Publications

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Distributed Energy Resources (DER) are being added to the nation's electric grid, and as penetration of these resources increases, they have the potential to displace or offset large-scale, capital-intensive, centralized generation. Integration of DER into operation of the traditional electric grid requires automated operational control and communication of DER elements, from system measurement to control hardware and software, in conjunction with a utility's existing automated and human-directed control of other portions of the system. Implementation of DER technologies suggests a number of gaps from both a security and a policy perspective. This page intentionally left blank.

This document describes a microgrid cyber security reference architecture leveraging defense- in-depth techniques that are executed by first describing actor communication using data exchange attributes, then segmenting the microgrid control system network into enclaves, and finally grouping enclaves into functional domains. To illustrate the design approach, two notional microgrid control implementations are presented. Both include a discussion on types of communication occurring on that network, data exchange attributes for the actors, and examples of segmentation via enclaves and functional domains. The second example includes results from Red Team analysis and quantitative scoring according to a novel system that derives naturally from the implementation of the cyber security architecture. Acknowledgements Sandia National Laboratories and the SPIDERS technical team would like to acknowledge the following for help in the project: * Mike Hightower, who has been the key driving force for Energy Surety Microgrids * Juan Torres and Abbas Akhil, who developed the concept of microgrids for military installations * Merrill Smith, U.S. Department of Energy SPIDERS Program Manager * Ross Roley and Rich Trundy from U.S. Pacific Command * Bill Waugaman and Bill Beary from U.S. Northern Command * Tarek Abdallah, Melanie Johnson, and Harold Sanborn of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction Engineering Research Laboratory * Colleagues from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-LL), United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), and the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) for their reviews, suggestions, and participation in the work.

Many critical loads rely on simple backup generation to provide electricity in the event of a power outage. An Energy Surety Microgrid TM can protect against outages caused by single generator failures to improve reliability. An ESM will also provide a host of other benefits, including integration of renewable energy, fuel optimization, and maximizing the value of energy storage. The ESM concept includes a categorization for microgrid value proposi- tions, and quantifies how the investment can be justified during either grid-connected or utility outage conditions. In contrast with many approaches, the ESM approach explic- itly sets requirements based on unlikely extreme conditions, including the need to protect against determined cyber adversaries. During the United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS) effort, the ESM methodology was successfully used to develop the preliminary designs, which direct supported the contracting, construction, and testing for three military bases. Acknowledgements Sandia National Laboratories and the SPIDERS technical team would like to acknowledge the following for help in the project: * Mike Hightower, who has been the key driving force for Energy Surety Microgrids * Juan Torres and Abbas Akhil, who developed the concept of microgrids for military installations * Merrill Smith, U.S. Department of Energy SPIDERS Program Manager * Ross Roley and Rich Trundy from U.S. Pacific Command * Bill Waugaman and Bill Beary from U.S. Northern Command * Melanie Johnson and Harold Sanborn of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construc- tion Engineering Research Laboratory * Experts from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

In 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated much of the U.S. northeast coastal areas. Among those hardest hit was the small community of Hoboken, New Jersey, located on the banks of the Hudson River across from Manhattan. This report describes a city-wide electrical infrastructure design that uses microgrids and other infrastructure to ensure the city retains functionality should such an event occur in the future. The designs ensure that up to 55 critical buildings will retain power during blackout or flooded conditions and include analysis for microgrid architectures, performance parameters, system control, renewable energy integration, and financial opportunities (while grid connected). The results presented here are not binding and are subject to change based on input from the Hoboken stakeholders, the integrator selected to manage and implement the microgrid, or other subject matter experts during the detailed (final) phase of the design effort.

This document describes a microgrid cyber security reference architecture. First, we present a high-level concept of operations for a microgrid, including operational modes, necessary power actors, and the communication protocols typically employed. We then describe our motivation for designing a secure microgrid; in particular, we provide general network and industrial control system (ICS)-speci c vulnerabilities, a threat model, information assurance compliance concerns, and design criteria for a microgrid control system network. Our design approach addresses these concerns by segmenting the microgrid control system network into enclaves, grouping enclaves into functional domains, and describing actor communication using data exchange attributes. We describe cyber actors that can help mitigate potential vulnerabilities, in addition to performance bene ts and vulnerability mitigation that may be realized using this reference architecture. To illustrate our design approach, we present a notional a microgrid control system network implementation, including types of communica- tion occurring on that network, example data exchange attributes for actors in the network, an example of how the network can be segmented to create enclaves and functional domains, and how cyber actors can be used to enforce network segmentation and provide the neces- sary level of security. Finally, we describe areas of focus for the further development of the reference architecture.