Publications

67 Results
Skip to search filters

System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)?Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Bland, Jesse J.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Cohn, Brian C.; Faucett, Christopher F.; Gilbert, Luke J.; Haddal, Risa H.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Majedi, Mike M.; Snell, Mark K.

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors-- increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aims of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives. This page left blank intentionally

More Details
TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2018
OSTIDOI

Domestic Nuclear Power Plant Physical Security Reevaluation - High-Level Project Plan

Osborn, Douglas M.; Snell, Mark K.; Clefton, Gordon C.; Yadav, Vaibhav Y.

The goal for this effort is a validated method which can be used to implement an updated physical security regime to optimize the physical security at domestic nuclear power plants (existing and future). It is the intent for the evaluation recommendations to provide the technical basis for an optimized plant security posture, which could consider reduce conservatisms in that posture, and potentially reduce security costs for the nuclear industry while meeting all security requirements.

More Details
TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2018
OSTIDOI

NUSAM Methodology for Assessment

Leach, Janice L.; Snell, Mark K.

This document provides a methodology for the performance-based assessment of security systems designed for the protection of nuclear and radiological materials and the processes that produce and/or involve them. It is intended for use with both relatively simple installations and with highly regulated complex sites with demanding security requirements.

More Details
TYPE Other Report YEAR 2016
OSTIDOI

Conducting a Nuclear Security Assessment

Leach, Janice L.; Snell, Mark K.

There are three general steps that make up a nuclear security assessment: 1. Develop data Libraries that indicate how effective the physical protection measures are both individually but also as parts of subsystems and actual systems. 2. Perform Path Analysis 3. Perform Scenario Analysis. Depending upon the nature and objectives of the assessment not all three of these steps may need to be performed; for example, at facilities with simple layouts there may not be a need to perform path analysis. Each of these steps is described within this report.

More Details
TYPE Other Report YEAR 2016
OSTIDOI

Leveraging Safety Programs to Improve and Support Security Programs

Snell, Mark K.; Leach, Janice L.

There has been a long history of considering Safety, Security, and Safeguards (3S) as three functions of nuclear security design and operations that need to be properly and collectively integrated with operations. This paper specifically considers how safety programmes can be extended directly to benefit security as part of an integrated facility management programme. The discussion will draw on experiences implementing such a programme at Sandia National Laboratories’ Annular Research Reactor Facility. While the paper focuses on nuclear facilities, similar ideas could be used to support security programmes at other types of high-consequence facilities and transportation activities.

More Details
TYPE Other Report YEAR 2015
OSTIDOI

Security-by-design handbook

Snell, Mark K.; Jaeger, Cal; Jordan, Sabina E.; Scharmer, Carol S.

This document is a draft SecuritybyDesign (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to %E2%80%9Cencourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.%E2%80%9D The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PASPP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessonslearned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the systemlevel incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A fourelement strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

More Details
TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2013
OSTIDOI

Report on Project Action Sheet PP05 task 3 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST)

Snell, Mark K.

This report documents the results of Task 3 of Project Action Sheet PP05 between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST) for Support with Review of an ROK Risk Evaluation Process. This task was to have Sandia National Laboratories collaborate with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) on several activities concerning how to determine the Probability of Neutralization, PN, and the Probability of System Effectiveness, PE, to include: providing descriptions on how combat simulations are used to determine PN and PE; comparisons of the strengths and weaknesses of two neutralization models (the Neutralization.xls spreadsheet model versus the Brief Adversary Threat-Loss Estimator (BATLE) software); and demonstrating how computer simulations can be used to determine PN. Note that the computer simulation used for the demonstration was the Scenario Toolkit And Generation Environment (STAGE) simulation, which is a stand-alone synthetic tactical simulation sold by Presagis Canada Incorporated. The demonstration is provided in a separate Audio Video Interleave (.AVI) file.

More Details
TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2013
OSTIDOI

Development of a security-by-design handbook

Snell, Mark K.

There is an increasing awareness that efficient and effective nuclear facility design is best achieved when requirements from the 3S disciplines Safety, Safeguards, and Security - are balanced and intrinsic to the facility design. This can be achieved when policy, processes, methods, and technologies are understood and applied in these areas during all phases of the design process. For the purposes of this paper, Security-by-design will be defined as the system level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new or retrofitted nuclear power plant (NPP) or nuclear facility (NF) resulting in intrinsic security. Security-by-design can also be viewed as a framework to achieve robust and durable security systems. This paper reports on work performed to date to create a Security-by-Design Handbook, under a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, specifically, a review of physical protection principles and best practices, and a decommissioning to better understand where these principles and practices can be applied. This paper describes physical protection principles and best practices to achieve security-by- design that were gathered from International, Japanese, and U.S. sources. Principles are included for achieving security early in the design process where security requirements are typically less costly and easier to incorporate. The paper then describes a generic design process that covers the entire facility lifecycle from scoping and planning of the project to decommissioning and decontamination. Early design process phases, such as conceptual design, offer opportunities to add security features intrinsic to the facility design itself. Later phases, including design engineering and construction, are important for properly integrating security features into a coherent design and for planning for and assuring the proper performance of the security system during the operation and decommissioning of the facility. The paper also describes some future activities on this bilateral project to create a Security-by-Design Handbook. When completed, the Handbook is intended to assist countries with less experience in nuclear power programs to apply principles and best practices in an effective and efficient manner as early in the design as possible to achieve robust and durable security.

More Details
TYPE Conference YEAR 2010
OSTI

Between detection and neutralization

Adams, Douglas G.; Green, Mary W.; Snell, Mark K.; Pritchard, Daniel P.

Security system analytical performance analysis is generally based on the probability of system effectiveness. The probability of effectiveness is a function of the probabilities of interruption and neutralization. Interruption occurs if the response forces are notified in sufficient time to engage the adversary. Neutralization occurs if the adversary attack is defeated after the security forces have actively engaged the adversary. Both depend upon communications of data. This paper explores details of embedded communications functions that are often assumed to be inconsequential. It is the intent of the authors to bring focus to an issue in security system modeling that, if not well understood, has the potential to be a deciding factor in the overall system failure or effectiveness.

More Details
TYPE Conference YEAR 2005
OSTI
67 Results
67 Results