VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Abstract not provided.
Publications
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Abstract not provided.
Risk Informed Approach for Nuclear Security Measrues for Radioactive Material Under Regulatory Control
Abstract not provided.
DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION MEASURE PERFORMANCE DATA FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FACILITIES
Abstract not provided.
System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)?Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security
Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors-- increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aims of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives. This page left blank intentionally
Domestic Nuclear Power Plant Physical Security Reevaluation - High-Level Project Plan
The goal for this effort is a validated method which can be used to implement an updated physical security regime to optimize the physical security at domestic nuclear power plants (existing and future). It is the intent for the evaluation recommendations to provide the technical basis for an optimized plant security posture, which could consider reduce conservatisms in that posture, and potentially reduce security costs for the nuclear industry while meeting all security requirements.
Summary of Analysis Methodology Results of the Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM) Coordinated Research Project
Abstract not provided.
APPROACHES AND MODELING TECHNIQUES TO DETERMINE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST INSIDER COLLUSION
Abstract not provided.
APPROACHES AND MODELING TECHNIQUES TO DETERMINE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST INSIDER COLLUSION
Abstract not provided.
Summary of Analysis Methodology Results of the Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM) Coordinated Research Project
Abstract not provided.
Best Practices in Design Organization and Operations of Physical Protection Test Beds
Abstract not provided.
NUSAM Methodology for Assessment
This document provides a methodology for the performance-based assessment of security systems designed for the protection of nuclear and radiological materials and the processes that produce and/or involve them. It is intended for use with both relatively simple installations and with highly regulated complex sites with demanding security requirements.
Conducting a Nuclear Security Assessment
There are three general steps that make up a nuclear security assessment: 1. Develop data Libraries that indicate how effective the physical protection measures are both individually but also as parts of subsystems and actual systems. 2. Perform Path Analysis 3. Perform Scenario Analysis. Depending upon the nature and objectives of the assessment not all three of these steps may need to be performed; for example, at facilities with simple layouts there may not be a need to perform path analysis. Each of these steps is described within this report.
Sections prepared for inclusion in an IAEA technical document handbook on Designing and Implementing a Physical Protection System
Two major sections were drafted (each with several subsections) for the IAEA dealing with designing and implementing a Physical Protection System (PPS). Areas addressed were Search Systems and the evaluation of PPS effectiveness.
Leveraging Safety Programs to Improve and Support Security Programs
There has been a long history of considering Safety, Security, and Safeguards (3S) as three functions of nuclear security design and operations that need to be properly and collectively integrated with operations. This paper specifically considers how safety programmes can be extended directly to benefit security as part of an integrated facility management programme. The discussion will draw on experiences implementing such a programme at Sandia National Laboratories’ Annular Research Reactor Facility. While the paper focuses on nuclear facilities, similar ideas could be used to support security programmes at other types of high-consequence facilities and transportation activities.
8th Annual NNSA-IRSN PCG on PAS-PP02 and Proposed Action Sheet AS8
Abstract not provided.
Outsider Assessments
Abstract not provided.
Detection Data Libraries
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Sensor Testbeds
Abstract not provided.
History of Vulnerability Assessments
Abstract not provided.
Collecting Statistical Data for Security Evaluations Based on Physical Protection Performance Assurance and Testing Methodologies
Abstract not provided.
5th Anniversary of US-Japan Cooperation on Human Capacity Building
Abstract not provided.
Collecting Statistical Data for Security EPhysical Protection Performance Assurance and Testing Methodologies
Abstract not provided.
The Treatment of Blended Attacks in Nuclear Security Effectiveness Assessments
Abstract not provided.
The Treatment of Blended Attacks in Nuclear Security Effectiveness Assessments
Abstract not provided.
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