Publications

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation Policy sponsored an international biosecurity symposium at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The event, entitled 'Securing High Consequence Pathogens and Toxins', took place from February 1 to February 6, 2004 and was hosted by Dr. Reynolds M. Salerno, Principal Member of the Technical Staff and Program Manager of the Biosecurity program at Sandia. Over 60 bioscience and policy experts from 14 countries gathered to discuss biosecurity, a strategy aimed at preventing the theft and sabotage of dangerous pathogens and toxins from bioscience facilities. Presentations delivered during the symposium were interspersed with targeted discussions that elucidated, among other things, the need for subsequent regional workshops on biosecurity, and a desire for additional work toward developing international biosecurity guidelines.

The threat from biological weapons is assessed through both a comparative historical analysis of the patterns of biological weapons use and an assessment of the technological hurdles to proliferation and use that must be overcome. The history of biological weapons is studied to learn how agents have been acquired and what types of states and substate actors have used agents. Substate actors have generally been more willing than states to use pathogens and toxins and they have focused on those agents that are more readily available. There has been an increasing trend of bioterrorism incidents over the past century, but states and substate actors have struggled with one or more of the necessary technological steps. These steps include acquisition of a suitable agent, production of an appropriate quantity and form, and effective deployment. The technological hurdles associated with the steps present a real barrier to producing a high consequence event. However, the ever increasing technological sophistication of society continually lowers the barriers, resulting in a low but increasing probability of a high consequence bioterrorism event.