Publications

Sandia National Laboratories’ Global Chemical and Biological Security program (SNL/GCBS) has an on-going mission to enhance laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. SNL/GCBS has developed robust biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment methodologies and tools to aid laboratories seeking to implement biosecurity as advocated in the recently released World Health Organization’s “Biorisk Management: Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance.” BioRAM Security (BioRAM) is one of these tools. This tool was designed to complement the “Laboratory Biosecurity Handbook” written by Ren Salerno and Jennifer Gaudioso (Salerno, 2007). BioRAM was originally developed under the Sandia National Laboratories Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) process and has been updated with support from the US Department of Health Centers for Disease Control Select Agent Program, the US Department of State Biosecurity Engagement Program, and by funding from Sandia National Laboratories’ Associated Laboratories Directors.

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This report describes the results of a seven day effort to assist subject matter experts address a problem related to COVID-19. In the course of this effort, we analyzed the 29K documents provided as part of the White House's call to action. This involved applying a variety of natural language processing techniques and compression-based analytics in combination with visualization techniques and assessment with subject matter experts to pursue answers to a specific question. In this paper, we will describe the algorithms, the software, the study performed, and availability of the software developed during the effort.

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This report summarizes the work performed as part of a Laboratory Directed Research and Development project focused on evaluating and mitigating risk associated with biological dual use research of concern. The academic and scientific community has identified the funding stage as the appropriate place to intervene and mitigate risk, so the framework developed here uses a portfolio-level approach and balances biosafety and biosecurity risks, anticipated project benefits, and available mitigations to identify the best available investment strategies subject to cost constraints. The modeling toolkit was designed for decision analysis for dual use research of concern, but is flexible enough to support a wide variety of portfolio-level funding decisions where risk/benefit tradeoffs are involved. Two mathematical optimization models with two solution methods are included to accommodate stakeholders with varying levels of certainty about priorities between metrics. An example case study is presented.

Here, with recent outbreaks of MERS-Cov, Anthrax, Nipah, and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, much emphasis has been placed on rapid identification of infectious agents globally. As a result, laboratories are building capacity, conducting more advanced and sophisticated research, increasing laboratory staff, and establishing collections of dangerous pathogens in an attempt to reduce the impact of infectious disease outbreaks and characterize disease causing agents. With this expansion, the global laboratory community has started to focus on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity to prevent the accidental and/or intent ional release o f these agents. Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity systems are used around the world to help mit igate the risks posed by dangerous pathogens in the laboratory. Veterinary laboratories carry unique responsibilities to workers and communities to safely and securely handle disease causing microorganisms. Many microorganisms studied in veterinary laboratories not only infect animals, but also have the potential to infect humans. This paper will discuss the fundamentals of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity.

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Numerous terrorist organizations have openly expressed interest in producing and deploying biological weapons. However, a limiting factor for many terrorists has been the acquisition of dangerous biological agents, as evidenced by the very few successful instances of biological weapons use compared to the number of documented hoaxes. Biological agents vary greatly in their ability to cause loss of life and economic damage. Some agents, if released properly, can kill many people and cause an extensive number of secondary infections; other agents will sicken only a small number of people for a short period of time. Consequently, several biological agents can potentially be used to perpetrate a bioterrorism attack but few are likely capable of causing a high consequence event. It is crucial, from a US national security perspective, to more deeply understand the likelihood that terrorist organizations can acquire the range of these agents. Few studies have attempted to comprehensively compile the technical information directly relevant to the acquisition of dangerous bacteria, viruses and toxins. In this report, technical fact sheets were assembled for 46 potentially dangerous biological agents. Much of the information was taken from various research sources which could ultimately and significantly expedite and improve bioterrorism threat assessments. By systematically examining a number of specific agent characteristics included in these fact sheets, it may be possible to detect, target, and implement measures to thwart future terrorist acquisition attempts. In addition, the information in these fact sheets may be used as a tool to help laboratories gain a rudimentary understanding of how attractive a method laboratory theft is relative to other potential acquisition modes.