Publications

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

This report fulfills the M3 milestone M3FT-15SN0802041, “Draft Evaluation of the Frequency for Gas Sampling for the High Burn-up Storage Demonstration Project” under Work Package FT-15SN080204, “ST Field Demonstration Support – SNL”. This report provides a technically based gas sampling frequency strategy for the High Burnup (HBU) Confirmatory Data Project. The evaluation of: 1) the types and magnitudes of gases that could be present in the project cask and, 2) the degradation mechanisms that could change gas compositions culminates in an adaptive gas sampling frequency strategy. This adaptive strategy is compared against the sampling frequency that has been developed based on operational considerations. Gas sampling will provide information on the presence of residual water (and byproducts associated with its reactions and decomposition) and breach of cladding, which could inform the decision of when to open the project cask.

For long-term storage, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is placed in dry storage cask systems, commonly consisting of welded stainless steel containers enclosed in ventilated cement or steel overpacks. At near-marine sites, failure by chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC) due to deliquescence of deposited salt aerosols is a major concern. This paper presents a preliminary probabilistic performance assessment model to assess canister penetration by SCC. The model first determines whether conditions for salt deliquescence are present at any given location on the canister surface, using an abstracted waste package thermal model and site-specific weather data (ambient temperature and absolute humidity). As the canister cools and aqueous conditions become possible, corrosion is assumed to initiate and is modeled as pitting (initiation and growth). With increasing penetration, pits convert to SCC and a crack growth model is implemented. The SCC growth model includes rate dependencies on temperature and crack tip stress intensity factor. The amount of penetration represents the summed effect of corrosion during time steps when aqueous conditions are predicted to occur. Model results and sensitivity analyses provide information on the impact of model assumptions and parameter values on predicted storage canister performance, and provide guidance for further research to reduce uncertainties.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Based on general arguments presented in this report, nuclear criticality was eliminated from performance assessment calculations for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a repository for waste contaminated with transuranic (TRU) radioisotopes, located in southeastern New Mexico. At the WIPP, the probability of criticality within the repository is low because mechanisms to concentrate the fissile radioisotopes dispersed throughout the waste are absent. In addition, following an inadvertent human intrusion into the repository (an event that must be considered because of safety regulations), the probability of nuclear criticality away from the repository is low because (1) the amount of fissile mass transported over 10,000 yr is predicted to be small, (2) often there are insufficient spaces in the advective pore space (e.g., macroscopic fractures) to provide sufficient thickness for precipitation of fissile material, and (3) there is no credible mechanism to counteract the natural tendency of the material to disperse during transport and instead concentrate fissile material in a small enough volume for it to form a critical concentration. Furthermore, before a criticality would have the potential to affect human health after closure of the repository--assuming that a criticality could occur--it would have to either (1) degrade the ability of the disposal system to contain nuclear waste or (2) produce significantly more radioisotopes than originally present. Neither of these situations can occur at the WIPP; thus, the consequences of a criticality are also low.

The following topics related to radionuclide transport in the vicinity of the repository in the 1996 performance assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant are presented: (i) mathematical description of models; (ii) uncertainty and sensitivity analysis results arising from subjective (i.e. epistemic) uncertainty for individual releases; (iii) construction of complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) arising from stochastic (i.e. aleatory) uncertainty; and (iv) uncertainty and sensitivity analysis results for CCDFs. The presented results indicate that no releases to the accessible environment take place due to radionuclide movement through the anhydrite marker beds, through the Dewey Lake Red Beds or directly to the surface, and also that the releases to the Culebra Dolomite are small. Even when the effects of uncertain analysis inputs are taken into account, the CCDFs for release to the Culebra Dolomite fall to the left of the boundary line specified in the US Environmental Protection Agency's standard for the geologic disposal of radioactive waste (40 CFR 191, 40 CFR 194).