Commercial nuclear power plants typically use nuclear fuel that is enriched to less than five weight percent in the isotope 235U. However, recently several vendors have proposed new nuclear power plant designs that would use fuel with 235U enrichments between five weight percent and 19.75 weight percent. Nuclear fuel with this level of 235U enrichment is known as “high assay low-enriched uranium.” Once it has been irradiated in a nuclear reactor and becomes used (or spent) nuclear fuel, it will be stored, transported, and disposed of. However, irradiated high assay low-enriched uranium differs from typical irradiated nuclear fuel in several ways, and these differences may have economic effects on its storage, transport, and disposal, compared to typical irradiated nuclear fuel. This report describes those differences and qualitatively discusses their potential economic effects on storage, transport, and disposal.
The Spent Fuel Waste Disposition (SFWD) program is planning to conduct a full-scale seismic shake table test on the dry storage systems of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to close the gap related to seismic loads on fuel assemblies in dry storage systems. This test will allow for quantifying the strains and accelerations on surrogate fuel assembly hardware and cladding during earthquakes of different magnitudes and frequency content. Full-scale testing is needed because a dry storage system is a complex and highly nonlinear system making it hard to predict (model) the responses to seismic excitations. The non-linearity arises from the multiple spatial gaps in the system – between fuel rods and the basket, between the basket and dry storage canister, between the dry storage canister and the storage cask (overpack), and ventilation gaps. The non-linearities pose significant limitations on the value of tests with scaled systems.
The Spent Fuel Waste Disposition (SFWD) program under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is planning a seismic shake table test of full-scale dry storage systems of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to close the gap related to the seismic loads on the fuel assemblies in dry storage systems. This test will allow for quantifying the strains and accelerations on surrogate fuel assembly during representative earthquakes. A concrete layer will be installed on the shake table before the test to simulate conditions representative of an ISFSI pad. In the shake table tests with the vertical cask, the cask will be free-standing because this is representative of all, except two, ISFSIs in the U.S. with vertical dry storage casks. The static and dynamic friction coefficients between the steel bottom of the cask and the concrete layer on the shake table are important parameters that will affect cask behavior during the test. These parameters must be known for the pre- and post-test modelling, data analysis, and model validation. The friction experiment was performed at the Engineering Department of the University of New Mexico (UNM) to determine the friction coefficients between a steel plate with the same finish as the bottom of the vertical cask manufactured for the test and different concrete surfaces. In this experiment the steel plate was fixed and the concrete sample was pulled over the plate with a constant displacement rate using an MTS machine. This allowed for collecting continuous horizontal force data over the length of the steel plate. Four displacement rates and three vertical loads were used. The tests were performed with four concrete blocks with different degrees of the surface roughness - light sandblast, light to medium sandblast, medium bush hammer, and heavy sandblast. The total number of tests was 48. The data were used to calculate static and dynamic friction coefficients.
The PRO-X program is actively supporting the design of nuclear systems by developing a framework to both optimize the fuel cycle infrastructure for advanced reactors (ARs) and minimize the potential for production of weapons-usable nuclear material. Three study topics are currently being investigated by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with support from Argonne National Laboratories (ANL). This multi-lab collaboration is focused on three study topics which may offer proliferation resistance opportunities or advantages in the nuclear fuel cycle. These topics are: 1) Transportation Global Landscape, 2) Transportation Avoidability, and 3) Parallel Modular Systems vs Single Large System (Crosscutting Activity).
This report documents the updated seismic shake table test plan. The report describes the shake table inputs (ground motions), test hardware, shake table facility, friction experiment, and proposed instrumentation.
This report is a preliminary test plan of the seismic shake table test. The final report will be developed when all decisions regarding the test hardware, instrumentation, and shake table inputs are made. A new revision of this report will be issued in spring of 2022. The preliminary test plan documents the free-field ground motions that will be used as inputs to the shake table, the test hardware, and instrumentation. It also describes the facility at which the test will take place in late summer of 2022.
Management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste consists of three main phases – storage, transportation, and disposal – commonly referred to as the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Current practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States (US) includes temporary storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage systems at operating or shutdown nuclear power plants. Storage pools are filling to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler spent fuel from pools into dry storage. Unless a repository becomes available that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 136,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage systems by mid-century, when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for dry storage systems rely on large multi-assembly canisters, the most common of which are so-called “dual-purpose canisters” (DPCs). DPCs are certified for both storage and transportation, but are not designed or licensed for permanent disposal. The large capacity (greater number of spent fuel assemblies) of these canisters can lead to higher canister temperatures, which can delay transportation and/or complicate disposal. This current management practice, in which the utilities continue loading an ever-increasing inventory of larger DPCs, does not emphasize integration among storage, transportation, and disposal. This lack of integration does not cause safety issues, but it does lead to a suboptimal system that increases costs, complicates storage and transportation operations, and limits options for permanent disposal. This paper describes strategies for improving integration of management practices in the US across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The complex interactions between storage, transportation, and disposal make a single optimal solution unlikely. However, efforts to integrate various phases of nuclear waste management can have the greatest impact if they begin promptly and continue to evolve throughout the remaining life of the current fuel cycle. A key factor that influences the path forward for integration of nuclear waste management practices is the identification of the timing and location for a repository. The most cost-effective path forward would be to open a repository by mid-century with the capability to directly dispose of DPCs without repackaging the spent fuel into disposalready canisters. Options that involve repackaging of spent fuel from DPCs into disposalready canisters or that delay the repository opening significantly beyond mid-century could add 10s of billions of dollars to the total system life cycle cost.
Currently, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is stored in on-site independent spent-fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) at seventythree (73) nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the US. Because a site for geologic repository for permanent disposal of SNF has not been constructed, the SNF will remain in dry storage significantly longer than planned. During this time, the ISFSIs, and potentially consolidated storage facilities, will experience earthquakes of different magnitudes. The dry storage systems are designed and licensed to withstand large seismic loads. When dry storage systems experience seismic loads, there are little data on the response of SNF assemblies contained within them. The Spent Fuel Waste Disposition (SFWD) program is planning to conduct a full-scale seismic shake table test to close the gap related to the seismic loads on the fuel assemblies in dry storage systems. This test will allow for quantifying the strains and accelerations on surrogate fuel assembly hardware and cladding during earthquakes of different magnitudes and frequency content. The main component of the test unit will be the full-scale NUHOMS 32 PTH2 dry storage canister. The canister will be loaded with three surrogate fuel assemblies and twenty-nine dummy assemblies. Two dry storage configurations will be tested – horizontal and vertical above-ground concrete overpacks. These configurations cover 91% of the current dry storage configurations. The major input into the shake table test are the seismic excitations or the earthquake ground motions – acceleration time histories in two horizontal and one vertical direction that will be applied to the shake table surface during the tests. The shake table surface represents the top of the concrete pad on which a dry storage system is placed. The goal of the ground motion task is to develop the ground motions that would be representative of the range of seismotectonic and other conditions that any site in the Western US (WUS) or Central Eastern US (CEUS) might entail. This task is challenging because of the large number of the ISFSI sites, variety of seismotectonic and site conditions, and effects that soil amplification, soil-structure interaction, and pad flexibility may have on the ground motions.
The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transport (NCT) regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the response of spent fuel. While obtaining data on the spent fuel is not a direct requirement, it allows for quantifying the risk of fuel breakage resulting from a cask drop from a height of 30 cm or less. Because a full-scale cask and impact limiters are very expensive, 3 consecutive drop tests were conducted to obtain strains on a full-scale surrogate 17x17 PWR assembly. The first step was a 30 cm drop of a 1/3 scale cask loaded with dummy assemblies. The second step was a 30 cm drop test of a full-scale dummy assembly. The third step was a 30 cm drop of a full-scale surrogate assembly. The results of this final test are presented in this paper. The test was conducted in May 2020. The acceleration pulses on the surrogate assembly were in good agreement with the expected pulses derived from steps 1 and 2. This confirmed that during the 30 cm drop the surrogate assembly experienced the same conditions as it would have if it had been dropped in a full-scale cask with impact limiters. The surrogate assembly was instrumented with 27 strain gauges. Pressure paper was inserted between the rods within the two long and two short spacer grid spans in order to register the pressure in case of rod-to-rod contact. The maximum observed peak strain on the surrogate assembly was 1,724 microstrain at the bottom end of the assembly. The pressure paper sheets from the two short spans were blank. The pressure paper sheets from the two long spans, except a few middle ones, showed marks indicating rod-to-rod contact. The maximum estimated contact pressure was 4,100 psi. The longitudinal bending stress corresponding to the maximum observed strain value (calculated from the stress-strain curve for low burnup cladding) was 22,230 psi. Both values are significantly below the yield strength of the cladding. The major conclusion is that the fuel rods will maintain their integrity following a 30 cm drop inside of a transportation cask.
The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transport (NCT) regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the actual surrogate fuel. While obtaining data on the actual fuel is not a direct requirement, it provides definitive information which aids in quantifying the risk of fuel breakage resulting from a cask drop from a height of 30 cm or less. The 30 cm drop test with the full-scale surrogate assembly conducted in May 2020 was the last step needed for quantifying the strains on the surrogate assembly rods under NCT. The full-scale surrogate assembly used in the 2020 30 cm drop test was built using a new 17x17 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Westinghouse skeleton filled with the copper rods and 3 zircaloy rods from the full-scale surrogate assembly used in the Multi-Modal Transportation Test (MMTT). Felt pads were attached to the surrogate assembly bottom prior to the 30 cm drop to adequately represent the effects of the impact limiters and the cask. Note that felt "programming material" has been used extensively in past drop tests and is known to be a good material for programming a desired shock pulse. The felt pad configuration was determined during a previous series of tests reported in. The acceleration pulses observed on the surrogate assembly during the test were in good agreement with the expected pulses. This confirmed that during the 30 cm drop the surrogate assembly experienced the same conditions as it would if it was dropped in the cask with the impact limiters.
Currently, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is stored in onsite independent spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSIs), which is a dry storage facility, at 55 nuclear power plant sites. The majority of SNF in dry storage is in welded metal canisters (2,917 canisters at the end of 2019). The canisters are loaded for storage in storage overpacks (vertical casks or horizontal storage modules) and placed on outdoor concrete pads. Because the SNF will be stored at ISFSIs for an extended period of time, there is growing concern with regards to the behavior of the SNF within these dry storage systems during earthquakes. To address these concerns, the SFWST program is considering conducting an earthquake shaker table test. The goal of this test is to determine the strains and accelerations on fuel assembly hardware and cladding during earthquakes of different magnitudes to better quantify the potential damage an earthquake could inflict on spent nuclear fuel rods. The seismic integrity of the storage system has been addressed in the past by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is not the focus of this potential test. Instead the DOE would benefit from knowing the condition of the fuel cladding from storage, transportation, to disposal so that it can ascertain repository performance for the fuel and packaging in its final state. A seismic event is part of the possible loading events that the fuel could experience in its lifetime. This report proposes several earthquake shaker table tests with different degrees of complexity. Alternative 1 was defined in the FY20 work scope. Alternatives 2 and 3 were recently developed to take advantage of the NUHOMS 32PTH dry storage canister that may be available in FY21 for this test at a minimum cost to the project. The selection of the alternative(s) will depend on the available budget and the SFWST program priorities for the near future.
The goal of this transportation analysis (TA) is to update the 2008 TA in order to evaluate the impacts associated with the transportation of transuranic (TRU) waste from waste generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility and from waste generator sites to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).
The DOE R&D program under the Spent Fuel Waste Science Technology (SFWST) campaign has made key progress in modeling and experimental approaches towards the characterization of chemical and physical phenomena that could impact the long-term safety assessment of heat-generating nuclear waste disposition in deep clay/shale/argillaceous rock. International collaboration activities such as heater tests and postmortem analysis of samples recovered from these have elucidated key information regarding changes in the engineered barrier system (EBS) material exposed to years of thermal loads. Chemical and structural analyses of sampled bentonite material from such tests has as well as experiments conducted on these are key to the characterization of thermal effects affecting bentonite clay barrier performance and the extent of sacrificial zones in the EBS during the thermal period. Thermal, hydrologic, and chemical data collected from heater tests and laboratory experiments has been used in the development, validation, and calibration of THMC simulators to model near-field coupled processes. This information leads to the development of simulation approaches (e.g., continuum vs. discrete) to tackle issues related to flow and transport at various scales of the host-rock and EBS design concept. Consideration of direct disposal of large capacity dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) as part of the back-end SNF waste disposition strategy has generated interest in improving our understanding of the effects of elevated temperatures on the EBS design. This is particularly important for backfilled repository concepts where temperature plays a key role in the EBS behavior and long-term performance. This report describes multiple R&D efforts on disposal in argillaceous geologic media through development and application of coupled THMC process models, experimental studies on clay/metal/cement barrier and host-rock (argillite) material interactions, molecular dynamic (MD) simulations of water transport during (swelling) clay dehydration, first-principles studies of metaschoepite (UO2 corrosion product) stability, and advances in thermodynamic plus surface complexation database development. Drift-scale URL experiments provides key data for testing hydrological-chemical (HC) model involving strong couplings of fluid mixing and barrier material chemical interactions. The THM modeling focuses on heater test experiments in argillite rock and gas migration in bentonite as part of international collaboration activities at underground research laboratories (URLs). In addition, field testing at an URL involves in situ analysis of fault slip behavior and fault permeability. Pore-scale modeling of gas bubble migration is also being investigated within the gas migration modeling effort. Interaction experiments on bentonite samples from heater test under ambient and elevated temperatures permit the evaluation of ion exchange, phase stability, and mineral transformation changes that could impact clay swelling. Advances in the development, testing, and implementation of a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) degradation model coupled with canister corrosion focus on the effects of hydrogen gas generation and its integration with Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA). GDSA integration activities includes evaluation of groundwater chemistries in shale formations.
The data from the multi-modal transportation test conducted in 2017 demonstrated that the inputs from the shock events during all transport modes (truck, rail, and ship) were amplified from the cask to the spent commercial nuclear fuel surrogate assemblies. These data do not support common assumption that the cask content experiences the same accelerations as the cask itself. This was one of the motivations for conducting 30 cm drop tests. The goal of the 30 cm drop test is to measure accelerations and strains on the surrogate spent nuclear fuel assembly and to determine whether the fuel rods can maintain their integrity inside a transportation cask when dropped from a height of 30 cm. The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transportation regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the actual surrogate fuel. Because the full-scale cask and impact limiters were not available (and their cost was prohibitive), it was proposed to achieve this goal by conducting three separate tests. This report describes the first two tests — the 30 cm drop test of the 1/3 scale cask (conducted in December 2018) and the 30 cm drop of the full-scale dummy assembly (conducted in June 2019). The dummy assembly represents the mass of a real spent nuclear fuel assembly. The third test (to be conducted in the spring of 2020) will be the 30 cm drop of the full-scale surrogate assembly. The surrogate assembly represents a real full-scale assembly in physical, material, and mechanical characteristics, as well as in mass.
The work for Step 1 performed at Sandia National Laboratories and reported in Section 7 has been updated to incorporate new data and to conduct new simulations using a new larger base case domain. The new simulations also include statistical analysis for different fracture realizations. A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to the study of the effect of domain size. A much larger mesh was selected to minimize boundary effects. The DFN model was upscaled to the new base case domain and the much larger domain to generate relevant permeability and porosity fields for each case. The calculations updated for Step 2 are described in Section 12.1. New calculations have also been conducted to model the flooding of the CTD and the resulting pressure recovery. The modeling includes matching of pressure and chloride experimental data at the six observation locations in Well 12M133. The modeling was done for the 10 fracture realizations. The Step 2 recovery simulations are described in Section 12.2. The Step 2 work is summarized in Section 12.3.
This report presents a comparative analysis of spent nuclear fuel management options to support the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Specifically, a set of scenarios was constructed to represent a range of possible combinations of alternative spent fuel management approaches. Analyses were performed to provide simple and credible estimates of relative costs to the U.S. government and to the nuclear utilities for moving forward with each scenario. The analyses of alternatives and options related to spent nuclear fuel management presented in this report are based on technical and programmatic considerations and do not include an evaluation of relevant regulatory and legal considerations (e.g., needs for new or modified regulations or legislation). This report has been prepared for informational and comparison purposes only and should not be construed as a determination of the legal permissibility of specific alternatives and options. No inferences should be drawn from this report regarding future actions by DOE. To the extent this report conflicts with provisions of the Standard Contract, those provisions prevail.
