This report summarizes the work performed under the Sandia LDRD project "Eyes on the Ground: Visual Verification for On-Site Inspection." The goal of the project was to develop methods and tools to assist an IAEA inspector in assessing visual and other information encountered during an inspection. Effective IAEA inspections are key to verifying states' compliance with nuclear non-proliferation treaties. In the course of this work we developed a taxonomy of candidate inspector assistance tasks, selected key tasks to focus on, identified hardware and software solution approaches, and made progress in implementing them. In particular, we demonstrated the use of multiple types of 3-d scanning technology applied to simulated inspection environments, and implemented a preliminary prototype of a novel inspector assistance tool. This report summarizes the project's major accomplishments, and gathers the abstracts and references for the publication and reports that were prepared as part of this work. We then describe work in progress that is not yet ready for publication. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.
The goal of the Eyes On the Ground project is to develop tools to aid IAEA inspectors. Our original vision was to produce a tool that would take three-dimensional measurements of an unknown piece of equipment, construct a semantic representation of the measured object, and then use the resulting data to infer possible explanations of equipment function. We report our tests of a 3-d laser scanner to obtain 3-d point cloud data, and subsequent tests of software to convert the resulting point clouds into primitive geometric objects such as planes and cylinders. These tests successfully identified pipes of moderate diameter and planar surfaces, but also incurred significant noise. We also investigated the IAEA inspector task context, and learned that task constraints may present significant obstacles to using 3-d laser scanners. We further learned that equipment scale and enclosing cases may confound our original goal of equipment diagnosis. Meanwhile, we also surveyed the rapidly evolving field of 3-d measurement technology, and identified alternative sensor modalities that may prove more suitable for inspector use in a safeguards context. We conclude with a detailed discussion of lessons learned and the resulting implications for project goals. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.
This report summarizes the discussion and conclusions reached during a table top exercise held at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque on September 3, 2014 regarding a recently described approach for nuclear warhead verification based on the cryptographic concept of a zero-knowledge protocol (ZKP) presented in a recent paper authored by Glaser, Barak, and Goldston. A panel of Sandia National Laboratories researchers, whose expertise includes radiation instrumentation design and development, cryptography, and arms control verification implementation, jointly reviewed the paper and identified specific challenges to implementing the approach as well as some opportunities. It was noted that ZKP as used in cryptography is a useful model for the arms control verification problem, but the direct analogy to arms control breaks down quickly. The ZKP methodology for warhead verification fits within the general class of template-based verification techniques, where a reference measurement is used to confirm that a given object is like another object that has already been accepted as a warhead by some other means. This can be a powerful verification approach, but requires independent means to trust the authenticity of the reference warhead - a standard that may be difficult to achieve, which the ZKP authors do not directly address. Despite some technical challenges, the concept of last-minute selection of the pre-loads and equipment could be a valuable component of a verification regime.