Sandia report on flight control systems evaluation
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Safety analysis of complex systems depends on decomposing the systems into manageable subsystems, from which analysis can be rolled back up to the system level. The authors have found that there is no single best way to decompose; in fact hybrid combinations of decompositions are generally necessary to achieve optimum results. They are currently using two backbone coordinated decompositions--functional and risk, supplemented by other types, such as organizational. An objective is to derive metrics that can be used to efficiently and accurately aggregate information through analysis, to contribute toward assessing system safety, and to contribute information necessary for defensible decisions.
The hazard model described in this paper is designed to accept data over the Internet from distributed databases. A hazard object template is used to ensure that all necessary descriptors are collected for each object. Three methods for combining the data are compared and contrasted. Three methods are used for handling the three types of interactions between the hazard objects.