The V31 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate (RCMD) as a third - generation EDS containment vessel. It is the fifth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the 2019 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the c ode c ase, is twenty - four (24) pounds TNT - equivalent for up to 1092 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were performed on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque , New Mexico to qualify the vessel for field ope rations use. There were three design basis configurations for qualification testing. Qualification test (1) consisted of a simulated M55 rocket motor and warhead assembly of 24lbs of Composition C - 4 (30 lb TNT equivalent). This test was considered the maxi mum load case, based on modeling and simulation methods performed by Sandia prior to the vessel design phase. Qualification test (2) consisted of a regular, right circular cylinder, unitary charge, located central to the vessel interior of 19.2 lb of Compo sition C - 4 (24 lb TNT equivalent). Qualification test (3) consisted of a 12 - pack of regular, right circular cylinders of 2 lb each, distributed evenly inside the vessel (totaling 19.2 lb of C - 4, or 24 lb TNT equivalent). All vessel acceptance criteria were met.
Sandia National Laboratories was tasked by the United States Army Recovered Chemical Materiel Directorate with evaluating the fitness of the Transportable Detonation Chamber for use in demilitarization of chemical munitions. The chamber was instrumented with strain, pressure, and acceleration sensors to study its behavior during explosive tests ranging from 1.25 to 20 lb of explosive charge weight. The structural response of the chamber and techniques recommended by the manufacturer- use of water bags and sand-filled walls-were assessed. Through this testing, it was found that the two techniques did not significantly affect the chamber's response. It was also discovered that the structural integrity of the chamber (and, therefore, its suitability for use with chemical agents) was compromised, as some welds failed. Sandia does not recommend using this vessel for chemical munition demilitarization. This chamber is suitable, however, for demilitarization of conventional munitions, in which fragments and overpressure are the primary concern.
The V27 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate ( RCMD ) as a replacement vessel for use on the P2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It is the third EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT - equivalent for up to 637 detonations . This report documents the results of explosive tests that were done on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque New Mexico to qualify the vessel for explosive use . The primary qualification test consisted of si x 1.5 pound charges of Composition C - 4 (equivalent to 11.25 pounds TNT) distributed around the vessel in accordance with the User Design Specification. Four subsequent tests using less explosive evaluated the effects of slight variations in orientation of the charges . All vessel acceptance criteria were met.
The V26 containment vessel was procured by the Project Manager, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel (PMNSCM) for use on the Phase-2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It was fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels [1]. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT-equivalent for up to 637 detonations. This report documents the results of tests that were performed on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories to qualify the vessel for explosive use [2]. Three of these explosive tests consisted of: (1) 9lbs bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 11.25lbs TNT); (2) a 7.2lbs bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 9lbs TNT); (3) a bare charge of 9lbs cast TNT. The results of these tests are compared in order to provide an understanding of how varying charge size affects vessel response when the ratio of free volume to charge volume is small, and in making direct comparisons between TNT and Composition C-4 for TNT equivalency calculations. In a previous paper [3], the 7.2lbs bare charge of Composition C-4, (2) above, was compared to 7.2lbs of Composition C-4 distributed into 6 charges.
This report documents the results of two of tests that were performed on an explosive containment vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico in July 2013 to provide some deeper understanding of the effects of charge geometry on the vessel response [1]. The vessel was fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels [2]. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT-equivalent. One explosive test consisted of a single, centrally located, 7.2 pound bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 9 pounds TNT). The other test used six each 1.2 pound charges of Composition C-4 (7.2 pounds total) distributed in two bays of three.
The objective of the test was to qualify the vessel for its intended use by subjecting it to a 1.25 times overtest. The criteria for success are that the measured strains do not exceed the calculated strains from the vessel analysis, there is no significant additional plastic strain on subsequent tests at the rated design load (shakedown), and there is no significant damage to the vessel and attached hardware that affect form, fit, or function. Testing of the V25 Vessel in 2011 established a precedent for testing V26 [2]. As with V25, two tests were performed to satisfy this objective. The first test used 9 pounds of Composition C-4 (11.25 lbs. TNT-equivalent), which is 125 percent of the design basis load. The second test used 7.2 pounds of Composition C-4 (9 lbs. TNT-equivalent) which is 100 percent of the design basis load. The first test provided the required overtest while the second test served to demonstrate shakedown and the absence of additional plastic deformation. Unlike the V25 vessel, which was mounted in a shipping cradle during testing, the V26 vessel was mounted on the EDS P2U3 trailer prior to testing. Visual inspections of the EDS vessel, surroundings, and diagnostics were completed before and after each test event. This visual inspection included analyzing the seals, fittings, and interior surfaces of the EDS vessel and documenting any abnormalities or damages. Photographs were used to visually document vessel conditions and findings before and after each test event.
Predicting failure of thin-walled structures from explosive loading is a very complex task. The problem can be divided into two parts; the detonation of the explosive to produce the loading on the structure, and secondly the structural response. First, the factors that affect the explosive loading include: size, shape, stand-off, confinement, and chemistry of the explosive. The goal of the first part of the analysis is predicting the pressure on the structure based on these factors. The hydrodynamic code CTH is used to conduct these calculations. Secondly, the response of a structure from the explosive loading is predicted using a detailed finite element model within the explicit analysis code Presto. Material response, to failure, must be established in the analysis to model the failure of this class of structures; validation of this behavior is also required to allow these analyses to be predictive for their intended use. The presentation will detail the validation tests used to support this program. Validation tests using explosively loaded aluminum thin flat plates were used to study all the aspects mentioned above. Experimental measurements of the pressures generated by the explosive and the resulting plate deformations provided data for comparison against analytical predictions. These included pressure-time histories and digital image correlation of the full field plate deflections. The issues studied in the structural analysis were mesh sensitivity, strain based failure metrics, and the coupling methodologies between the blast and structural models. These models have been successfully validated using these tests, thereby increasing confidence of the results obtained in the prediction of failure thresholds of complex structures, including aircraft.
This report summarizes probable causes and contributing factors that led to a rocket motor initiating prematurely while employees were preparing instrumentation for an AIII rocket sled test at SNL/NM, resulting in a Type-B Accident. Originally prepared by the Technical Advisory Team that provided technical assistance to the NNSA's Accident Investigation Board, the report includes analyses of several proposed causes and concludes that the most probable source of power for premature initiation of the rocket motor was the independent battery contained in the HiCap recorder package. The report includes data, evidence, and proposed scenarios to substantiate the analyses.