Publications

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This document describes the draft ruleset for Assent, an experimental wargame to practice consensus making in a crisis scenario.

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SIGNAL is a first of its kind experimental wargame developed as part of the Project on Nuclear Gaming (PoNG). In this document we describe the rules and game mechanics associated with the online version of SIGNAL created by team members from the University of California, Berkeley, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The game was developed as part of a larger research project to develop the experimental wargaming methodology and explore its use on a model scenario: the impact of various military capabilities on conflict escalation dynamics. We discuss the results of this research in a forthcoming paper that will include this manual as an appendix. It is our hope that this manual will both contribute to our players' understanding of the game prior to play and that it will allow for replication of the SIGNAL game environment for future research purposes. The manual begins by introducing the terminology used throughout the document. It then outlines the technical requirements required to run SIGNAL. The following section provides a description of the map, resources, infrastructure, tokens, and action cards used in the game environment. The manual then describes the user interface including the chat functions, trade mechanism, currency and population counts necessary for players to plan their actions. It then turns to the sequence of player actions in the game describing the signaling, action, and upkeep phases that comprise each round of play. It then outlines the use of diplomacy including alliances with minor states and trade between players. The manual also describes the process for scoring the game and determining the winner. The manual concludes with tips for players to remember as they embark upon playing the game.

We develop a methodology for comparing two or more agent-based models that are developed for the same domain, but may differ in the particular data sets (e.g., geographical regions) to which they are applied, and in the structure of the model. Our approach is to learn a response surface in the common parameter space of the models and compare the regions corresponding to qualitatively different behaviors in the models. As an example, we develop an active learning algorithm to learn phase transition boundaries in contagion processes in order to compare two agent-based models of rooftop solar panel adoption.

National security decisions are driven by complex, interconnected contextual, individual, and strategic variables. Modeling and simulation tools are often used to identify relevant patterns, which can then be shaped through policy remedies. In the paper to follow, however, we argue that models of these scenarios may be prone to the complexity-scarcity gap, in which relevant scenarios are too complex to model from first principles and data from historical scenarios are too sparse-making it difficult to draw representative conclusions. The result are models that are either too simple or are unduly biased by the assumptions of the analyst. We outline a new method of quantitative inquiry-experimental wargaming-as a means to bridge the complexity-scarcity gap that offers human-generated, empirical data to inform a variety of model and simulation tasks (model building, calibration, testing, and validation). Below, we briefly describe SIGNAL-our first-of-a-kind experimental wargame designed to study strategic stability in conflict settings with nuclear weapons. We then highlight the potential utility of this data for modeling and simulation efforts in the future using this data.

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Much has been written on the potential for games to enhance our ability to study complex systems. In this chapter we focus on how we can use games to study national security issues. We reflect on the benefits of using games and the inherent difficulties that we must address. As a means of grounding the discussion, we will present a case study of a retrospective analysis of gaming data.

In order to understand the effect of economic interdependence on conflict and on deterrents to conflict, and to assess the viability of online games as experiments to perform research, an online serious game was used to gather data on economic, political, and military factors in the game setting. These data were operationalized in forms analogous to variables from the real-world Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset. A set of economic predictor variables was analyzed using linear mixed effects regression models in an attempt to discover relationships between the predictor variables and conflict outcomes. Differences between the online game results and results from the real world are discussed.

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The doctrine of nuclear deterrence and a belief in its importance underpins many aspects of United States policy; it informs strategic force structures within the military, incentivizes multi-billion-dollar weapon-modernization programs within the Department of Energy, and impacts international alliances with the 29 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The doctrine originally evolved under the stewardship of some of the most impressive minds of the twentieth century, including the physicist and H-bomb designer Herman Kahn, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling, and the preeminent political scientist and diplomat Henry Kissinger.

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While there has been a great deal of security research focused on preventing attacks, there has been less work on how one should balance security and resilience investments. In this work we developed and evaluated models that captured both explicit defenses and other mitigations that reduce the impact of attacks. We examined these issues both in more broadly applicable general Stackelberg models and in more specific network and power grid settings. Finally, we compared these solutions to existing work in terms of both solution quality and computational overhead.

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Agent-based modeling is commonly used for studying complex system properties emergent from interactions among many agents. We present a novel data-driven agent-based modeling framework applied to forecasting individual and aggregate residential rooftop solar adoption in San Diego county. Our first step is to learn a model of individual agent behavior from combined data of individual adoption characteristics and property assessment. We then construct an agent-based simulation with the learned model embedded in artificial agents, and proceed to validate it using a holdout sequence of collective adoption decisions. We demonstrate that the resulting agent-based model successfully forecasts solar adoption trends and provides a meaningful quantification of uncertainty about its predictions. We utilize our model to optimize two classes of policies aimed at spurring solar adoption: one that subsidizes the cost of adoption, and another that gives away free systems to low-income house-holds. We find that the optimal policies derived for the latter class are significantly more efficacious, whereas the policies similar to the current California Solar Initiative incentive scheme appear to have a limited impact on overall adoption trends.

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We consider the question of predicting solar adoption using demographic, economic, peer effect and predicted system characteristic features. We use data from San Diego county to evaluate both discrete and continuous models. Additionally, we consider three types of sensitivity analysis to identify which features seem to have the greatest effect on prediction accuracy.

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