Publications

Proton-induced singl -event effects hardness assurance guidelines are developed to address issues raised by recent test results in advanced IC technologies for use in space environments. Specifically, guidelines are developed that address the effects of proton energy and angle of incidence on single-event latchup and the effects of total dose on single-event upset. The guidelines address both single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), and combined SEU and total ionizing dose (TID) effects. © 2006 IEEE.

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Large and unexpected radiation-induced voltage shifts have been observed for some MOS technologies exposed to moisture. The mechanisms for these large voltage shifts and their implications for long-term aging are discussed.

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The effect of total dose on SEU hardness is investigated as a function of temperature and power supply voltage to determine worst-case hardness assurance test conditions for space environments. SRAMs from six different vendors were characterized for single-event upset (SEU) hardness at proton energies from 20 to 500 MeV and at temperatures of 25 and 80°C after total dose irradiating the SRAMs with either protons, Co-60 gamma rays, or low-energy x-rays. It is shown that total dose irradiation and the memory pattern written to the memory array during total dose irradiation and SEU characterization can substantially affect SEU hardness for some SRAMs. For one SRAM, the memory pattern made more than two orders of magnitude difference in SEU cross section at the highest total dose level examined. For all SRAMs investigated, the memory pattern that led to the largest increase in SEU cross section was the same memory pattern that led to the maximum increase in total-dose induced power supply leakage current. In addition, it is shown that increasing the temperature during SEU characterization can also increase the effect of total dose on SEU hardness. As a result, worst-case SEU hardness assurance test conditions are the maximum total dose and temperature of the system environment, and the minimum operating voltage of the SRAM. Possible screens for determining whether or not the SEU cross section of an SRAM will vary with total dose, based on the magnitude of the increase in power supply leakage current with total dose or the variation in SEU cross section with power supply voltage, have been suggested. In contrast to previous works, our results using selective area x-ray irradiations show that the source of the effect of total dose on SEU hardness is radiation-induced leakage currents in the memory cells. The increase in SEU cross section with total dose appears to be consistent with radiation-induced currents originating in the memory cells affecting the output bias levels of bias level shift circuitry used to control the voltage levels to the memory cells and/or due to the lowering of the noise margin of individual memory cells caused by radiation-induced leakage currents. © 2006 IEEE.

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The effect of proton energy on single-event latchup (SEL) in present-day SRAMs is investigated over a wide range of proton energies and temperature. SRAMs from five different vendors were irradiated at proton energies from 20 to 500 MeV and at temperatures of 25° and 85°C. For the SRAMs and radiation conditions examined in this work, proton energy SEL thresholds varied from as low as 20 MeV to as high as 490 MeV. To gain insight into the observed effects, the heavy-ion SEL linear energy transfer (LET) thresholds of the SRAMs were measured and compared to high-energy transport calculations of proton interactions with different materials. For some SRAMs that showed proton-induced SEL, the heavy-ion SEL threshold LET was as high as 25 MeV-cm 2/mg. Proton interactions with Si cannot generate nuclear recoils with LETs this large. Our nuclear scattering calculations suggest that the nuclear recoils are generated by proton interactions with tungsten. Tungsten plugs are commonly used in most high-density ICs fabricated today, including SRAMs. These results demonstrate that for system applications where latchups cannot be tolerated, SEL hardness assurance testing should be performed at a proton energy at least as high as the highest proton energy present in the system environment. Moreover, the best procedure to ensure that ICs will be latchup free in proton environments may be to use a heavy-ion source with LETs ≥40 MeV-cm 2/mg. © 2005 IEEE.

The total dose hardness of several commercial power MOSFET technologies is examined. After exposure to 20 krad(SiO{sub 2}) most of the n- and p-channel devices examined in this work show substantial (2 to 6 orders of magnitude) increases in off-state leakage current. For the n-channel devices, the increase in radiation-induced leakage current follows standard behavior for moderately thick gate oxides, i.e., the increase in leakage current is dominated by large negative threshold voltage shifts, which cause the transistor to be partially on even when no bias is applied to the gate electrode. N-channel devices biased during irradiation show a significantly larger leakage current increase than grounded devices. The increase in leakage current for the p-channel devices, however, was unexpected. For the p-channel devices, it is shown using electrical characterization and simulation that the radiation-induced leakage current increase is related to an increase in the reverse bias leakage characteristics of the gated diode which is formed by the drain epitaxial layer and the body. This mechanism does not significantly contribute to radiation-induced leakage current in typical p-channel MOS transistors. The p-channel leakage current increase is nearly identical for both biased and grounded irradiations and therefore has serious implications for long duration missions since even devices which are usually powered off could show significant degradation and potentially fail.

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