Publications

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Missiles are attractive weapon systems because of their flexibility, survivability, and relatively low cost. Consequently, many nations are seeking to build missile forces resulting in regional arms races. Missile forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). Efforts to control missile proliferation must account for these effects. A number of strategies to control the destabilizing effects of missiles were developed during the Cold War. Some of these strategies are applicable to regional missile control but new approaches, tailored to regional geographic and security conditions, are needed. Regional missile nonproliferation can be pursued in a variety of ways: Reducing the demand for missiles by decreasing the perception of national threats; Restricting the export of missiles and associated equipment by supplier countries; Restricting information describing missile technology; Limiting missile development activities such as flight or engine tests; Restricting the operational deployment of existing missile forces; and Reducing existing missile forces by number and/or type. Even when development is complete, limits on deployment within range of potential targets or limits on operational readiness can help stabilize potential missile confrontations. Implementing these strategies often involves the collection and exchange of information about activities related to missile development or deployment. Monitoring is the process of collecting information used to for subsequent verification of commitments. A systematic approach to implementing verification is presented that identifies areas where monitoring could support missile nonproliferation agreements. The paper presents both non-technical and technical techniques for monitoring. Examples of non-technical techniques are declarations about planned test launches or on-site inspections. Examples of technical monitoring include remote monitoring (i.e., a sensor that is physically present at a facility) and remote sensing (i.e., a sensor that records activity without being physically present at a facility).

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

The aim of this paper is to understand the numerous nuclear-related agreements that involve India and Pakistan, and in so doing identify starting points for future confidence-creating and confidence-building projects. Existing nuclear-related agreements provide a framework under which various projects can be proposed that foster greater nuclear transparency and cooperation in South Asia. The basic assumptions and arguments underlying this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) Increased nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan is a worthwhile objective, as it will lead to the irreversibility of extant nuclear agreements, the prospects of future agreements; and the balance of opacity and transparency required for stability in times of crises; (2) Given the current state of Indian and Pakistani relations, incremental progress in increased nuclear transparency is the most likely future outcome; and (3) Incremental progress can be achieved by enhancing the information exchange required by existing nuclear-related agreements.

To promote cooperation in South Asia on environmental research, an international working group comprised of participants from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the US convened at the Soaltee Hotel in Kathmandu, Nepal, September 12 to 14, 1999. The workshop was sponsored in part by the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, through funding provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. The CMC promotes collaborations among scientists and researchers in regions throughout the world as a means of achieving common regional security objectives. In the long term, the workshop organizers and participants are interested in the significance of regional information sharing as a means to build confidence and reduce conflict. The intermediate interests of the group focus on activities that might eventually foster regional management of some aspects of water resources utilization. The immediate purpose of the workshop was to begin the implementation phase of a project to collect and share water quality information at a number of river and coastal estuary locations throughout the region. The workshop participants achieved four objectives: (1) gaining a better understanding of the partner organizations involved; (2) garnering the support of existing regional organizations promoting environmental cooperation in South Asia; (3) identifying sites within the region at which data is to be collected; and (4) instituting a data and information collection and sharing process.

The potential for cooperation between India and Pakistan is substantial. Topics as widely varying as national security, the environment and trade hold the potential for improved bilateral relations. This paper looks at a few areas in which monitoring technology could contribute to enhancing cooperative border agreements between the two nations. The goal of the paper is not to provide prescriptive solutions to regional problems, but to expand the number of options being considered for improving Indian-Pakistan relations. Many of the impediments to bilateral progress are a result of a history of conflict and mistrust. By utilizing technical monitoring and inspections, each side can begin to replace suspicion and doubt with knowledge and information useful in making informed political, economic and military decisions. At the same time, technical monitoring and inspections can build confidence through common interactions. India and Pakistan have pledged to resolve their disputes, including Kashmir, through dialogue. Implementation of that pledge is influenced by a number of factors, including changes in the political systems and the fortunes of the leadership. Events of the past year and a half have severely tested these two governments' ability to move forward along a constructive and positive path. Testing of new missile systems both preceded and followed testing of nuclear weapons in May 1998. Both countries disregarded subsequent international displeasure as they proceeded to openly declare their respective nuclear capability. Their brief engagement with each other in February 1999 and movement toward a rapprochement diluted international condemnation of their nuclear activity. Within a recent period of nine months however, progress in the dialogue has been stalled first by the Pakistani move in Kashmir in May 1999, then by the Indian election in the summer of 1999 and most recently by the military coup in Pakistan.