Publications

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

In the summer of 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to launch a spacecraft as part of the Mars 2020 mission. One option for the rover on the proposed spacecraft uses a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) to provide continuous electrical and thermal power for the mission. NASA has prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. The EIS includes information on the risks of mission accidents to the general public and on-site workers at the launch complex. The Nuclear Risk Assessment (NRA) addresses the responses of the MMRTG option to potential accident and abort conditions during the launch opportunity for the Mars 2020 mission and the associated consequences. This information provides the technical basis for the radiological risks of the MMRTG option for the EIS. This paper provides a summary of the methods and results used in the NRA.

Abstract not provided.

In the summer of 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to launch a spacecraft as part of the Mars 2020 mission. One option for the rover on the proposed spacecraft uses a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) to provide continuous electrical and thermal power for the mission. An alternative option being considered is a set of solar panels for electrical power with up to 80 Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Units (LWRHUs) for local component heating. Both the MMRTG and the LWRHUs use radioactive plutonium dioxide. NASA is preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. The EIS will include information on the risks of mission accidents to the general public and on-site workers at the launch complex. This Nuclear Risk Assessment (NRA) addresses the responses of the MMRTG or LWRHU options to potential accident and abort conditions during the launch opportunity for the Mars 2020 mission and the associated consequences. This information provides the technical basis for the radiological risks of both options for the EIS.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Design procedures for hypersonic flight systems have changed dramatically over the years. To this end, a new capability (PIRATE) to analyze the interaction of reentry systems with their enveloping plasma is introduced. PIRATE is a driver program to solve the coupled physics problem of motion, heating, thermal response, chemistry, inviscid flowfield, and electromagnetic wave propagation/interaction for hypersonic flight systems in an automated fashion. A total of thirteen programs are coupled and controlled from a single software procedure to iteratively solve a complex design problem. The immediate benefit of this type of analysis is to guide design work as well as to more wisely choose costly test flights in regions that may be most stressing for a design concept. Sample results of a parametric study for a standard hypersonic flight system are presented to illustrate the utility of the program.

The Department of Energy has assigned to Sandia National Laboratories the responsibility of producing a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the plutonium-dioxide fueled Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) proposed to be used in the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) is anticipating a launch in fall of 2009, and the SAR will play a critical role in the launch approval process. As in past safety evaluations of MMRTG missions, a wide range of potential accident conditions differing widely in probability and seventy must be considered, and the resulting risk to the public will be presented in the form of probability distribution functions of health effects in terms of latent cancer fatalities. The basic descriptions of accident cases will be provided by NASA in the MSL SAR Databook for the mission, and on the basis of these descriptions, Sandia will apply a variety of sophisticated computational simulation tools to evaluate the potential release of plutonium dioxide, its transport to human populations, and the consequent health effects. The first step in carrying out this project is to evaluate the existing computational analysis tools (computer codes) for suitability to the analysis and, when appropriate, to identify areas where modifications or improvements are warranted. The overall calculation of health risks can be divided into three levels of analysis. Level A involves detailed simulations of the interactions of the MMRTG or its components with the broad range of insults (e.g., shrapnel, blast waves, fires) posed by the various accident environments. There are a number of candidate codes for this level; they are typically high resolution computational simulation tools that capture details of each type of interaction and that can predict damage and plutonium dioxide release for a range of choices of controlling parameters. Level B utilizes these detailed results to study many thousands of possible event sequences and to build up a statistical representation of the releases for each accident case. A code to carry out this process will have to be developed or adapted from previous MMRTG missions. Finally, Level C translates the release (or ''source term'') information from Level B into public risk by applying models for atmospheric transport and the health consequences of exposure to the released plutonium dioxide. A number of candidate codes for this level of analysis are available. This report surveys the range of available codes and tools for each of these levels and makes recommendations for which choices are best for the MSL mission. It also identities areas where improvements to the codes are needed. In some cases a second tier of codes may be identified to provide supporting or clarifying insight about particular issues. The main focus of the methodology assessment is to identify a suite of computational tools that can produce a high quality SAR that can be successfully reviewed by external bodies (such as the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel) on the schedule established by NASA and DOE.

The formulation, implementation and usage of a numerical solution verification code is described. This code uses the Richardson extrapolation procedure to estimate the order of accuracy and error of a computational program solution. It evaluates multiple solutions performed in numerical grid convergence studies to verify a numerical algorithm implementation. Analyses are performed on both structured and unstructured grid codes. Finite volume and finite element discretization programs are examined. Two and three-dimensional solutions are evaluated. Steady state and transient solution analysis capabilities are present in the verification code. Multiple input data bases are accepted. Benchmark options are included to allow for minimal solution validation capability as well as verification.