Publications

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In August 2017, Sandia convened five workshops to explore the future of advanced technologies and global peace and security through the lenses of deterrence, information, innovation, nonproliferation, and population and Earth systems.

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Pakistani and Indian militaries have been occupying the Siachen Glacier and surrounding regions for decades. Although a cease-fire is in place, continued occupation carries the risk of an inadvertent conflict, which could escalate into a full-fledged nuclear-backed confrontation. Political and military analysts in Pakistan and India now question the strategic significance of the Siachen Glacier and agree that under the right circumstances, military withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier region would not adversely affect either state. The difficulty lies in conducting the withdrawal in such a way that neither side feels vulnerable, and in maintaining the demilitarization in a way that can be verified. In this paper, the authors who have both held command responsibilities in the Siachen Glacier region present a process for conducting and verifying the demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier region. The authors discuss the role of monitoring and verification tools and their relevance to this border zone of conflict.

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Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain high despite a long-term strategy by South Korea to increase inter-Korean exchanges in economics, culture, sports, and other topics. This is because the process of reconciliation has rarely extended to military and security topics and those initiatives that were negotiated have been ineffective. Bilateral interactions must include actions to reduce threats and improve confidence associated with conventional military forces (land, sea, and air) as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological activities that are applicable to developing and producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The purpose of this project is to develop concepts for inter-Korean confidence building measures (CBMs) for military and WMD topics that South Korea could propose to the North when conditions are right. This report describes the historical and policy context for developing security-related CBMs and presents an array of bilateral options for conventional military and WMD topics within a consistent framework. The conceptual CBMs address two scenarios: (1) improved relations where construction of a peace regime becomes a full agenda item in inter-Korean dialogue, and (2) continued tense inter-Korean relations. Some measures could be proposed in the short term under current conditions, others might be implemented in a series of steps, while some require a higher level of cooperation than currently exists. To support decision making by political leaders, this research focuses on strategies and policy options and does not include technical details.

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Missiles are attractive weapon systems because of their flexibility, survivability, and relatively low cost. Consequently, many nations are seeking to build missile forces resulting in regional arms races. Missile forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). Efforts to control missile proliferation must account for these effects. A number of strategies to control the destabilizing effects of missiles were developed during the Cold War. Some of these strategies are applicable to regional missile control but new approaches, tailored to regional geographic and security conditions, are needed. Regional missile nonproliferation can be pursued in a variety of ways: Reducing the demand for missiles by decreasing the perception of national threats; Restricting the export of missiles and associated equipment by supplier countries; Restricting information describing missile technology; Limiting missile development activities such as flight or engine tests; Restricting the operational deployment of existing missile forces; and Reducing existing missile forces by number and/or type. Even when development is complete, limits on deployment within range of potential targets or limits on operational readiness can help stabilize potential missile confrontations. Implementing these strategies often involves the collection and exchange of information about activities related to missile development or deployment. Monitoring is the process of collecting information used to for subsequent verification of commitments. A systematic approach to implementing verification is presented that identifies areas where monitoring could support missile nonproliferation agreements. The paper presents both non-technical and technical techniques for monitoring. Examples of non-technical techniques are declarations about planned test launches or on-site inspections. Examples of technical monitoring include remote monitoring (i.e., a sensor that is physically present at a facility) and remote sensing (i.e., a sensor that records activity without being physically present at a facility).

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