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Harmonized Automatic Relay Mitigation of Nefarious Intentional Events (HARMONIE) - Special Protection Scheme (SPS)

Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Summers, Adam; Kolaczkowski, Bryan D.; Goes, Christopher E.; Fasano, Raymond E.; Mao, Zeyu M.; Al Homoud, Leen A.; Davis, Kate D.; Overbye, Thomas O.

The harmonized automatic relay mitigation of nefarious intentional events (HARMONIE) special protection scheme (SPS) was developed to provide adaptive, cyber-physical response to unpredictable disturbances in the electric grid. The HARMONIE-SPS methodology includes a machine learning classification framework that analyzes real time cyber-physical data and determines if the system is in normal conditions, cyber disturbance, physical disturbance, or cyber-physical disturbance. This classification then informs response, if needed and/or suitable, and included cyber-physical corrective actions. Beyond standard power system mitigations, a few novel approaches were developed that included a consensus algorithm-based relay voting scheme, an automated power system triggering condition and corrective action pairing algorithm, and a cyber traffic routing optimization algorithm. Both the classification and response techniques were tested within a newly integrated emulation environment composed of a real-time digital simulator (RTDS) and SCEPTREā„¢. This report details the HARMONIE-SPS methodology, highlighting both the classification and response techniques, and the subsequent testing results from the emulation environment.

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Securing Inverter Communication: Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System to Tap, Analyze, and Act

Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Chavez, Adrian R.; Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Jones, Christian B.; Summers, Adam; Wright, Brian J.

The electric grid has undergone rapid, revolutionary changes in recent years; from the addition of advanced smart technologies to the growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) to increased interconnectivity and communications. However, these added communications, access interfaces, and third-party software to enable autonomous control schemes and interconnectivity also expand the attack surface of the grid. To address the gap of DER cybersecurity and secure the grid-edge to motivate a holistic, defense-in-depth approach, a proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) device was developed to secure PV smart inverter communications. The PIDMS was developed as a distributed, flexible bump-in-the-wire (BITW) solution for protecting PV smart inverter communications. Both cyber (network traffic) and physical (power system measurements) are processed using network intrusion monitoring tools and custom machinelearning algorithms for deep packet analysis and cyber-physical event correlation. The PIDMS not only detects abnormal events but also deploys mitigations to limit or eliminate system impact; the PIDMS communicates with peer PIDMSs at different locations using the MQTT protocol for increased situational awareness and alerting. The details of the PIDMS methodology and prototype development are detailed in this report as well as the evaluation results within a cyber-physical emulation environment and subsequent industry feedback.

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Modeling data flows with network calculus in cyber-physical systems: Enabling feature analysis for anomaly detection applications

Information (Switzerland)

Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Summers, Adam

The electric grid is becoming increasingly cyber-physical with the addition of smart technologies, new communication interfaces, and automated grid-support functions. Because of this, it is no longer sufficient to only study the physical system dynamics, but the cyber system must also be monitored as well to examine cyber-physical interactions and effects on the overall system. To address this gap for both operational and security needs, cyber-physical situational awareness is needed to monitor the system to detect any faults or malicious activity. Techniques and models to understand the physical system (the power system operation) exist, but methods to study the cyber system are needed, which can assist in understanding how the network traffic and changes to network conditions affect applications such as data analysis, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and anomaly detection. In this paper, we examine and develop models of data flows in communication networks of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and explore how network calculus can be utilized to develop those models for CPSs, with a focus on anomaly and intrusion detection. This provides a foundation for methods to examine how changes to behavior in the CPS can be modeled and for investigating cyber effects in CPSs in anomaly detection applications.

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Next-Generation Relay Voting Scheme Design Leveraging Consensus Algorithms

2021 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2021

Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Summers, Adam; Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Calzada, Daniel A.; Li, Hanyue; Mao, Zeyu; Goes, Chris; Davis, Katherine; Shetye, Komal

Traditional protective relay voting schemes utilize simple logic to achieve confidence in relay trip actions. However, the smart grid is rapidly evolving and there are new needs for a next-generation relay voting scheme. In such new schemes, aspects such as inter-relay relationships and out-of-band data can be included. In this work, we explore the use of consensus algorithms and how they can be utilized for groups of relays to vote on system protection actions and also reach consensus on the values of variables in the system. A proposed design is explored with a simple case study with two different scenarios, including simulation in PowerWorld Simulator, to demonstrate the consensus algorithm benefits and future directions are discussed.

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Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System: Case Study on Packet Replay Attacks in Distributed Energy Resource Systems

2021 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2021

Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Chavez, Adrian R.; Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Jones, C.B.; Summers, Adam; Wright, Brian J.

The electric grid is rapidly being modernized with novel technologies, adaptive and automated grid-support functions, and added connectivity with internet-based communications and remote interfaces. These advancements render the grid increasingly 'smart' and cyber-physical, but also broaden the vulnerability landscape and potential for malicious, cascading disturbances. The grid must be properly defended with security mechanisms such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs), but these tools must account for power system behavior as well as network traffic to be effective. In this paper, we present a cyber-physical IDS, the proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS), that analyzes both cyber and physical data streams in parallel, detects intrusion, and deploys proactive response. We demonstrate the PIDMS with an exemplar case study exploring a packet replay attack scenario focused on photovoltaic inverter communications; the scenario is tested with an emulated, cyber-physical grid environment with hardware-in-the-loop inverters.

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Review of Intrusion Detection Methods and Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

Lai, Christine L.; Chavez, Adrian R.; Jones, Christian B.; Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Johnson, Jay B.; Summers, Adam

Recent trends in the growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric grid and newfound malware frameworks that target internet of things (IoT) devices is driving an urgent need for more reliable and effective methods for intrusion detection and prevention. Cybersecurity intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are responsible for detecting threats by monitoring and analyzing network data, which can originate either from networking equipment or end-devices. Creating intrusion detection systems for PV/DER networks is a challenging undertaking because of the diversity of the attack types and intermittency and variability in the data. Distinguishing malicious events from other sources of anomalies or system faults is particularly difficult. New approaches are needed that not only sense anomalies in the power system but also determine causational factors for the detected events. In this report, a range of IDS approaches were summarized along with their pros and cons. Using the review of IDS approaches and subsequent gap analysis for application to DER systems, a preliminary hybrid IDS approach to protect PV/DER communications is formed in the conclusion of this report to inform ongoing and future research regarding the cybersecurity and resilience enhancement of DER systems.

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Cyber-physical observability for the electric grid

2020 IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference, TPEC 2020

Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Summers, Adam; Jones, C.B.; Wright, Brian J.; Chavez, Adrian R.

The penetration of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices in the electric grid is growing at a rapid pace; from smart meters at residential homes to distributed energy resource (DER) system technologies such as smart inverters, various devices are being integrated into the grid with added connectivity and communications. Furthermore, with these increased capabilities, automated grid-support functions, demand response, and advanced communication-assisted control schemes are being implemented to improve the operation of the grid. These advancements render our power systems increasingly cyber-physical. It is no longer sufficient to only focus on the physical interactions, especially when implementing cybersecurity mechanisms such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and mitigation schemes that need to access both cyber and physical data. This new landscape necessitates novel methods and technologies to successfully interact and understand the overall cyber-physical system. Specifically, this paper will investigate the need and definition of cyber-physical observability for the grid.

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Cryptography Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Systems

2019 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2019

Lai, Christine F.; Cordeiro, Patricia G.; Hasandka, Adarsh; Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Hossain-Mckenzie, Shamina; Jose, Deepu J.; Saleem, Danish; Martin, Maurice

Distributed energy resource (DER) systems are rapidly being adopted and integrated within the electric power grid. Developments in smart grid devices and communication protocols are advancing the power system domain but are also introducing new cyber attack vectors. In particular, the ability to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data is of increasing concern. Cryptography is a powerful tool that can be leveraged to protect DER systems and their critical information. This paper discusses prominent methods of cryptographic authentication and encryption that can be used to secure DER communications. Specific considerations and recommendations for applying cryptography to DER systems are provided, including system design constraints and system impact. These will be demonstrated with two case studies that assess cryptography hardware requirements and communications latency in DERs.

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Module OT Laboratory Test Procedure

Cordeiro, Patricia G.; Onunkwo, Ifeoma O.; Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Jose, Deepu J.; Wright, Brian J.; Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.

This document will detail a test procedure, involving bench and emulation testing, for the Module OT device developed for the joint NREL-SNL DOE CEDS project titled "Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command & Control Messages on Operational Technology (OT) Networks." The aim of this document is to create the testing and evaluation protocol for the module for lab-level testing; this includes checklists and experiments for information gathering, functional testing, cryptographic implementation, public key infrastructure, key exchange/authentication, encryption, and implementation testing in the emulation environment.

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Enhancing Power Plant Safety through Coupling Plant Simulators to Cyber Digital Architecture

Adams, Susan S.; Bruneau, Robert J.; Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Murchison, Nicole M.; Sandoval, Daniel R.; Seng, Bibiana E.

There are differences in how cyber - attack, sabotage, or discrete component failure mechanisms manifest within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions based on those perceptions will allow him/her to maintain plant safety. This research is funded as part of Sandia's Laborator y Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program to develop scenarios with cyber induced failure of plant systems coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. The cyber scenario s w ere developed separately and injected into the simulator operational state to simulate an attack. These scenarios will determine if Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operators can 1) recognize that the control room indicators were presenting incorrect or erroneous i nformation and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. This paper will review results of a pilot study run with NPP operators to investigate performance under various cyber scenarios. The d iscussion will provide an overview of the approach, scenario selection, metrics captured , resulting insights into operator actions and plant response to multiple sc enarios of the NPP system .

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Measurement and Analysis of Cyber Resilience for Control Systems: An Illustrative Example

Proceedings - Resilience Week 2018, RWS 2018

Jacobs, Nicholas J.; Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina S.; Vugrin, Eric D.

Control systems for critical infrastructure are becoming increasingly interconnected while cyber threats against critical infrastructure are becoming more sophisticated and difficult to defend against. Historically, cyber security has emphasized building defenses to prevent loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability in digital information and systems, but in recent years cyber attacks have demonstrated that no system is impenetrable and that control system operation may be detrimentally impacted. Cyber resilience has emerged as a complementary priority that seeks to ensure that digital systems can maintain essential performance levels, even while capabilities are degraded by a cyber attack. This paper examines how cyber security and cyber resilience may be measured and quantified in a control system environment. Load Frequency Control is used as an illustrative example to demonstrate how cyber attacks may be represented within mathematical models of control systems, to demonstrate how these events may be quantitatively measured in terms of cyber security or cyber resilience, and the differences and similarities between the two mindsets. These results demonstrate how various metrics are applied, the extent of their usability, and how it is important to analyze cyber-physical systems in a comprehensive manner that accounts for all the various parts of the system.

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31 Results
31 Results