The PRO-X program is actively supporting the design of nuclear systems by developing a framework to both optimize the fuel cycle infrastructure for advanced reactors (ARs) and minimize the potential for production of weapons-usable nuclear material. Three study topics are currently being investigated by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with support from Argonne National Laboratories (ANL). This multi-lab collaboration is focused on three study topics which may offer proliferation resistance opportunities or advantages in the nuclear fuel cycle. These topics are: 1) Transportation Global Landscape, 2) Transportation Avoidability, and 3) Parallel Modular Systems vs Single Large System (Crosscutting Activity).
This report is a companion document to a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting crosscutting Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR), the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR).
The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. Single analyst tools allow for rapid design and evaluation of advanced approaches for new and existing nuclear facilities. A low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel conversion and fabrication facility simulator has been developed to assist with MC&A for existing LEU fuel fabrication for light water reactors. Simulated measurement blocks were added to the model (consistent with current best practices). Material balance calculations and statistical tests have also been added to the model.
The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A and PPS designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.
This report is part of a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting the status of Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for each of the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR). This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) VHTR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the VHTR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of VHTR system designers. It updates the VHTR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF VHTR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the key points of PR&PP features extracted from the reference designs of VHTRs under consideration in various countries. A major update from the 2011 report is an explicit distinction between prismatic block-type VHTRs and pebble-bed VHTRs. The white paper also provides an overview of the TRISO fuel and fuel cycle. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.
This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Gas-cooled Fast reactor (GFR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) GFR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the GFR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of GFR system designers. It updates the GFR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF GFR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the PR&PP features of the GIF GFR 2400 MWth reference design. The ALLEGRO reactor is also described. The EM2 and HEN MHR reactor are mentioned. An overview of fuel cycle for the GFR reference design and for the ALLEGRO reactor are provided. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.
The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. Single analyst tools allow for rapid design and evaluation of advanced approaches for new and existing nuclear facilities. A low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel conversion and fabrication facility simulator is developed to assist with MC&A for existing facilities. Measurements are added to the model (consistent with current best practices). Material balance calculations and statistical tests are also added to the model. In addition, scoping work is performed for developing a single stage aqueous reprocessing model. Preliminary results are presented and discussed, and next steps outlined.
The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. Existing regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and some of the requirements are not suited to smaller, safer advanced reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), or the consideration of safeguards and security requirements early in the design process, is an overarching principle that guides this program. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.
University research is a strong focus of the Office of Nuclear Energy within the Department of Energy. This research complements existing work in the various program areas and provides support and training for students entering the field. Four university projects have provided support to the Material Protection Accounting and Controls Technologies (MPACT) 2020 milestone focused on safeguards for electrochemical processing facilities. The University of Tennessee Knoxville has examined data fusion of NDA measurements such as Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry and Cyclic Voltammetry. Oregon State University and Virginia Polytechnic Institute have examined the integration of accountancy data with process monitoring data for safeguards. The Ohio State University and the University of Utah have developed a Ni-Pt SiC Schottky diode capable of high temperature alpha spectroscopy for actinide detection of molten salts. Finally, the University of Colorado has developed a key enabling technology for the use of Microcalorimetry.
The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, within the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, has developed a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed for safeguards and security design for future nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The purpose of the Virtual Test Bed is to bring together experimental and modeling capabilities across the U.S. national laboratory and university complex to provide a one-stop-shop for advanced Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD). Experimental testing alone of safeguards and security technologies would be cost prohibitive, but testbeds and laboratory processing facilities with safeguards measurement opportunities, coupled with modeling and simulation, provide the ability to generate modern, efficient safeguards and security systems for new facilities. This Virtual Test Bed concept has been demonstrated using a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility as an example, but the concept can be extended to other facilities. While much of the recent work in the MPACT program has focused on electrochemical safeguards and security technologies, the laboratory capabilities have been applied to other facilities in the past (including aqueous reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactors as examples). This paper provides an overview of the Virtual Test Bed concept, a description of the design process, and a baseline safeguards and security design for the example facility. Parallel papers in this issue go into more detail on the various technologies, experimental testing, modeling capabilities, and performance testing.
Future nuclear fuel cycle facilities will see a significant benefit from considering materials accountancy requirements early in the design process. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group is demonstrating Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for a notional electrochemical reprocessing facility as part of a 2020 Milestone. The idea behind SSBD is to consider regulatory requirements early in the design process to provide more optimized systems and avoid costly retrofits later in the design process. Safeguards modeling, using single analyst tools, allows the designer to efficiently consider materials accountancy approaches that meet regulatory requirements. However, safeguards modeling also allows the facility designer to go beyond current regulations and work toward accountancy designs with rapid response and lower thresholds for detection of anomalies. This type of modeling enables new safeguards approaches and may inform future regulatory changes. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) has been used for materials accountancy system design and analysis. This paper steps through the process of designing a Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) system, presents the baseline system design for an electrochemical reprocessing facility, and provides performance metrics from the modeling analysis. The most critical measurements in the electrochemical facility are the spent fuel input, electrorefiner salt, and U/TRU product output measurements. Finally, material loss scenario analysis found that measurement uncertainties (relative standard deviations) for Pu would need to be at 1% (random and systematic error components) or better in order to meet domestic detection goals or as high as 3% in order to meet international detection goals, based on a 100 metric ton per year plant size.
The Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) system was identified during the Generation IV Technology Roadmap as a promising technology to perform the actinide management mission and, if enhanced economics for the system could be realized, also the electricity and heat production missions. The main characteristics of the SFR that make it especially suitable for the actinide management mission are: Consumption of transuranics in a closed fuel cycle, thus reducing the radiotoxicity and heat load which facilitates waste disposal and geologic isolation; Enhanced utilization of uranium resources through efficient management of fissile materials and multi-recycle; and, High level of safety achieved through inherent and passive means that accommodate transients and bounding events with significant safety margins.