A key objective of the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign is to better understand the technical basis, risks, and uncertainty associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. Commercial nuclear power generation in the United States has resulted in thousands of metric tons of SNF, the disposal of which is the responsibility of the DOE (Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended). Any repository licensed to dispose of SNF must meet requirements regarding the long-term performance of that repository. For an evaluation of the long-term performance of the repository, one of the events that may need to be considered is the SNF achieving a critical configuration during the postclosure period. Of particular interest is the potential behavior of SNF in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently licensed and being used to store and transport SNF but were not designed for permanent geologic disposal. A study has been initiated to examine the potential consequences, with respect to long-term repository performance, of criticality events that might occur during the postclosure period in a hypothetical repository containing DPCs. The first phase (a scoping phase) consisted of developing an approach to creating the modeling tools and techniques that may eventually be needed to either include or exclude criticality from a performance assessment (PA) as appropriate; this scoping phase is documented in Price et al. (2019a). In the second phase, that modeling approach was implemented and future work was identified, as documented in Price et al. (2019b). This report gives the results of a repository-scale PA examining the potential consequences of postclosure criticality, as well as the information, modeling tools, and techniques needed to incorporate the effects of postclosure criticality in the PA.
Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors-- increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aims of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives. This page left blank intentionally
This document details the Fiscal Year 2016 modeling efforts to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) experiments. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.
This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.
The Terry turbine is a small, single-stage, compound-velocity impulse turbine originally designed and manufactured by the Terry Steam Turbine Company purchased by Ingersoll-Rand in 1974. Terry turbines are currently manufactured and marketed by Dresser-Rand. Terry turbines were principally designed for waste-steam applications. Terry turbopumps are ubiquitous to the US nuclear fleet as a steam driven turbopump in either the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) and high pressure coolant injection systems for boiling water reactors (BWRs) or in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) system for pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
ANS IHLRWM 2017 - 16th International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference: Creating a Safe and Secure Energy Future for Generations to Come - Driving Toward Long-Term Storage and Disposal
Transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to increase in the future, as the nuclear fuel infrastructure continues to expand and fuel takeback programs increase in popularity. Analysis of potential risks and threats to SNF shipments is currently performed separately for safety and security. However, as SNF transportation increases, the plausible threats beyond individual categories and the interactions between them become more apparent. A new approach is being developed to integrate safety, security, and safeguards (3S) under a system-theoretic framework and a probabilistic risk framework. At the first stage, a simplified scenario will be implemented using a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) method. This scenario considers a rail derailment followed by an attack. The consequences of derailment are calculated with RADTRAN, a transportation risk analysis code. The attack scenarios are analyzed with STAGE, a combat simulation model. The consequences of the attack are then calculated with RADTRAN. Note that both accident and attack result in SNF cask damage and a potential release of some fraction of the SNF inventory into the environment. The major purpose of this analysis was to develop the input data for DPRA. Generic PWR and BWR transportation casks were considered. These data were then used to demonstrate the consequences of hypothetical accidents in which the radioactive materials were released into the environment. The SNF inventory is one of the most important inputs into the analysis. Several pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel burnups and discharge times were considered for this proof-of-concept. The inventory was calculated using ORIGEN (point depletion and decay computer code, Oak Ridge National Laboratory) for 3 characteristic burnup values (40, 50, and 60 GWD/MTU) and 4 fuel ages (5, 10, 25 and 50 years after discharge). The major consequences unique to the transportation of SNF for both accident and attack are the results of the dispersion of radionuclides in the environment. The dynamic atmospheric dispersion model in RADTRAN was used to calculate these consequences. The examples of maximum exposed individual (MEI) dose, early mortality and soil contamination are discussed to demonstrate the importance of different factors. At the next stage, the RADTRAN outputs will be converted into a form compatible with the STAGE analysis. As a result, identification of additional risks related to the interaction between characteristics becomes a more straightforward task. In order to present the results of RADTRAN analysis in a framework compatible with the results of the STAGE analysis, the results will be grouped into three categories: • Immediate negative harms •Future benefits that cannot be realized •Additional increases in future risk By describing results within generically applicable categories, the results of safety analysis are able to be placed in context with the risk arising from security events.
Radionuclide inventories are generated to permit detailed analyses of the Fukushima Daiichi meltdowns. This is necessary information for severe accident calculations, dose calculations, and source term and consequence analyses. Inventories are calculated using SCALE6 and compared to values predicted by international researchers supporting the OECD/NEA's Benchmark Study on the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (BSAF). Both sets of inventory information are acceptable for best-estimate analyses of the Fukushima reactors. Consistent nuclear information for severe accident codes, including radionuclide class masses and core decay powers, are also derived from the SCALE6 analyses. Key nuclide activity ratios are calculated as functions of burnup and nuclear data in order to explore the utility for nuclear forensics and support future decommissioning efforts.
Efforts are being pursued to develop and qualify a system-level model of a reactor core isolation (RCIC) steam-turbine-driven pump. The model is being developed with the intent of employing it to inform the design of experimental configurations for full-scale RCIC testing. The model is expected to be especially valuable in sizing equipment needed in the testing. An additional intent is to use the model in understanding more fully how RCIC apparently managed to operate far removed from its design envelope in the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 accident. RCIC modeling is proceeding along two avenues that are expected to complement each other well. The first avenue is the continued development of the system-level RCIC model that will serve in simulating a full reactor system or full experimental configuration of which a RCIC system is part. The model reasonably represents a RCIC system today, especially given design operating conditions, but lacks specifics that are likely important in representing the off-design conditions a RCIC system might experience in an emergency situation such as a loss of all electrical power. A known specific lacking in the system model, for example, is the efficiency at which a flashing slug of water (as opposed to a concentrated jet of steam) could propel the rotating drive wheel of a RCIC turbine. To address this specific, the second avenue is being pursued wherein computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analyses of such a jet are being carried out. The results of the CFD analyses will thus complement and inform the system modeling. The system modeling will, in turn, complement the CFD analysis by providing the system information needed to impose appropriate boundary conditions on the CFD simulations. The system model will be used to inform the selection of configurations and equipment best suitable of supporting planned RCIC experimental testing. Preliminary investigations with the RCIC model indicate that liquid water ingestion by the turbine decreases the developed turbine torque; the RCIC speed then slows, and thus the pump flow rate to the RPV decreases. Subsequently, RPV water level decreases due to continued boiling and the liquid fraction flowing to the RCIC decreases, thereby accelerating the RCIC and refilling the RPV. The feedback cycle then repeats itself and/or reaches a quasi-steady equilibrium condition. In other words, the water carry-over is limited by cyclic RCIC performance degradation, and hence the system becomes self-regulating. The indications achieved to date with the system model are more qualitative than quantitative. The avenues being pursued to increase the fidelity of the model are expected to add quantitative realism. The end product will be generic in the sense that the RCIC model will be incorporable within the larger reactor coolant system model of any nuclear power plant or experimental configuration.
This document provides Sandia National Laboratories’ meeting notes and presentations at the Society for Modeling and Simulation Power Plant Simulator conference in Jacksonville, FL. The conference was held January 26-28, 2015, and SNL was invited by the U.S. nuclear industry to present Fukushima modeling insights and lessons learned.
A simplified but mechanistic governing equation for a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is developed to support investigations into severe accident mitigation strategies. Since the RCIC uses a single-stage impulse turbine, the model is essentially the application of Newton's Laws for a rotational system. Specifically, the control volume formulation of angular momentum conservation is used to derive an equation of motion that is simple enough to be implemented as user input for lumped parameter codes such as MELCOR. Preliminary testing of the RCIC equations and solution methodology has been completed. The equations are integrated into MELCOR input via control functions for scoping calculations; the derivation of the equations and solution methods are intentionally selected to facilitate this effort and the subsequent scoping calculations. The MELCOR model used for the test calculations contains simplified representations of the RCS and RCIC piping for a generic 2000 MW BWR. Scoping calculations of the accident scenario at Fukushima unit 2 are presented that show promising initial results. In conjunction with a literature review of RCIC turbine design, a key conclusion is established that the simplicity and pure-impulse design of the turbine facilitates computational modeling using simplified (lumped-parameter) momentum methods.
Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self - correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the syste m's design to manage the accident. While inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety , thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intend of exploring two issues : (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayes ian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform (1). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author s would like to acknowledge the U.S. Department of E nergy's Office of Nuclear Energy for funding this research through Work Package SR - 14SN100303 under the Advanced Reactor Concepts program. The authors also acknowledge the PRA teams at A rgonne N ational L aborator y , O ak R idge N ational L aborator y , and I daho N ational L aborator y for their continue d contributions to the advanced reactor PRA mission area.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) plans to conduct uncertainty analyses (UA) on the Fukushima Daiichi unit (1F1) plant with the MELCOR code. The model to be used was developed for a previous accident reconstruction investigation jointly sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, that study only examined a handful of various model inputs and boundary conditions, and the predictions yielded only fair agreement with plant data and current release estimates. The goal of this uncertainty study is to perform a focused evaluation of uncertainty in core melt progression behavior and its effect on key figures-of-merit (e.g., hydrogen production, vessel lower head failure, etc.). In preparation for the SNL Fukushima UA work, a scoping study has been completed to identify important core melt progression parameters for the uncertainty analysis. The study also lays out a preliminary UA methodology.
This paper describes the knowledge advancements from the uncertainty analysis for the State-of- the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) unmitigated long-term station blackout accident scenario at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. This work assessed key MELCOR and MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, Version 2 (MACCS2) modeling uncertainties in an integrated fashion to quantify the relative importance of each uncertain input on potential accident progression, radiological releases, and off-site consequences. This quantitative uncertainty analysis provides measures of the effects on consequences, of each of the selected uncertain parameters both individually and in interaction with other parameters. The results measure the model response (e.g., variance in the output) to uncertainty in the selected input. Investigation into the important uncertain parameters in turn yields insights into important phenomena for accident progression and off-site consequences. This uncertainty analysis confirmed the known importance of some parameters, such as failure rate of the Safety Relief Valve in accident progression modeling and the dry deposition velocity in off-site consequence modeling. The analysis also revealed some new insights, such as dependent effect of cesium chemical form for different accident progressions. (auth)
In response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in Japan, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and US. Department of Energy agreed to jointly sponsor an accident reconstruction study as a means of assessing the severe accident modeling capability of the MELCOR code and developing an understanding of the likely accident progression. Objectives of the project included reconstruction of the accident progressions using computer models and accident data, and validation of MELCOR and the Fukushima models against plant data. In this study Sandia National Laboratories developed MELCOR 2.1 models of Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 (IFI), 2, and 3 as well as the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. This paper reports on the analysis of the 1F1 accident. Details are presented on the modeled accident progression, hypothesized mode of failures in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and containment pressure boundary, and release of fission products to the environment. The MELCOR-predicted RPV and containment pressure trends compare well with available measured pressures. Conditions leading up to the observed explosion of the reactor building are postulated based on this analysis where drywell head flange leakage is thought to have led to accumulation of flammable gases in the refueling bay. The favorable comparison of the results from the analyses with the data from the plant provides additional confidence in MELCOR to reliably predict real-world accident progression. The modeling effort has also provided insights into future data needs for both model development and validation.
Data, a brief description of key boundary conditions, and results of Sandia National Laboratories’ ongoing MELCOR analysis of the Fukushima Unit 2 accident are given for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. Important assumptions and related boundary conditions in the current analysis additional to or different than what was assumed/imposed in the work of SAND2012-6173 are identified. This work is for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy University Programs fiscal year 2014 Reactor Safety Technologies Research and Development Program RC-7: RCIC Performance under Severe Accident Conditions.