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PAT-1 safety analysis report addendum

Yoshimura, Richard H.; Morrow, Charles W.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Harding, David C.; Heitman, Lili A.; Kalan, Robert K.; Lopez Mestre, Carlos L.; Miller, David R.; Schmale, David T.; Knorovsky, Gerald A.

The Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1, is certified under Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/0361B(U)F-96 (currently Revision 9). The purpose of this SAR Addendum is to incorporate plutonium (Pu) metal as a new payload for the PAT-1 package. The Pu metal is packed in an inner container (designated the T-Ampoule) that replaces the PC-1 inner container. The documentation and results from analysis contained in this addendum demonstrate that the replacement of the PC-1 and associated packaging material with the T-Ampoule and associated packaging with the addition of the plutonium metal content are not significant with respect to the design, operating characteristics, or safe performance of the containment system and prevention of criticality when the package is subjected to the tests specified in 10 CFR 71.71, 71.73 and 71.74.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2010
OSTIDOI

PAT-1 safety analysis report addendum author responses to request for additional information

Yoshimura, Richard H.; Knorovsky, Gerald A.; Morrow, Charles W.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Harding, David C.; Heitman, Lili A.; Lopez Mestre, Carlos L.; Kalan, Robert K.; Miller, David R.; Schmale, David T.

The Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1, is certified under Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/0361B(U)F-96 (currently Revision 9). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) submitted SAND Report SAND2009-5822 to NRC that documented the incorporation of plutonium (Pu) metal as a new payload for the PAT-1 package. NRC responded with a Request for Additional Information (RAI), identifying information needed in connection with its review of the application. The purpose of this SAND report is to provide the authors responses to each RAI. SAND Report SAND2010-6106 containing the proposed changes to the Addendum is provided separately.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2010
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A stress-state modified strain based failure criterion for evaluating the structural integrity of an inner eutectic barrier

Heitman, Lili A.; Yoshimura, Richard H.; Miller, David R.

A slight modification of a package to transport solid metal contents requires inclusion of a thin titanium liner to protect against possible eutectic formation in 10 CFR 71.74 regulatory fire accident conditions. Under severe transport regulatory impact conditions, the package contents could impart high localized loading of the liner, momentarily pinching it between the contents and the thick containment vessel, and inducing some plasticity near the contact point. Actuator and drop table testing of simulated contents impacts against liner/containment vessel structures nearly bounded the potential plastic strain and stress triaxiality conditions, without any ductile tearing of the eutectic barrier. Additional bounding was necessary in some cases beyond the capability of the actuator and drop table tests, and in these cases a stress-modified evolution integral over the plastic strain history was successfully used as a failure criterion to demonstrate that structural integrity was maintained. The Heaviside brackets only allow the evolution integral to accumulate value when the maximum principal stress is positive, since failure is never observed under pure hydrostatic pressure, where the maximum principal stress is negative. Detailed finite element analyses of myriad possible impact orientations and locations between package contents and the thin eutectic barrier under regulatory impact conditions have shown that not even the initiation of a ductile tear occurs. Although localized plasticity does occur in the eutectic barrier, it is not the primary containment boundary and is thus not subject to ASME stress allowables from NRC Regulatory Guide 7.6. These analyses were used to successfully demonstrate that structural integrity of the eutectic barrier was maintained in all 10 CFR 71.73 and 71.74 regulatory accident conditions. The NRC is currently reviewing the Safety Analysis Report.

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TYPE Conference YEAR 2010
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Results 1–25 of 29
Results 1–25 of 29