A High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is a potential threat to the power grid. HEMP can couple to transmission lines and cables, causing significant overvoltages which can be harmful to line connected equipment. The effects of overvoltages on various types of power systems components need to be understood. HEMP effects on trip coils were tested and presented in this report. A high voltage pulser was built to replicate the induced voltage waveform from a HEMP. The pulser was used to test breaker trip coils with increasing pulse magnitudes ranging from 20 kV to 80 kV. The State-of-Health of each trip coils was measured via mechanical operation and impedance measurements before and after each insult to identify any damage or degradation to the trip coils. Dielectric breakdown was observed at the conductor leads during testing, causing the HEMP insult to be diverted to the grounded casing. However, the dielectric breakdown did not cause interference with regular device operation.
Determining the effectiveness of surge and pulse protection devices in the United States power grid against effects of a High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is crucial in determining the present state of grid resilience. Transient Voltage Surge Suppressors (TVSS) are used to protect loads in substations from transient overvoltages. Designed to mitigate the effects of lightning, their response to a HEMP event is unknown and was determined. TVSSs were tested in two unique configurations using a pulser that generates pulses in the tens of nanoseconds scale to determine their protective capability as well as to determine their self-resilience against HEMP pulses. Testing concluded that TVSS devices adequately protect against microsecond scale pulses like lightning but do not protect against pulses resembling HEMP events. It suggests that TVSS devices should not be relied upon to mitigate the effects of HEMP pulses.
Sandia National Laboratories sponsored a three-year internally funded Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) effort to investigate the vulnerabilities and mitigations of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) on the electric power grid. The research was focused on understanding the vulnerabilities and potential mitigations for components and systems at the high voltage transmission level. Results from the research included a broad array of subtopics, covered in twenty-three reports and papers, and which are highlighted in this executive summary report. These subtopics include high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) characterization, HEMP coupling analysis, system-wide effects, and mitigating technologies.
The electric power grid is one of the most critical infrastructures in the modern world, and the continued protection and resilience of this system from threats is of significant concern. One such set of threats is nanosecond-scale transient effects generated by high-altitude electromagnetic pulses, for which the effect on the power grid is still being studied. Lightning surge arresters serve as the current grid protection against fast transients but are designed and modeled for protection against lightning and switching transients. Surge arrester response to faster transients is not well known. This work defines a scalable metal-oxide surge arrester model with specific consideration to frequencies attributed to fast transient overvoltages from electromagnetic pulses. Measurements using vector network analyzer sweeps at low and high bias as well as high-voltage I-V curve traces are presented to define arrester behavior and to parameterize it from measurement data. The proposed model is compared to the standard IEEE model for lightning arresters in this paper. Furthermore, model parameters are defined by scalable terms to be easily implemented for transmission-level devices. The scalable model enables enhanced assessment of protection levels and grid susceptibility against fast transients.
Impacts of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) on the power grid are a growing concern due to the increased reliance on the power grid. A critical area of research is quantifying power system equipment response to HEMP since this is not known in general. Substation site surveys were performed at seven high voltage substations across the United States to gather substation layout and construction details pertinent to HEMP coupling calculations and component vulnerability assessments. The primary objective for the survey was to gather information on cable layouts and cable construction within substations. Additional information was also gathered on equipment present within the substations and control house layouts. This report provides information gathered from the substation surveys.
Radiated power calculation approaches for practical scenarios of incomplete high- density interface characterization information and incomplete incident power information are presented. The suggested approaches build upon a method that characterizes power losses through the definition of power loss constant matrices. Potential radiated power estimates include using total power loss information, partial radiated power loss information, worst case analysis, and statistical bounding analysis. A method is also proposed to calculate radiated power when incident power information is not fully known for non-periodic signals at the interface. Incident data signals are modeled from a two-state Markov chain where bit state probabilities are derived. The total spectrum for windowed signals is postulated as the superposition of spectra from individual pulses in a data sequence. Statistical bounding methods are proposed as a basis for the radiated power calculation due to the statistical calculation complexity to find a radiated power probability density function.
In this study, we characterized and quantified the behavior of Sandia National Laboratories' electromagnetic reverberation chamber owned by department 1353. The primary purpose of the chamber is to measure the response of a test object to electromagnetic stimuli. The primary chamber application is qualification of nuclear weapons systems and components for the nuclear weapon qualification programs. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires a comprehensive understanding of any measurement used to qualify a nuclear weapon. Understanding includes the accuracy of every measurement used to qualify the weapon. Knowing the uncertainty of any measurement gives the information needed to estimate boundaries and tolerances of the measurement. By proper application of these measurement tolerances, weapon qualification programs can comply with uncertainty requirements. This document reports our findings. Weapons Systems Engineering Assessment Technology (WSEAT) commissioned this effort to provide support to Nuclear Weapons qualification in accordance with Realize Product Sub System (RPSS). Motivation for this effort stems from four qualification programs: B61 LEP, W88 ALT370, W80-4 LEP, and the Mk21 fuze program.