A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain high despite a long-term strategy by South Korea to increase inter-Korean exchanges in economics, culture, sports, and other topics. This is because the process of reconciliation has rarely extended to military and security topics and those initiatives that were negotiated have been ineffective. Bilateral interactions must include actions to reduce threats and improve confidence associated with conventional military forces (land, sea, and air) as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological activities that are applicable to developing and producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The purpose of this project is to develop concepts for inter-Korean confidence building measures (CBMs) for military and WMD topics that South Korea could propose to the North when conditions are right. This report describes the historical and policy context for developing security-related CBMs and presents an array of bilateral options for conventional military and WMD topics within a consistent framework. The conceptual CBMs address two scenarios: (1) improved relations where construction of a peace regime becomes a full agenda item in inter-Korean dialogue, and (2) continued tense inter-Korean relations. Some measures could be proposed in the short term under current conditions, others might be implemented in a series of steps, while some require a higher level of cooperation than currently exists. To support decision making by political leaders, this research focuses on strategies and policy options and does not include technical details.
The waters surrounding Taiwan are important international waterways. In addition to merchant ships of every nation, the warships of the United States, Japan, Russia, and China may appear in these waters. No hostility is expected between Taiwan and the United States, Japan, or Russia; however, Taiwan and China have a tense relationship, and both sides face a potential for naval incidents. As Taiwan and China expand their naval capability, the International Maritime Organization Convention for the lnternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea may not be sufficient to prevent naval incidents, any of which might develop into conflict or war. Therefore, China and Taiwan need to develop maritime confidence building measures (CBMs) that could reduce the chance of naval incidents and strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Among the variety of maritime CBM concepts for military purposes, the most successful and effective measure has been the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Union Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA). The success of the agreement demonstrates that CBMs represent a workable alternative to traditional arms controls. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a concrete approach to the constraint of naval activities between China and Taiwan to reduce accidents and misunderstandings. This paper outlines the categories and characteristics of incidents at sea. Next, the author identifies the successful factors of the U.S.-Soviet INCSEA and applies the INCSEA concept to the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the author develops a framework of options and a step-by-step approach for establishing an INCSEA between Taiwan and China.
The economies of East Asia are predominantly export based and, therefore, place special emphasis on the security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Due to economic globalization, the United States shares these concerns. Cooperative measures by the concerned parties could reduce the potential for disruption by maritime conflicts. Primary threats against the SLOCs are disputes over the resources under the seas, disputes over some small island groups, disputes between particular parties (China-Taiwan and North-South Korea), or illegal activities like smuggling, piracy, or terrorism. This paper provides an overview on these threats, issue by issue, to identify common elements and needed cooperation. Cooperation on other topics such as search and rescue, fisheries protection, and oil spill response may help support improved relations to prevent maritime conflicts. Many technologies can help support maritime cooperation, including improved communications links, tracking and emergency beacon devices, and satellite imaging. Appropriate technical and political means are suggested for each threat to the SLOCs.
Terrorism is a scourge common to the international community and its threat to world peace and stability is severe and imminent. This paper evaluates the campaign against terrorism and the possible modalities of constructive cooperation between China and the United States in this fight. Technical cooperation can enhance Sino-U.S. security capabilities for dealing with the terrorist threat. This paper identifies specific bilateral cooperative activities that may benefit common interests. Focusing on protecting people, facilities, and infrastructure, Sino-U.S. cooperation may introduce protective technologies and training, including means of boosting port and border security, and detecting explosives or nuclear materials. Cooperation will not only enhance the global counterterrorism campaign, but also form a sound foundation for constructive and cooperative relations between the two countries.