Publications

139 Results
Skip to search filters

Development of a leading simulator/trailing simulator methodology as part of an integrated safety-security analysis for nuclear power plants

Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers. Part O, Journal of Risk and Reliability

Cohn, Brian C.; Noel, Todd G.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Aldemir, Tunc A.

Nuclear power plant (NPP) risk assessment is broadly separated into disciplines of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Different analysis methods and computer models have been constructed to analyze each of these as separate disciplines. However, due to the complexity of NPP systems, there are risks that can span all these disciplines and require consideration of safety-security (2S) interactions which allows a more complete understanding of the relationship among these risks. In this work, a novel leading simulator/trailing simulator (LS/TS) method is introduced to integrate multiple generic safety and security computer models into a single, holistic 2S analysis. A case study is performed using this novel method to determine its effectiveness. The case study shows that the LS/TS method avoided introducing errors in simulation, compared to the same scenario performed without the LS/TS method. A second case study is then used to illustrate an integrated 2S analysis which shows that different levels of damage to vital equipment from sabotage at a NPP can affect accident evolution by several hours.

More Details

Alpha Spectrometry Results for Groundwater Samples Collected in Northern Iraq and a Summary of the Environmental Setting of the Adaya Burial Site

Copland, John R.; Farrar, David R.; Osborn, Douglas M.

The Radiation Protection Center (RPC) of the Iraqi Ministry of Environment continues to evaluate the potential health impacts associated with the Adaya Burial Site, which is located 33 kilometers (20.5 miles) southwest of Mosul. This report documents the radiological analyses of 16 groundwater samples collected from wells located in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site and at other sites in northern Iraq. The Adaya Burial Site is a high-risk dump site because a large volume of radioactive material and contaminated soil is located on an unsecure hillside above the village of Tall ar Ragrag. The uranium activities for the 16 water samples in northern Iraq are considered to be naturally occurring and do not indicate artificial (man-made) contamination. With one exception, the alpha spectrometry results for the 16 wells that were sampled in 2019 indicate that the water quality concerning the three uranium isotopes (Uranium-233/234, Uranium-235/236, and Uranium-238) was acceptable for potable purposes (drinking and cooking). However, Well 7 in Mosul had a Uranium-233/234 activity concentration that slightly exceeded the World Health Organization guidance level. Eight of the 16 wells are located in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya and had naturally occurring uranium concentrations. Wells in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya are located near the Adaya Burial Site and should be sampled on an annual schedule. The list of groundwater analytes should include metals, total uranium, isotopic uranium, gross alpha/beta, gamma spectroscopy, organic compounds, and standard water quality parameters. Our current understanding of the hydrogeologic setting in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site is solely based on villager's domestic wells, topographic maps, and satellite imagery. To better understand the hydrogeologic setting, a Groundwater Monitoring Program needs to be developed and should include the installation of twelve groundwater monitoring wells in the vicinity of Tall ar Ragrag and the Adaya Burial Site. Characterization of the limestone aquifer and overlying alluvium is needed. RPC should continue to support health assessments for the villagers in Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya. Collecting samples for surface water (storm water), airborne dust, vegetation, and washway sediment should be conducted on a routine basis. Human access to the Adaya Burial Site needs to be strictly limited. Livestock access on or near the burial site needs to be eliminated. The surface-water exposure pathway is likely a greater threat than the groundwater exposure pathway. Installation of a surface-water diversion or collection system is recommended in order to reduce the potential for humans and livestock to come in contact with contaminated water and sediment. To reduce exposure to villagers, groundwater treatment should be considered if elevated uranium or other contaminants are detected in drinking water. Installing water-treatment systems would likely be quicker to accomplish than remediation and excavation of the Adaya Burial Site. The known potential for human exposure to uranium and metals (such as arsenic, chromium, selenium, and strontium) at the Adaya Burial Site is serious. Additional characterization , mitigation, and remediation efforts should be given a high priority.

More Details

DOE-NE LWRS Integrated Program Plan - Physical Security Pathway

Osborn, Douglas M.

Domestic nuclear power is facing increased financial pressures from a variety of areas and there is pressure on these utilities to reduce their cost of operation. Currently, about 20%-30% of all on-site personnel are related to physical security. The LWRS Program recognized that R&D related to physical security could play a role in providing nuclear utilities technical and staffing efficiency options to meet their physical security commitments, but utilities often lack the technical basis or the ability to create the technical basis to realize or implement these efficiencies; towards this end, the LWRS Program created the Physical Security Pathway in September 2019. The pathway performs R&D to develop methods, tools, and technologies to optimize and modernize a nuclear power facility’s security posture. The pathway will: (1) conduct research on risk-informed techniques for physical security that account for a dynamic adversary; (2) apply advanced modeling and simulation tools to better inform physical-security scenarios and reduce uncertainties in force-on-force modeling; (3) assess benefits from proposed enhancements and novel mitigation strategies and explore changes to best practices, guides, or regulation to enable modernization; and (4) enhance and provide the technical basis for stakeholders to employ new security methods, tools, and technologies.

More Details

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Bland, Jesse J.; Evans, Alan S.; Goolsby, Tommy D.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Monthan, Chad W.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Rivers, Joe R.; Rodgers, Thomas W.; White, Jake W.; Williams, Adam D.

The design and construction of a nuclear power plant must include robust structures and a security boundary that is difficult to penetrate. For security considerations, the reactors would ideally be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, which would be too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives. Additionally, all communications and power transfer lines would also be located underground and would be fortified against any possible design basis threats. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is a key aspect for determining response and staffing requirements. Considerations considered in a graded approach to physical protection are described.

More Details

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Bland, Jesse J.; Evans, Alan S.; Goolsby, Tommy D.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Monthan, Chad W.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Rivers, Joe R.; Rodgers, Thomas W.; White, Jake W.; Williams, Adam D.

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

More Details

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Bland, Jesse J.; Evans, Alan S.; Goolsby, Tommy D.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Monthan, Chad W.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Rivers, Joe R.; Rodgers, Thomas W.; White, Jake W.; Williams, Adam D.

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.

More Details

SOARCA uncertainty analysis of a short-term station blackout accident at the Sequoyah nuclear power plant

Annals of Nuclear Energy

Bixler, Nathan E.; Dennis, Matthew L.; Ross, Kyle R.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Gauntt, Randall O.; Wagner, K.C.; Ghosh, S.T.; Hathaway, A.G.; Esmaili, H.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission initiated the state-of-the-art reactor consequence analyses (SOARCA) project to develop realistic estimates of the offsite radiological health consequences for potential severe reactor accidents. The SOARCA analysis of an ice condenser containment plant was performed because its relatively low design pressure and its reliance on igniters make it potentially susceptible to early containment failure from hydrogen combustion during a severe accident. The focus was on station blackout accident scenarios where all alternating current power is lost. Accident progression calculations used the MELCOR computer code and offsite consequence analyses were performed with MACCS. The analysis included more than 500 MELCOR and MACCS simulations to account for uncertainty in important accident progression and offsite consequence input parameters. Consequences from severe nuclear power plant accidents modeled in SOARCA are smaller than previously calculated. The delayed releases calculated provide more time for emergency response actions. The results show that early containment failure is very unlikely, even without successful use of igniters. The modeled behavior of safety valves is very important to this conclusion, but there is sparse data and a lack of established expert consensus on the failure rates under severe accident conditions. Even for scenarios resulting in early containment failure, the calculated individual latent fatal cancer risks are very small. Early and latent-cancer fatality risks are one focus of this paper. Regression results showing the most influential parameters are also discussed.

More Details

Quasi-simultaneous system modeling in adapt

Proceedings of the 30th European Safety and Reliability Conference and the 15th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference

Cohn, Brian C.; Noel, Todd G.; Haskin, Troy; Osborn, Douglas M.; Aldemir, Tunc

Risk assessment of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is commonly driven by computer modeling which tracks the evolution of NPP events over time. To capture interactions between nuclear safety and nuclear security, multiple system codes each of which specializes on one space may need to be linked with information transfer among the codes. A systems analysis based on fixed length time blocks is proposed to allow for such a linking within the ADAPT framework without needing to predetermine in which order the safety/security codes interact. A case study using two instances of the Scribe3D code demonstrates the concept and shows agreement with results from a direct solution.

More Details

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: September 2019 Physical Security Stakeholder Working Group Meeting

Osborn, Douglas M.; Lord, Jodie L.; Werner, Hannah J.

The LWRS Program Physical Security Pathway held the first meeting of the Physical Security Stakeholder working group on September 10-12, 2019 at Sandia National Laboratories. This working group is comprised of nuclear enterprise physical security stakeholders and the meeting included over 10 Utilities representing roughly 60 nuclear power plants, two staff from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, physical security vendors, the Nuclear Energy Institute, the Electric Power Research Institute, and staff from Sandia National Laboratories and Idaho National Laboratory. The working group was established with the objectives of providing stakeholder feedback to the LWRS Program on their research and development needs and priorities, socializing the progress of Physical Security Pathway initiatives, and identifying opportunities for additional engagement and participation of stakeholders in the pathway research activities. The working group also provided a forum for physical security professionals to share common experiences and recommend prioritized activities based on their common needs.

More Details

Modeling for Existing Nuclear Power Plant Security Regime

Osborn, Douglas M.; Parks, Mancel J.; Knudsen, Ryan A.; Ross, Kyle R.; Faucett, Christopher F.; Haskin, Troy C.; Kitsos, Panayioti C.; Noel, Todd G.; Cohn, Brian C.

This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.

More Details

Modeling for Existing Nuclear Power Plant Security Regime

Osborn, Douglas M.; Parks, Mancel J.; Knudsen, Ryan A.; Ross, Kyle R.; Faucett, Christopher F.; Haskin, Troy C.; Kitsos, Panayioti C.; Noel, Todd G.; Cohn, Brian C.

This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.

More Details

State-of-the-art reactor consequence analyses project uncertainty analyses: Insights on offsite consequences

PSA 2019 - International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis

Tina Ghosh, S.; Esmaili, Hossein; Hathaway, Alfred; Bixler, Nathan E.; Brooks, Dusty M.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Wagner, Kenneth C.

This paper is the third paper in a special session on the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Uncertainty Analyses (UAs), and summarizes offsite consequence insights from the three SOARCA UAs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with Sandia National Laboratories has completed three UAs for particular station blackout scenarios as part of the SOARCA research project: for a boiling-water reactor with a Mark I containment in Pennsylvania State (Peach Bottom), for a pressurized-water reactor (PWR) with an ice condenser containment in Tennessee State (Sequoyah), and for a PWR with subatmospheric large dry containment in Virginia State (Surry). The Sequoyah and Surry SOARCA UAs focused on an unmitigated short-term station blackout (SBO) scenario involving an immediate loss of offsite and onsite AC power. In the Surry UA, induced steam generator tube rupture was also modeled. The Sequoyah study focused on issues unique to the ice condenser containment and the potential for early containment failure due to hydrogen combustion. The Peach Bottom UA focused on an unmitigated long-term SBO scenario, where battery power is initially available. The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) suite of codes was used for offsite radiological consequence modeling. This paper presents the offsite consequence results, individual latent cancer fatality risk and the individual early fatality risk, for the three SOARCA UAs and summarizes some of the insights and features of the analyses.

More Details

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Integral Long-Term Low-Pressure Experiments ? Preliminary Test Plan

Osborn, Douglas M.; Solom, Matthew A.

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 5 (full-scale integral long-term low-pressure operations) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

More Details

System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)?Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Bland, Jesse J.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Cohn, Brian C.; Faucett, Christopher F.; Gilbert, Luke J.; Haddal, Risa H.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Majedi, Mike M.; Snell, Mark K.

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors-- increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aims of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives. This page left blank intentionally

More Details

Domestic Nuclear Power Plant Physical Security Reevaluation - High-Level Project Plan

Osborn, Douglas M.; Snell, Mark K.; Clefton, Gordon C.; Yadav, Vaibhav Y.

The goal for this effort is a validated method which can be used to implement an updated physical security regime to optimize the physical security at domestic nuclear power plants (existing and future). It is the intent for the evaluation recommendations to provide the technical basis for an optimized plant security posture, which could consider reduce conservatisms in that posture, and potentially reduce security costs for the nuclear industry while meeting all security requirements.

More Details

Terry Turbopump Analytical Modeling Efforts in Fiscal Year 2016 - Progress Report

Osborn, Douglas M.; Ross, Kyle R.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.

This document details the Fiscal Year 2016 modeling efforts to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) experiments. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

More Details

System theoretic frameworks for mitigating risk complexity in the international transportation of spent nuclear fuel

PSAM 2018 - Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Kalinina, Elena A.

In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities (and the associated suite of risks) around the world, this effort provides an evaluation of systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multi-modal (land and water), and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrates interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards (3S) risks is inherent in NFC activities that can go unidentified when each “S” is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques, dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA), provide integrated 3S analysis to address these interdependencies. This research suggests a need (and provides a way) to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global SNF transportation risks. Note: This paper is a summary of the final results found in Reference [1].

More Details

Sequoyah SOARCA uncertainty analysis of a STSBO accident

PSAM 2018 - Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management

Bixler, Nathan E.; Dennis, Matthew L.; Brooks, Dusty M.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Ghosh, S.T.; Hathaway, Alfred

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission initiated the state-of-the-art reactor consequence analyses (SOARCA) project to develop realistic estimates of the offsite radiological health consequences for potential severe reactor accidents. The SOARCA analysis of an ice condenser containment plant was performed because its relatively low design pressure and reliance on igniters makes it potentially susceptible to early containment failure from hydrogen combustion during a severe accident. The focus was on station blackout accident scenarios where all alternating current power is lost. Accident progression calculations used the MELCOR computer code and offsite consequence analyses were performed with MACCS. The analysis included more than 500 MELCOR and MACCS simulations to account for uncertainty in important accident progression and offsite consequence input parameters. Consequences from severe nuclear power plant accidents modeled in this and previous SOARCA analyses are smaller than calculated in earlier studies. The delayed releases calculated provide more time for emergency response actions. The results show that early containment failure is very unlikely, even without successful use of igniters. However, these results are dependent on the distributions assigned to safety valve failure-to-close parameters, and considerable uncertainty remains on the true distributions for these parameters due to very limited test data. Even for scenarios resulting in early containment failure, the calculated individual latent fatal cancer risks are very small. Early and latent-cancer fatality risks are one focus of this paper. Regression results showing the most influential parameters are also discussed.

More Details

Hypothetical Case and Scenario Description for International Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Jones, Katherine A.; Kalinina, Elena A.; Cohn, Brian C.; Thomas, Maikael A.; Parks, Mancel J.; Parks, Ethan R.; Mohagheghi, Amir H.

To support more rigorous analysis on global security issues at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), there is a need to develop realistic data sets without using "real" data or identifying "real" vulnerabilities, hazards or geopolitically embarrassing shortcomings. In response, an interdisciplinary team led by subject matter experts in SNL's Center for Global Security and Cooperation (CGSC) developed a hypothetical case description. This hypothetical case description assigns various attributes related to international SNF transportation that are representative, illustrative and indicative of "real" characteristics of "real" countries. There is no intent to identify any particular country and any similarity with specific real-world events is purely coincidental. To support the goal of this report to provide a case description (and set of scenarios of concern) for international SNF transportation inclusive of as much "real-world" complexity as possible -- without crossing over into politically sensitive or classified information -- this SAND report provides a subject matter expert-validated (and detailed) description of both technical and political influences on the international transportation of spent nuclear fuel.

More Details

Understanding Risks in the Global Civilian Nuclear Enterprise: Global Nuclear Assured Security Scenarios Workshop

Deland, Sharon M.; Keller, Elizabeth J.; Littlefield, Adriane L.; Osborn, Douglas M.

The purpose of the scenarios workshop held for the Civilian Nuclear component of the Global Nuclear Assured Security Mission Integration Initiative was to identify sources of risk in the global civilian nuclear enterprise. The risks identified are inadequately addressed through current technical measures, regulatory frameworks and institutions and should be considered for further research. The workshop participants also developed four high level scenarios describing different sequences of events that could result in radiological releases, widespread loss of electric power, and loss of public confidence in segments of the nuclear industry. The scenarios are intended for further analysis and as the basis for simulation exercises.

More Details

System Theoretic Frameworks for Mitigating Risk Complexity in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Jones, Katherine A.; Kalinina, Elena A.; Cohn, Brian C.; Mohagheghi, Amir H.; DeMenno, Mercy D.; Thomas, Maikael A.; Parks, Mancel J.; Parks, Ethan R.; Jeantete, Brian A.

In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.

More Details

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Component and Basic Science Detailed Test Plan-Revision 2

Osborn, Douglas M.; Solom, Matthew A.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Ross, Kyle R.

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

More Details

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Component and Basic Science Detailed Test Plan - Final

Osborn, Douglas M.; Solom, Matthew A.

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

More Details

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band

ASME/NRC 2017 13th Pump and Valve Symposium, PVS 2017

Osborn, Douglas M.; Ross, Kyle R.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Solom, Matthew A.; Zhao, Haihua; O’Brien, James; Vierow-Kirkland, Karen; Bergman, Mark; Bunt, Randy

The Terry turbine is a small, single-stage, compound-velocity impulse turbine originally designed and manufactured by the Terry Steam Turbine Company purchased by Ingersoll-Rand in 1974. Terry turbines are currently manufactured and marketed by Dresser-Rand. Terry turbines were principally designed for waste-steam applications. Terry turbopumps are ubiquitous to the US nuclear fleet as a steam driven turbopump in either the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) and high pressure coolant injection systems for boiling water reactors (BWRs) or in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) system for pressurized water reactors (PWRs).

More Details

Example of integration of safety, security, and safeguard using dynamic probabilistic risk assessment under a system-theoretic framework

ANS IHLRWM 2017 - 16th International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference: Creating a Safe and Secure Energy Future for Generations to Come - Driving Toward Long-Term Storage and Disposal

Kalinina, Elena A.; Cohn, Brian C.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Williams, Adam D.; Parks, M.J.; Jones, Katherine A.; Andrews, Nathan A.; Johnson, Emma S.; Parks, Ethan R.; Mohagheghi, Amir H.

Transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to increase in the future, as the nuclear fuel infrastructure continues to expand and fuel takeback programs increase in popularity. Analysis of potential risks and threats to SNF shipments is currently performed separately for safety and security. However, as SNF transportation increases, the plausible threats beyond individual categories and the interactions between them become more apparent. A new approach is being developed to integrate safety, security, and safeguards (3S) under a system-theoretic framework and a probabilistic risk framework. At the first stage, a simplified scenario will be implemented using a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) method. This scenario considers a rail derailment followed by an attack. The consequences of derailment are calculated with RADTRAN, a transportation risk analysis code. The attack scenarios are analyzed with STAGE, a combat simulation model. The consequences of the attack are then calculated with RADTRAN. Note that both accident and attack result in SNF cask damage and a potential release of some fraction of the SNF inventory into the environment. The major purpose of this analysis was to develop the input data for DPRA. Generic PWR and BWR transportation casks were considered. These data were then used to demonstrate the consequences of hypothetical accidents in which the radioactive materials were released into the environment. The SNF inventory is one of the most important inputs into the analysis. Several pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel burnups and discharge times were considered for this proof-of-concept. The inventory was calculated using ORIGEN (point depletion and decay computer code, Oak Ridge National Laboratory) for 3 characteristic burnup values (40, 50, and 60 GWD/MTU) and 4 fuel ages (5, 10, 25 and 50 years after discharge). The major consequences unique to the transportation of SNF for both accident and attack are the results of the dispersion of radionuclides in the environment. The dynamic atmospheric dispersion model in RADTRAN was used to calculate these consequences. The examples of maximum exposed individual (MEI) dose, early mortality and soil contamination are discussed to demonstrate the importance of different factors. At the next stage, the RADTRAN outputs will be converted into a form compatible with the STAGE analysis. As a result, identification of additional risks related to the interaction between characteristics becomes a more straightforward task. In order to present the results of RADTRAN analysis in a framework compatible with the results of the STAGE analysis, the results will be grouped into three categories: • Immediate negative harms •Future benefits that cannot be realized •Additional increases in future risk By describing results within generically applicable categories, the results of safety analysis are able to be placed in context with the risk arising from security events.

More Details

Modeling of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Response to Beyond Design Basis Operations - Interim Report

Osborn, Douglas M.; Ross, Kyle R.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Wilson, Chisom S.; Morrow, Charles W.; Gauntt, Randall O.

Efforts are being pursued to develop and qualify a system-level model of a reactor core isolation (RCIC) steam-turbine-driven pump. The model is being developed with the intent of employing it to inform the design of experimental configurations for full-scale RCIC testing. The model is expected to be especially valuable in sizing equipment needed in the testing. An additional intent is to use the model in understanding more fully how RCIC apparently managed to operate far removed from its design envelope in the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 accident. RCIC modeling is proceeding along two avenues that are expected to complement each other well. The first avenue is the continued development of the system-level RCIC model that will serve in simulating a full reactor system or full experimental configuration of which a RCIC system is part. The model reasonably represents a RCIC system today, especially given design operating conditions, but lacks specifics that are likely important in representing the off-design conditions a RCIC system might experience in an emergency situation such as a loss of all electrical power. A known specific lacking in the system model, for example, is the efficiency at which a flashing slug of water (as opposed to a concentrated jet of steam) could propel the rotating drive wheel of a RCIC turbine. To address this specific, the second avenue is being pursued wherein computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analyses of such a jet are being carried out. The results of the CFD analyses will thus complement and inform the system modeling. The system modeling will, in turn, complement the CFD analysis by providing the system information needed to impose appropriate boundary conditions on the CFD simulations. The system model will be used to inform the selection of configurations and equipment best suitable of supporting planned RCIC experimental testing. Preliminary investigations with the RCIC model indicate that liquid water ingestion by the turbine decreases the developed turbine torque; the RCIC speed then slows, and thus the pump flow rate to the RPV decreases. Subsequently, RPV water level decreases due to continued boiling and the liquid fraction flowing to the RCIC decreases, thereby accelerating the RCIC and refilling the RPV. The feedback cycle then repeats itself and/or reaches a quasi-steady equilibrium condition. In other words, the water carry-over is limited by cyclic RCIC performance degradation, and hence the system becomes self-regulating. The indications achieved to date with the system model are more qualitative than quantitative. The avenues being pursued to increase the fidelity of the model are expected to add quantitative realism. The end product will be generic in the sense that the RCIC model will be incorporable within the larger reactor coolant system model of any nuclear power plant or experimental configuration.

More Details

Presentation of Fukushima Analyses to U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Simulator Operators and Vendors

Osborn, Douglas M.; Kalinich, Donald A.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.

This document provides Sandia National Laboratories’ meeting notes and presentations at the Society for Modeling and Simulation Power Plant Simulator conference in Jacksonville, FL. The conference was held January 26-28, 2015, and SNL was invited by the U.S. nuclear industry to present Fukushima modeling insights and lessons learned.

More Details

SOARCA Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Long-Term Station Blackout Uncertainty Analysis: Knowledge Advancement

Gauntt, Randall O.; Mattie, Patrick D.; Bixler, Nathan E.; Ross, Kyle R.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Kalinich, Donald A.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Sallaberry, Cedric J.

This paper describes the knowledge advancements from the uncertainty analysis for the State-of- the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) unmitigated long-term station blackout accident scenario at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. This work assessed key MELCOR and MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, Version 2 (MACCS2) modeling uncertainties in an integrated fashion to quantify the relative importance of each uncertain input on potential accident progression, radiological releases, and off-site consequences. This quantitative uncertainty analysis provides measures of the effects on consequences, of each of the selected uncertain parameters both individually and in interaction with other parameters. The results measure the model response (e.g., variance in the output) to uncertainty in the selected input. Investigation into the important uncertain parameters in turn yields insights into important phenomena for accident progression and off-site consequences. This uncertainty analysis confirmed the known importance of some parameters, such as failure rate of the Safety Relief Valve in accident progression modeling and the dry deposition velocity in off-site consequence modeling. The analysis also revealed some new insights, such as dependent effect of cesium chemical form for different accident progressions. (auth)

More Details

SOARCA Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Long-Term Station Blackout Uncertainty Analysis: Convergence of the Uncertainty Results

Bixler, Nathan E.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Sallaberry, Cedric J.; Eckert, Aubrey C.; Mattie, Patrick D.

This paper describes the convergence of MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, Version 2 (MACCS2) probabilistic results of offsite consequences for the uncertainty analysis of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) unmitigated long-term station blackout scenario at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. The consequence metrics evaluated are individual latent-cancer fatality (LCF) risk and individual early fatality risk. Consequence results are presented as conditional risk (i.e., assuming the accident occurs, risk per event) to individuals of the public as a result of the accident. In order to verify convergence for this uncertainty analysis, as recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a ‘high’ source term from the original population of Monte Carlo runs has been selected to be used for: (1) a study of the distribution of consequence results stemming solely from epistemic uncertainty in the MACCS2 parameters (i.e., separating the effect from the source term uncertainty), and (2) a comparison between Simple Random Sampling (SRS) and Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) in order to validate the original results obtained with LHS. Three replicates (each using a different random seed) of size 1,000 each using LHS and another set of three replicates of size 1,000 using SRS are analyzed. The results show that the LCF risk results are well converged with either LHS or SRS sampling. The early fatality risk results are less well converged at radial distances beyond 2 miles, and this is expected due to the sparse data (predominance of “zero” results).

More Details

Statistical analyses of plume composition and deposited radionuclide mixture ratios

Kraus, Terrence D.; Sallaberry, Cedric J.; Eckert, Aubrey C.; Brito, Roxanne B.; Hunt, Brian D.; Osborn, Douglas M.

A proposed method is considered to classify the regions in the close neighborhood of selected measurements according to the ratio of two radionuclides measured from either a radioactive plume or a deposited radionuclide mixture. The subsequent associated locations are then considered in the area of interest with a representative ratio class. This method allows for a more comprehensive and meaningful understanding of the data sampled following a radiological incident.

More Details

Interim MELCOR Simulation of the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 Accident Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Operation

Ross, Kyle R.; Gauntt, Randall O.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Phillips, Jesse P.; Kalinich, Donald A.; Osborn, Douglas M.

Data, a brief description of key boundary conditions, and results of Sandia National Laboratories’ ongoing MELCOR analysis of the Fukushima Unit 2 accident are given for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. Important assumptions and related boundary conditions in the current analysis additional to or different than what was assumed/imposed in the work of SAND2012-6173 are identified. This work is for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy University Programs fiscal year 2014 Reactor Safety Technologies Research and Development Program RC-7: RCIC Performance under Severe Accident Conditions.

More Details

Dose estimates in a loss of lead shielding truck accident

Dennis, Matthew L.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Osborn, Douglas M.

The radiological transportation risk & consequence program, RADTRAN, has recently added an updated loss of lead shielding (LOS) model to it most recent version, RADTRAN 6.0. The LOS model was used to determine dose estimates to first-responders during a spent nuclear fuel transportation accident. Results varied according to the following: type of accident scenario, percent of lead slump, distance to shipment, and time spent in the area. This document presents a method of creating dose estimates for first-responders using RADTRAN with potential accident scenarios. This may be of particular interest in the event of high speed accidents or fires involving cask punctures.

More Details

RadCat 3.0 user guide

Weiner, Ruth F.; Dennis, Matthew L.; Osborn, Douglas M.

RADTRAN is an internationally accepted program and code for calculating the risks of transporting radioactive materials. The first versions of the program, RADTRAN I and II, were developed for NUREG-0170 (USNRC, 1977), the first environmental statement on transportation of radioactive materials. RADTRAN and its associated software have undergone a number of improvements and advances consistent with improvements in both available data and computer technology. The version of RADTRAN currently bundled with RadCat is RADTRAN 6.0. This document provides a detailed discussion and a guide for the use of the RadCat 3.0 Graphical User Interface input file generator for the RADTRAN code. RadCat 3.0 integrates the newest analysis capabilities of RADTRAN 6.0 which includes an economic model, updated loss-of-lead shielding model, and unit conversion. As of this writing, the RADTRAN version in use is RADTRAN 6.0.

More Details

Benchmarking RADTRAN loss of shielding model for a SNF cask

Proceedings of the 11th International High Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference, IHLRWM

Boyd, Adam M.; Worthy, Danielle K.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Weiner, Ruth F.

The RADTRAN Loss of Shielding (LOS) Model was benchmarked using MicroShield 6.20®. This analysis considers an intact spent fuel truck cask as well as a set of damaged truck casks. Ratios of dose rates are calculated for casks with a loss of lead shielding to those of intact casks, and are then compared to ratios generated by the LOS model. LOS Model results were considered verified if two main constraints were satisfied. First, the dose rate profiles for both the LOS and MicroShield 6.20® calculations must have the same general shape and behavior. Additionally, the largest factor difference between any two points of the dose rate profiles may not exceed an order of magnitude. Reasonable agreement is shown for large-fraction LOS scenarios; however the differences in results are not satisfactory for cases with small fractions of slump.

More Details

Transportation of Hazardous Evidentiary Material

Osborn, Douglas M.

This document describes the specimen and transportation containers currently available for use with hazardous and infectious materials. A detailed comparison of advantages, disadvantages, and costs of the different technologies is included. Short- and long-term recommendations are also provided.3 DraftDraftDraftExecutive SummaryThe Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit currently has hazardous material transport containers for shipping 1-quart paint cans and small amounts of contaminated forensic evidence, but the containers may not be able to maintain their integrity under accident conditions or for some types of hazardous materials. This report provides guidance and recommendations on the availability of packages for the safe and secure transport of evidence consisting of or contaminated with hazardous chemicals or infectious materials. Only non-bulk containers were considered because these are appropriate for transport on small aircraft. This report will addresses packaging and transportation concerns for Hazardous Classes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 materials. If the evidence is known or suspected of belonging to one of these Hazardous Classes, it must be packaged in accordance with the provisions of 49 CFR Part 173. The anthrax scare of several years ago, and less well publicized incidents involving unknown and uncharacterized substances, has required that suspicious substances be sent to appropriate analytical laboratories for analysis and characterization. Transportation of potentially hazardous or infectious material to an appropriate analytical laboratory requires transport containers that maintain both the biological and chemical integrity of the substance in question. As a rule, only relatively small quantities will be available for analysis. Appropriate transportation packaging is needed that will maintain the integrity of the substance, will not allow biological alteration, will not react chemically with the substance being shipped, and will otherwise maintain it as nearly as possible in its original condition.The recommendations provided are short-term solutions to the problems of shipping evidence, and have considered only currently commercially available containers. These containers may not be appropriate for all cases. Design, testing, and certification of new transportation containers would be necessary to provide a container appropriate for all cases.Table 1 provides a summary of the recommendations for each class of hazardous material.Table 1: Summary of RecommendationsContainerCost1-quart paint can with ArmlockTM seal ringLabelMaster(r)%242.90 eachHazard Class 3, 4, 5, 8, or 9 Small ContainersTC Hazardous Material Transport ContainerCurrently in Use4 DraftDraftDraftTable 1: Summary of Recommendations (continued)ContainerCost55-gallon open or closed-head steel drumsAll-Pak, Inc.%2458.28 - %2473.62 eachHazard Class 3, 4, 5, 8, or 9 Large Containers95-gallon poly overpack LabelMaster(r)%24194.50 each1-liter glass container with plastic coatingLabelMaster(r)%243.35 - %243.70 eachHazard Class 6 Division 6.1 Poisonous by Inhalation (PIH) Small ContainersTC Hazardous Material Transport ContainerCurrently in Use20 to 55-gallon PIH overpacksLabelMaster(r)%24142.50 - %24170.50 eachHazard Class 6 Division 6.1 Poisonous by Inhalation (PIH) Large Containers65 to 95-gallon poly overpacksLabelMaster(r)%24163.30 - %24194.50 each1-liter transparent containerCurrently in UseHazard Class 6 Division 6.2 Infectious Material Small ContainersInfectious Substance ShipperSource Packaging of NE, Inc.%24336.00 eachNone Commercially AvailableN/AHazard Class 6 Division 6.2 Infectious Material Large ContainersNone Commercially Available N/A5

More Details

RadCat 2.0 User Guide

Osborn, Douglas M.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Mills, G.S.

This document provides a detailed discussion and a guide for the use of the RadCat 2.0 Graphical User Interface input file generator for the RADTRAN 5.5 code. The differences between RadCat 2.0 and RadCat 1.0 can be attributed to the differences between RADTRAN 5 and RADTRAN 5.5 as well as clarification for some of the input parameters. 3

More Details
139 Results
139 Results