Strategies and decisions to protect emergency responders, the public, and critical infrastructure against the effects of a radiological dispersal device detonated outdoors must be made in the planning stage, not in the early period just after an attack. This contrasts with planning for small-scale types of radiological or nuclear emergencies, or for a large-scale nuclear-power-type accident that evolves over many hours or days before radioactivity is released to the environment, such that its effects can be prospectively modeled and analyzed. By the time it is known an attack has occurred, most likely there will have been casualties, all the radioactive material will have been released, plume growth will be progressing, and there will be no time left for evaluating possible countermeasures. This paper offers guidance to planners, first responders, and senior decision makers to assist them in developing strategies for protective actions and operational procedures for the first 48 hours after an explosive radiological dispersal device has been detonated.
In support of the Cassini Mission Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was requested by Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) to investigate for various scenarios, the distribution of aerosol and particulate mass in a stabilized buoyant plume created as a result of a fireball explosion. The information obtained from these calculations is to provide background information for the radiological consequence analysis of the FSAR. Specifically, the information is used to investigate the mass distribution within the ''cap and stem'' portions of the initial fireball plume, a modeling feature included in the SATRAP module in the LMC SPARRC code. The investigation includes variation of the plume energy and the application of several meteorological conditions for a total of seven sensitivity case studies. For each of the case studies, the calculations were performed for two configurations of particle mass in the plume (total mass and plutonium mass).
Uncertainty distributions for specific parameters of the Cassini General Purpose Heat Source Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (GPHS-RTG) Final Safety Analysis Report consequence risk analysis were revised and updated. The revisions and updates were done for all consequence parameters for which relevant information exists from the joint project on Probabilistic Accident Consequence Uncertainty Analysis by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commission of European Communities.