Evaluating the Effectiveness of Insider Threat Mitigation Systems
Abstract not provided.
Publications
Project Summary 27th International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities
Abstract not provided.
Sandia National Laboratories: World-class scientific, engineering, and cyber solutions for safer, more secure nuclear technologies
Abstract not provided.
ITC Conference Booth_R&A.pdf
Abstract not provided.
TTD Display - Integrated Security Facility - sample camera layout
Abstract not provided.
PTVA Student Handout
Abstract not provided.
Developing the State?s Capacity to Perform Evaluations of Physical Security Systems
Abstract not provided.
Springfield Processing Plant* (A Hypothetical Facility) SPP, Entry Control Point and Vehicle Gate Access Control Post Order
This hypothetical order provides the requirements and instructions for the Springfield Processing Plant (SPP) Vehicle Gate and Entry Control Point (ECP) in the perimeter access building. The purpose of this post is to prevent the theft, sabotage or diversion of nuclear material (NM), control access and exit at the protected area, and to respond to emergencies according the SPP Guard Force (GF) Contingency Plan and as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.
Integrated Performance Testing Workshop - Supplemental Materials (Scripts and Procedures)
A variety of performance tests are described relating to: Material Transfers; Emergency Evacuation; Alarm Response Assessment; and an Enhanced Limited Scope Performance Test (ELSPT). Procedures are given for: nuclear material physical inventory and discrepancy; material transfers; and emergency evacuation.
Evaluation of the applicability of existing nuclear power plant regulatory requirements in the U.S. to advanced small modular reactors
The current wave of small modular reactor (SMR) designs all have the goal of reducing the cost of management and operations. By optimizing the system, the goal is to make these power plants safer, cheaper to operate and maintain, and more secure. In particular, the reduction in plant staffing can result in significant cost savings. The introduction of advanced reactor designs and increased use of advanced automation technologies in existing nuclear power plants will likely change the roles, responsibilities, composition, and size of the crews required to control plant operations. Similarly, certain security staffing requirements for traditional operational nuclear power plants may not be appropriate or necessary for SMRs due to the simpler, safer and more automated design characteristics of SMRs. As a first step in a process to identify where regulatory requirements may be met with reduced staffing and therefore lower cost, this report identifies the regulatory requirements and associated guidance utilized in the licensing of existing reactors. The potential applicability of these regulations to advanced SMR designs is identified taking into account the unique features of these types of reactors.
Generic small modular reactor plant design
This report gives an overview of expected design characteristics, concepts, and procedures for small modular reactors. The purpose of this report is to provide those who are interested in reducing the cost and improving the safety of advanced nuclear power plants with a generic design that possesses enough detail in a non-sensitive manner to give merit to their conclusions. The report is focused on light water reactor technology, but does add details on what could be different in a more advanced design (see Appendix). Numerous reactor and facility concepts were used for inspiration (documented in the bibliography). The final design described here is conceptual and does not reflect any proposed concept or sub-systems, thus any details given here are only relevant within this report. This report does not include any design or engineering calculations.
Response Performance Testing
Abstract not provided.
Response Performance Testing Controller and Response Force Functions
Abstract not provided.
Bilateral Collaboration on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Abstract not provided.
Bilateral Collaboration on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Abstract not provided.
Additional ITC-22 components
Abstract not provided.
Copy of International Training Course (ITC) Weapons Demonstration
Abstract not provided.
Red Cell Point of View
Abstract not provided.
18 Results