to as the Spent Fuel Database or the SFDB, which is the acronym that will be used in this report. Once fully implemented, this integration effort will serve as a template for interfacing with additional databases throughout the DOE complex.
This paper describes the fissile mass and concentration necessary for a critical event to occur outside containers disposed in a bedded salt repository. The criticality limits are based on modeling mixtures of water, salt, dolomite, concrete, rust, and fissile material using a neutron/photon transport computational code. Several idealized depositional configurations of fissile material in the host rock are analyzed: homogeneous spheres and heterogeneous arrangements of plate fractures in regular arrays. Deposition of large masses and concentrations are required for criticality to occur for low enriched 235U enrichment. Homogeneous mixtures with deposition in all the porosity are more reactive at high enrichments of 235U and 239Pu. However, unlike typical engineered systems, heterogeneous configurations can be more reactive than homogeneous systems at high enrichment when deposition occurs in only a portion of the porosity and the total porosity is small, because the relationship between the porosity of the fractures and matrix also strongly influences the results.
This report represents completion of milestone deliverable M2SF-18SNO10309013 "Inventory and Waste Characterization Status Report and OWL Update that reports on FY2018 activities for the work package (WP) SF-18SNO1030901. This report provides the detailed final information for completed FY2018 work activities for WP SF-18SN01030901, and a summary of priorities for FY2019. This status report on FY2018 activities includes evaluations of waste form characteristics and waste form performance models, updates to the OWL development, and descriptions of the two planned management processes for the OWL. Updates to the OWL include an updated user's guide, additions to the OWL database content for wastes and waste forms, results of the Beta testing and changes implemented from it. There are two processes being planned in FY2018, which will be implemented in FY2019. One process covers methods for interfacing with the DOE SNF DB (DOE 2007) at INL on the numerous entries for DOE managed SNF, and the other process covers the management of updates to, and version control/archiving of, the OWL database. In FY2018, we have pursued three studies to evaluate/redefine waste form characteristics and/or performance models. First characteristic isotopic ratios for various waste forms included in postclosure performance studies are being evaluated to delineate isotope ratio tags that quantitatively identify each particular waste form. This evaluation arose due to questions regarding the relative contributions of radionuclides from disparate waste forms in GDSA results, particularly, radionuclide contributions of DOE-managed SNF vs HLW glass. In our second study we are evaluating the bases of glass waste degradation rate models to the HIP calcine waste form. The HIP calcine may likely be a ceramic matrix material, with multiple ceramic phases with/without a glass phase. The ceramic phases are likely to have different degradation performance from the glass portion. The distribution of radionuclides among those various phases may also be a factor in the radionuclide release rates. Additionally, we have an ongoing investigation of the performance behavior of TRISO particle fuels and are developing a stochastic model for the degradation of those fuels that accounts for simultaneous corrosion of the silicon carbide (SiC) layer and radionuclide diffusion through it. The detailed model of the TRISO particles themselves, will be merged with models of the degradation behavior(s) of the graphite matrix (either prismatic compacts or spherical "pebbles") containing the particles and the hexagonal graphite elements holding the compacts.
The experimental breeder reactor (EBR-II) used fuel with a layer of sodium surrounding the uranium-zirconium fuel to improve heat transfer. Disposing of EBR-II fuel in a geologic repository without treatment is not prudent because of the potentially energetic reaction of the sodium with water. In 2000, the US Department of Energy (DOE) decided to treat the sodium-bonded fuel with an electrorefiner (ER), which produces metallic uranium product, a metallic waste, mostly from the cladding, and the salt waste in the ER, which contains most of the actinides and fission products. Two waste forms were proposed for disposal in a mined repository; the metallic waste, which was to be cast into ingots, and the ER salt waste, which was to be further treated to produce a ceramic waste form. However, alternative disposal pathways for metallic and salt waste streams may reduce the complexity. For example, performance assessments show that geologic repositories can easily accommodate the ER salt waste without treating it to form a ceramic waste form. Because EBR-II was used for atomic energy defense activities, the treated waste likely meets the definition of transuranic waste. Hence, disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southern New Mexico, may be feasible. This report reviews the direct disposal pathway for ER salt waste and describes eleven tasks necessary for implementing disposal at WIPP, provided space is available, DOE decides to use this alternative disposal pathway in an updated environmental impact statement, and the State of New Mexico grants permission.
This report provides an update to Sassani et al. (2016) and includes: (1) an updated set of inputs (Sections 2.3) on various additional waste forms (WF) covering both DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and DOE-managed (as) high-level waste (HLW) for use in the inventory represented in the geologic disposal safety analyses (GDSA); (2) summaries of evaluations initiated to refine specific characteristics of particular WF for future use (Section 2.4); (3) updated development status of the Online Waste Library (OWL) database (Section 3.1.2) and an updated user guide to OWL (Section 3.1.3); and (4) status updates (Section 3.2) for the OWL inventory content, data entry checking process, and external OWL BETA testing initiated in fiscal year 2017.
Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.; Silva, Carol, L.; Gupta, Kuhika G.; Rechard, Robert P.
This report presents the questions and responses to a nationwide survey taken June 2016 to track preferences of US residents concerning the environment, energy, and radioactive waste management. A focus of the 2016 survey is public perceptions on different options for managing spent nuclear fuel, including on-site storage, interim storage, deep boreholes, general purpose geologic repositories, and geologic repositories for only defense-related waste. Highlights of the survey results include the following: (1) public attention to the 2011 accident and subsequent cleanup at the Fukushima nuclear facility continues to influence the perceived balance of risk and benefit for nuclear energy; (2) the incident at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 2014 could influence future public support for nuclear waste management; (3) public knowledge about US nuclear waste management policies has remined higher than seen prior to the Fukushima nuclear accident and submittal of the Yucca Mountain application; (6) support for a mined disposal facility is higher than for deep borehole disposal, building one more interim storage facilities, or continued on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel; (7) support for a repository that comingles commercial and defense related waste is higher than for a repository for only defense related waste; (8) the public’s level of trust accorded to the National Academies, university scientists, and local emergency responders is the highest and the level trust accorded to advocacy organizations, public utilities, and local/national press is the lowest; and (9) the public is willing to serve on citizens panels but, in general, will only modestly engage in issues related to radioactive waste management.
The Waste Form Disposal Options Evaluation Report (SNL 2014) evaluated disposal of both Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel (CSNF) and DOE-managed HLW and Spent Nuclear Fuel (DHLW and DSNF) in the variety of disposal concepts being evaluated within the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign. That work covered a comprehensive inventory and a wide range of disposal concepts. The primary goal of this work is to evaluate the information needs for analyzing disposal solely of a subset of those wastes in a Defense Repository (DRep; i.e., those wastes that are either defense related, or managed by DOE but are not commercial in origin). A potential DRep also appears to be safe in the range of geologic mined repository concepts, but may have different concepts and features because of the very different inventory of waste that would be included. The focus of this status report is to cover the progress made in FY16 toward: (1) developing a preliminary DRep included inventory for engineering/design analyses; (2) assessing the major differences of this included inventory relative to that in other analyzed repository systems and the potential impacts to disposal concepts; (3) designing and developing an on-line waste library (OWL) to manage the information of all those wastes and their waste forms (including CSNF if needed); and (4) constraining post-closure waste form degradation performance for safety assessments of a DRep. In addition, some continuing work is reported on identifying potential candidate waste types/forms to be added to the full list from SNL (2014 – see Table C-1) which also may be added to the OWL in the future. The status for each of these aspects is reported herein.
The subject report from High Bridge Associates (HBA) was issued on March 2, 2016, in reaction to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program decision to pursue down-blending of surplus Pu and geologic disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Sandia National Laboratories was requested by the DOE to review the technical arguments presented in the HBA report. Specifically, this review is organized around three technical topics: criticality safety, radiological release limits, and thermal impacts. Questions raised by the report pertaining to legal and regulatory requirements, safeguards and security, international agreements, and costing of alternatives, are beyond the scope of this review.