The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.
The PRO-X program is actively supporting the design of nuclear systems by developing a framework to both optimize the fuel cycle infrastructure for advanced reactors (ARs) and minimize the potential for production of weapons-usable nuclear material. Three study topics are currently being investigated by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with support from Argonne National Laboratories (ANL). This multi-lab collaboration is focused on three study topics which may offer proliferation resistance opportunities or advantages in the nuclear fuel cycle. These topics are: 1) Transportation Global Landscape, 2) Transportation Avoidability, and 3) Parallel Modular Systems vs Single Large System (Crosscutting Activity).
The global expansion of nuclear energy will generate increasing quantities of waste with low levels of plutonium or other nuclear materials (NM) potentially subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Reducing requirements on retained wastes has the potential to reduce future demands on already strained IAEA resources. We describe an effort to help the IAEA and Member States better estimate projected waste loads and associated safeguards obligations by developing a reporting tool to estimate types and sizes of future waste-storage and -disposal facilities. States can use such information to plan waste facilities, including size and type. The IAEA can use these data for inclusion in multiple agency reports and products for the benefit of Member States.
This study examines methods that can help maximize confidence in maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) on plutonium-bearing wastes, from a final safeguards-verification measurement through emplacement underground. The study identifies Containment and Surveillance (C/S) measures that can be applied during packaging of plutonium wastes at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, USA, through shipment to, and receipt and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, USA. Results of this study could apply to countries with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) that plan to dispose in a geological repository plutonium or other non-fuel nuclear materials that are under international safeguards.
Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.