This lecture is on the design of a Uranium Dioxide-Beryllium Oxide UO2-BeO Critical Experiment at Sandia. This presentation provides background info on the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR). Additionally, this presentation shows experimental and alternative designs and concludes with a sensitivity analysis.
Members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have updated the suite of benchmark problems developed to validate MCNP6 Version 2.0 for use in NCS applications. The updated NCS benchmark suite adds approximately 600 new benchmarks and includes peer review of all input files by two different NCS engineers (or one NCS engineer and one candidate NCS engineer). As with the originally released benchmark suite, the updated suite covers a broad range of fissile material types, material forms, moderators, reflectors, and neutron energy spectra. The benchmark suite provides a basis to establish a bias and bias uncertainty for use in NCS analyses at SNL.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Transactions of the American Nuclear Society
There has only been one naturally occurring reactor region (Oklo) identified historically. There has to have been other factors that prevented uncontrolled nuclear criticality events. There are higher concentration uranium depositions in the earth's crust than the Oklo region, that did not go critical based on uranium enrichment. There are many papers on the Oklo phenomena which do not address why the uranium did not reach criticality prior to the historical point of 2 billion years ago, nor do they specifically address the lack of radiogenic lead in any of the uranium deposits. Consideration of the lack of lead as a potential indicator of the age of the earth as being a possible factor. Reports which address the leaching effect could consider the reactivity effect of moderation associated with higher enrichment uranium. The lack of radiogenic lead associated with the uranium may or may not be due to leaching. Also, the higher concentration uranium deposits (>15%) were discovered in the 1990s, and reevaluation of the overall effect on a natural reactor criticality were not considered. The high reactivity levels and the low quantity of radiogenic lead identified in uranium tailings, tends to favor a significantly shorter time period or a highly efficient naturally occurring leaching process. A shorter time period would reduce uranium mass and enrichment. Given even a small quantity of moderator would allow an uncontrolled nuclear criticality for high concentration uranium deposits for enrichment between 3 and 8 percent 235 U. The evaluation and analysis of the nuclear criticality safety factors should be evaluated further to document the actual uranium ore grade, and Pb constituents. Identification of the macro-scale quantity (PPM) of radiogenic lead coupled with the NCS factors could be a more useful tool for determining the age of the earth. Further calculations could be considered to determine the impact of different rock formations and materials where uranium is located, and evaluation of the natural leaching of uranium and its decay by-products to associate the effect of radiogenic lead or other materials.
Transactions of the American Nuclear Society
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
ICNC 2015 - International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety
The process nuclear criticality accident that occurred at the Mayak Production Association (Chelyabinsk-40) on January 2, 1958 involving a vessel of uranyl nitrate solution claimed the lives of three workers and left a fourth worker with continuing health problems. There are a myriad of uncertain parameters involved with this accident: What was the molarity of the solution? How much solution was in the vessel at the time of the accident? In what position was the vessel and the solution when it went critical? How important was the impact of reflection due to the workers and/or the floor? These uncertain parameters have made this accident particularly difficult to analyze in the past. This work aims to lower the uncertainty on some of these parameters. A most-probable solution composition is determined by comparing literature on the physical properties of uranyl nitrate solutions to those presented in LA-13638 [1], which describes the accident in question. Using this most-probable solution, the main contributions to the reactivity of the system and hence the eventual accident, are identified through Serpent 2 and OpenFOAM analyses. Serpent 2, a Monte Carlo software tool, is used to perform calculations of the reactivity effects of lowering the vessel toward the floor and the reactivity added by the close proximity of workers. OpenFOAM, a C++ partial differential equation solver toolkit, is used to simulate the fluid inside the vessel as the vessel is tipped. This is done by treating the solution and air inside the vessel as two incompressible, isothermal, and immiscible fluids using a volume of fluid (VoF) approach. The goal of this approach is simply to track the interface between the two fluids, and hence give an accurate description of the geometrical structure of the solution as the vessel is tipped. These two unique tools are then coupled to provide a time-dependent flow simulation to study the effect that the changing geometrical structure had on the criticality of the system, which is novel to the criticality safety field. This work provides a more accurate picture of the accident going forward. Key Words: Serpent 2, OpenFOAM, multi-physics, prompt neutron excursion, nuclear criticality safety accident, process condition change.