Sandia National Laboratories has prepared a budgetary cost estimate for planning for the IDC Re-engineering Phase 3 effort, based on leveraging a fully funded, Sandia executed NDC Modernization project. This report provides the budgetary cost estimate and describes the methodology, assumptions, and cost model details used to create the budgetary cost estimate. Budgetary Cost Estimate Disclaimer This cost estimate is based upon a documented work scope that may not be complete at this time. This estimate may be used to develop budgets, includes a contingency appropriate for a budget estimate and does not represent a commitment to the estimate. If the project proceeds and the scope becomes better defined, a definitive estimate will be developed.
This report summarizes the discussion and conclusions reached during a table top exercise held at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque on September 3, 2014 regarding a recently described approach for nuclear warhead verification based on the cryptographic concept of a zero-knowledge protocol (ZKP) presented in a recent paper authored by Glaser, Barak, and Goldston. A panel of Sandia National Laboratories researchers, whose expertise includes radiation instrumentation design and development, cryptography, and arms control verification implementation, jointly reviewed the paper and identified specific challenges to implementing the approach as well as some opportunities. It was noted that ZKP as used in cryptography is a useful model for the arms control verification problem, but the direct analogy to arms control breaks down quickly. The ZKP methodology for warhead verification fits within the general class of template-based verification techniques, where a reference measurement is used to confirm that a given object is like another object that has already been accepted as a warhead by some other means. This can be a powerful verification approach, but requires independent means to trust the authenticity of the reference warhead - a standard that may be difficult to achieve, which the ZKP authors do not directly address. Despite some technical challenges, the concept of last-minute selection of the pre-loads and equipment could be a valuable component of a verification regime.
Sandia National Laboratories, CA proposed a sensor concept to detect emissions from open-burning/open-detonation (OB/OD) events. The system would serve two purposes: (1) Provide data to demilitarization operations about process efficiency, allowing process optimization for cleaner emissions and higher efficiency. (2) Provide data to regulators and neighboring communities about materials dispersing into the environment by OB/OD operations. The proposed sensor system uses instrument control hardware and data visualization software developed at Sandia National Laboratories to link together an array of sensors to monitor emissions from OB/OD events. The suite of sensors would consist of various physical and chemical detectors mounted on stationary or mobile platforms. The individual sensors would be wirelessly linked to one another and controlled through a central command center. Real-time data collection from the sensors, combined with integrated visualization of the data at the command center, would allow for feedback to the sensors to alter operational conditions to adjust for changing needs (i.e., moving plume position, increased spatial resolution, increased sensitivity). This report presents a systems study of the problem of implementing a sensor system for monitoring OB/OD emissions. The goal of this study was to gain a fuller understanding of the political, economic, and technical issues for developing and fielding this technology.