Publications

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Strategies and decisions to protect emergency responders, the public, and critical infrastructure against the effects of a radiological dispersal device detonated outdoors must be made in the planning stage, not in the early period just after an attack. This contrasts with planning for small-scale types of radiological or nuclear emergencies, or for a large-scale nuclear-power-type accident that evolves over many hours or days before radioactivity is released to the environment, such that its effects can be prospectively modeled and analyzed. By the time it is known an attack has occurred, most likely there will have been casualties, all the radioactive material will have been released, plume growth will be progressing, and there will be no time left for evaluating possible countermeasures. This paper offers guidance to planners, first responders, and senior decision makers to assist them in developing strategies for protective actions and operational procedures for the first 48 hours after an explosive radiological dispersal device has been detonated.

One of the key issues in the aftermath of an exploded radiological dispersal device from a terrorist event is that of the contaminated victim and the concern among healthcare providers for the harmful exposures they may receive in treating patients, especially if the patient has not been thoroughly decontaminated. This is critically important in the event of mass casualties from a nuclear or radiological incident because of the essential rapidity of acute medical decisions and that those who have life- or limb-threatening injuries may have treatment unduly delayed by a decontamination process that may be unnecessary for protecting the health and safety of the patient or the healthcare provider. To estimate potential contamination of those exposed in a radiological dispersal device event, results were used from explosive aerosolization tests of surrogate radionuclides detonated with high explosives at the Sandia National Laboratories. Computer modeling was also used to assess radiation dose rates to surgical personnel treating patients with blast injuries who are contaminated with any of a variety of common radionuclides. It is demonstrated that exceptional but plausible cases may require special precautions by the healthcare provider, even while managing life-threatening injuries of a contaminated victim from a radiological dispersal device event. Copyright © 2005 Health Physics Society.

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In support of the Cassini Mission Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was requested by Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) to investigate for various scenarios, the distribution of aerosol and particulate mass in a stabilized buoyant plume created as a result of a fireball explosion. The information obtained from these calculations is to provide background information for the radiological consequence analysis of the FSAR. Specifically, the information is used to investigate the mass distribution within the ''cap and stem'' portions of the initial fireball plume, a modeling feature included in the SATRAP module in the LMC SPARRC code. The investigation includes variation of the plume energy and the application of several meteorological conditions for a total of seven sensitivity case studies. For each of the case studies, the calculations were performed for two configurations of particle mass in the plume (total mass and plutonium mass).

Uncertainty distributions for specific parameters of the Cassini General Purpose Heat Source Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (GPHS-RTG) Final Safety Analysis Report consequence risk analysis were revised and updated. The revisions and updates were done for all consequence parameters for which relevant information exists from the joint project on Probabilistic Accident Consequence Uncertainty Analysis by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commission of European Communities.