Publications

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This document is a draft SecuritybyDesign (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to %E2%80%9Cencourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.%E2%80%9D The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PASPP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessonslearned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the systemlevel incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A fourelement strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

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The presentation outline of this paper is: (1) How identification of chemical hazards fits into a security risk analysis approach; (2) Techniques for target identification; and (3) Identification of chemical hazards by different organizations. The summary is: (1) There are a number of different methodologies used within the chemical industry which identify chemical hazards: (a) Some develop a manual listing of potential targets based on published lists of hazardous chemicals or chemicals of concern, 'expert opinion' or known hazards. (b) Others develop a prioritized list based on chemicals found at a facility and consequence analysis (offsite release affecting population, theft of material, product tampering). (2) Identification of chemical hazards should include not only intrinsic properties of the chemicals but also potential reactive chemical hazards and potential use for activities off-site.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a number of security risk assessment methodologies (RAMs) for various infrastructures including dams, water systems, electrical transmission, chemical facilities and communities. All of these RAMs consider potential malevolent attacks from different threats, possible undesired events and consequences and determine potential adversary success. They focus on the assessment of these infrastructures to help identify security weaknesses and develop measures to help mitigate the consequences from possible adversary attacks. This paper will focus on RAM-C, the security risk assessment methodology for communities. There are many reasons for a community to conduct a security risk assessment. They include: providing a way to identify vulnerabilities, helping a community to be better prepared in the event of an adversary attack, providing justification for resources to address identified vulnerabilities and planning for future projects. RAM-C provides a systematic, risk-based approach useable by public safety and emergency planners to determine relative risk and provides useful information in making security risk decisions. RAM-C consists of a number of steps starting with a screening step which selects facilities based on a documented process; characterization of the community and facilities; determination of severity of consequences for identified undesired events; determination of the community protection goals and defining the threat; defining existing baseline safeguard measures; analyzing protection system effectiveness against identified scenarios, determining a relative risk and finally deciding if that risk is too high. If the risk is too high then possible countermeasures and mitigation measures are considered. RAM-C has been used by a number of communities within the United States. From these assessments there have been many results. Some communities have been surprised by the vulnerabilities that have been identified; have identified the need to test procedures and responses to many different situations; have identified the need to have redundancy in certain systems and have identified who within their community are valuable resources. The RAM-C process is a systematic way to assess vulnerabilities and make decisions based on risk. It has provided valuable information to community planners.

A considerable amount of effort over the past two years has been devoted to the development of Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) methodologies for evaluating chemical facilities against potential malevolent threats. The SVAs include Sandia's VAM-CF™ and the Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS) SVA as well as others. There are differences in the level of rigor among the different SVA methodologies but generally these methodologies identify potential targets and determine a relative risk with respect to identified undesired events, threats and adversary scenarios. Chemical reactivity hazards are considered during the SVA process but in some cases to a lesser degree than other areas. This paper will discuss how a user can consider chemical reactivity and high-energy release hazards within the framework of an SVA approach for chemical site security. This would include such areas as the identification of targets/critical areas, consequence assessment, threat assessment and the evaluation of protection effectiveness and safety/mitigation features.

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