The PRO-X program is actively supporting the design of nuclear systems by developing a framework to both optimize the fuel cycle infrastructure for advanced reactors (ARs) and minimize the potential for production of weapons-usable nuclear material. Three study topics are currently being investigated by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with support from Argonne National Laboratories (ANL). This multi-lab collaboration is focused on three study topics which may offer proliferation resistance opportunities or advantages in the nuclear fuel cycle. These topics are: 1) Transportation Global Landscape, 2) Transportation Avoidability, and 3) Parallel Modular Systems vs Single Large System (Crosscutting Activity).
This report is a companion document to a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting crosscutting Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR), the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR).
The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. Single analyst tools allow for rapid design and evaluation of advanced approaches for new and existing nuclear facilities. A low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel conversion and fabrication facility simulator has been developed to assist with MC&A for existing LEU fuel fabrication for light water reactors. Simulated measurement blocks were added to the model (consistent with current best practices). Material balance calculations and statistical tests have also been added to the model.
The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A and PPS designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.
This report is part of a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting the status of Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for each of the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR). This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) VHTR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the VHTR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of VHTR system designers. It updates the VHTR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF VHTR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the key points of PR&PP features extracted from the reference designs of VHTRs under consideration in various countries. A major update from the 2011 report is an explicit distinction between prismatic block-type VHTRs and pebble-bed VHTRs. The white paper also provides an overview of the TRISO fuel and fuel cycle. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.
This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Gas-cooled Fast reactor (GFR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) GFR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the GFR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of GFR system designers. It updates the GFR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF GFR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the PR&PP features of the GIF GFR 2400 MWth reference design. The ALLEGRO reactor is also described. The EM2 and HEN MHR reactor are mentioned. An overview of fuel cycle for the GFR reference design and for the ALLEGRO reactor are provided. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.
The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. Single analyst tools allow for rapid design and evaluation of advanced approaches for new and existing nuclear facilities. A low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel conversion and fabrication facility simulator is developed to assist with MC&A for existing facilities. Measurements are added to the model (consistent with current best practices). Material balance calculations and statistical tests are also added to the model. In addition, scoping work is performed for developing a single stage aqueous reprocessing model. Preliminary results are presented and discussed, and next steps outlined.
The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. Existing regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and some of the requirements are not suited to smaller, safer advanced reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), or the consideration of safeguards and security requirements early in the design process, is an overarching principle that guides this program. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.
University research is a strong focus of the Office of Nuclear Energy within the Department of Energy. This research complements existing work in the various program areas and provides support and training for students entering the field. Four university projects have provided support to the Material Protection Accounting and Controls Technologies (MPACT) 2020 milestone focused on safeguards for electrochemical processing facilities. The University of Tennessee Knoxville has examined data fusion of NDA measurements such as Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry and Cyclic Voltammetry. Oregon State University and Virginia Polytechnic Institute have examined the integration of accountancy data with process monitoring data for safeguards. The Ohio State University and the University of Utah have developed a Ni-Pt SiC Schottky diode capable of high temperature alpha spectroscopy for actinide detection of molten salts. Finally, the University of Colorado has developed a key enabling technology for the use of Microcalorimetry.
The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, within the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, has developed a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed for safeguards and security design for future nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The purpose of the Virtual Test Bed is to bring together experimental and modeling capabilities across the U.S. national laboratory and university complex to provide a one-stop-shop for advanced Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD). Experimental testing alone of safeguards and security technologies would be cost prohibitive, but testbeds and laboratory processing facilities with safeguards measurement opportunities, coupled with modeling and simulation, provide the ability to generate modern, efficient safeguards and security systems for new facilities. This Virtual Test Bed concept has been demonstrated using a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility as an example, but the concept can be extended to other facilities. While much of the recent work in the MPACT program has focused on electrochemical safeguards and security technologies, the laboratory capabilities have been applied to other facilities in the past (including aqueous reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactors as examples). This paper provides an overview of the Virtual Test Bed concept, a description of the design process, and a baseline safeguards and security design for the example facility. Parallel papers in this issue go into more detail on the various technologies, experimental testing, modeling capabilities, and performance testing.
Future nuclear fuel cycle facilities will see a significant benefit from considering materials accountancy requirements early in the design process. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group is demonstrating Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for a notional electrochemical reprocessing facility as part of a 2020 Milestone. The idea behind SSBD is to consider regulatory requirements early in the design process to provide more optimized systems and avoid costly retrofits later in the design process. Safeguards modeling, using single analyst tools, allows the designer to efficiently consider materials accountancy approaches that meet regulatory requirements. However, safeguards modeling also allows the facility designer to go beyond current regulations and work toward accountancy designs with rapid response and lower thresholds for detection of anomalies. This type of modeling enables new safeguards approaches and may inform future regulatory changes. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) has been used for materials accountancy system design and analysis. This paper steps through the process of designing a Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) system, presents the baseline system design for an electrochemical reprocessing facility, and provides performance metrics from the modeling analysis. The most critical measurements in the electrochemical facility are the spent fuel input, electrorefiner salt, and U/TRU product output measurements. Finally, material loss scenario analysis found that measurement uncertainties (relative standard deviations) for Pu would need to be at 1% (random and systematic error components) or better in order to meet domestic detection goals or as high as 3% in order to meet international detection goals, based on a 100 metric ton per year plant size.
The Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) system was identified during the Generation IV Technology Roadmap as a promising technology to perform the actinide management mission and, if enhanced economics for the system could be realized, also the electricity and heat production missions. The main characteristics of the SFR that make it especially suitable for the actinide management mission are: Consumption of transuranics in a closed fuel cycle, thus reducing the radiotoxicity and heat load which facilitates waste disposal and geologic isolation; Enhanced utilization of uranium resources through efficient management of fissile materials and multi-recycle; and, High level of safety achieved through inherent and passive means that accommodate transients and bounding events with significant safety margins.
Renewed interest in the development of molten salt reactors has created the need for analytical tools that can perform safeguards assessments on these advanced reactors. This work outlines a flexible framework to perform safeguards analyses on a wide range of advanced reactor designs. The framework consists of two parts, a process model and a safeguards tool. The process model, developed in MATLAB Simulink, simulates the flow materials through a reactor facility. These models are linked to SCALE/TRITON and SCALE/ORIGEN to approximate depletion and decay of fuel salts but are flexible enough to accommodate higher fidelity tools if needed. The safeguards tool uses the process data to calculate common statistical quantities of interest such as material unaccounted for (MUF) and Page's trend test on the standardized independent transformed MUF (SITMUF). This paper documents the development of these tools.
The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program is working toward a 2020 demonstration of Safeguards and Security by Design for advanced fuel cycle facilities. This milestone ties together modeling and experimental work and will initially demonstrate the concept for electrochemical processing facilities. The safeguards modeling tool used is the Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM). This report outlines the baseline model design that will be used for the 2020 milestone analysis, which was updated to represent a new baseline flowsheet developed for the MPACT program. The model was also used to generate simulation data for other labs to use as part of their safeguards analysis. Finally, this report describes how the 2020 milestone will be met. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.
This work describes the ongoing work to develop a molten salt reactor (MSR) model and associated tools for safeguards analysis. A new flowsheet was developed in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR). This design was chosen by ORNL as a generic baseline design that could be used for safeguards research. The model has simple chemical processing that is less extensive than the two-fluid flowsheet developed in the last year. A detailed TRITON reactor physics model, provided by ORNL, was implemented into the process model. The process model now includes reactor parameters such as K-eff and decay heat, which could be used as part of an advanced safeguards approach. Finally, a set of generic safeguards tools based on current safeguards approaches were developed. These tools are flexible and can be used with most MSR flowsheets. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Fuel Cycle Technologies Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The authors would also like to acknowledge Ben Betz ler for his work on the reactor physics models that were incorporated into the work and the continued collaboration with ORNL staff.
Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model up a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. One outsider theft scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work fits into a larger Virtual Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.
The Co-Decontamination (CoDCon) Demonstration experiment at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is designed to test the separation of a mixed U and Pu product from dissolved spent nuclear fuel. The primary purpose of the project is to demonstrate control of the Pu/U ratio throughout the entire process without producing a pure Pu stream. In addition, the project is quantifying the accuracy and precision to which a Pu/U mass ratio can be achieved. The system includes an on-line monitoring system using spectroscopy to monitor the ratios throughout the process. A dynamic model of the CoDCon flowsheet and the on-line monitoring system was developed to augment the experimental work. This model is based in MATLAB Simulink and provides the ability to expand the range of scenarios that can be examined for process control and determine overall measurement uncertainty. Experimental results have been used to inform and benchmark the model so that it can accurately simulate various transient scenarios. The results of the experimental benchmarking are presented here along with modeled scenarios to demonstrate the control and process monitoring of the system.
The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) uses MATLAB/Simulink to provide a tool for safeguards analysis of bulk handling nuclear processing facilities. Models of aqueous and electrochemical reprocessing, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactor facilities have been developed to date. These models are used for designing the overall safeguards system, examining new safeguards approaches, virtually testing new measurement instrumentation, and analyzing diversion scenarios. The key metrics generated by the models include overall measurement uncertainty and detection probability for various material diversion or facility misuse scenarios. Safeguards modeling allows for rapid and cost-effective analysis for Safeguards by Design. The models are currently being used to explore alternative safeguards approaches, including more reliance on process monitoring data to reduce the need for destructive analysis that adds considerable burden to international safeguards. Machine learning techniques are being applied, but these techniques need large amounts of data for training and testing the algorithms. The SSPM can provide that training data. This paper will describe the SSPM and its use for applying both traditional nuclear material accountancy and newer machine learning options.
The Material Protection Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) program within DOE NE is working toward a 2020 milestone to demonstrate a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed. The goal of the Virtual Test Bed is to link all MPACT modeling tools, technology development, and experimental work to create a Safeguards and Security by Design capability for fuel cycle facilities. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) forms the core safeguards analysis tool, and the Scenario Toolkit and Generation Environment (STAGE) code forms the core physical security tool. These models are used to design and analyze safeguards and security systems and generate performance metrics. Work over the past year has focused on how these models will integrate with the other capabilities in the MPACT program and specific model changes to enable more streamlined integration in the future. This report describes the model changes and plans for how the models will be used more collaboratively. The Virtual Facility is not designed to integrate all capabilities into one master code, but rather to maintain stand-alone capabilities that communicate results between codes more effectively.
The Co-Decontamination (CoDCon) Demonstration project is designed to test the separation of a mixed U and Pu product from dissolved spent nuclear fuel. The primary purpose of the project is to quantify the accuracy and precision to which a U/Pu mass ratio can be achieved without removing a pure Pu product. The system includes an on-line monitoring system using spectroscopy to monitor the ratios throughout the process. A dynamic model of the CoDCon flowsheet and on-line monitoring system was developed in order to expand the range of scenarios that can be examined for process control and determine overall measurement uncertainty. The model development and initial results are presented here.
This report gives an overview of expected design characteristics, concepts, and procedures for small modular reactors. The purpose of this report is to provide those who are interested in reducing the cost and improving the safety of advanced nuclear power plants with a generic design that possesses enough detail in a non-sensitive manner to give merit to their conclusions. The report is focused on light water reactor technology, but does add details on what could be different in a more advanced design (see Appendix). Numerous reactor and facility concepts were used for inspiration (documented in the bibliography). The final design described here is conceptual and does not reflect any proposed concept or sub-systems, thus any details given here are only relevant within this report. This report does not include any design or engineering calculations.
Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.
The future of reprocessing in the United States is strongly driven by plant economics. With increasing safeguards, security, and safety requirements, future plant monitoring systems must be able to demonstrate more efficient operations while improving the current state of the art. The goal of this work was to design and examine the incorporation of advanced plant monitoring technologies into safeguards systems with attention to the burden on the operator. The technologies examined include micro-fluidic sampling for more rapid analytical measurements and spectroscopy-based techniques for on-line process monitoring. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model was used to design the layout and test the effect of adding these technologies to reprocessing. The results here show that both technologies fill key gaps in existing materials accountability that provide detection of diversion events that may not be detected in a timely manner in existing plants. The plant architecture and results under diversion scenarios are described. As a tangent to this work, both the AMUSE and SEPHIS solvent extraction codes were examined for integration in the model to improve the reality of diversion scenarios. The AMUSE integration was found to be the most successful and provided useful results. The SEPHIS integration is still a work in progress and may provide an alternative option.
Imported oil exacerabates our trade deficit and funds anti-American regimes. Nuclear Energy (NE) is a demonstrated technology with high efficiency. NE's two biggest political detriments are possible accidents and nuclear waste disposal. For NE policy, proliferation is the biggest obstacle. Nuclear waste can be reduced through reprocessing, where fuel rods are separated into various streams, some of which can be reused in reactors. Current process developed in the 1950s is dirty and expensive, U/Pu separation is the most critical. Fuel rods are sheared and dissolved in acid to extract fissile material in a centrifugal contactor. Plants have many contacts in series with other separations. We have taken a science and simulation-based approach to develop a modern reprocessing plant. Models of reprocessing plants are needed to support nuclear materials accountancy, nonproliferation, plant design, and plant scale-up.
The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.
Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.
Near Real Time Accountability (NRTA) of actinides at high precision in reprocessing plants has been a long sought-after goal in the safeguards community. Achieving this goal is hampered by the difficulty of making precision measurements in the reprocessing environment, equipment cost, and impact to plant operations. Thus the design of future reprocessing plants requires an optimization of different approaches. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model, developed at Sandia National Laboratories, was used to evaluate a number of NRTA strategies in a UREX+ reprocessing plant. Strategies examined include the incorporation of additional actinide measurements of internal plant vessels, more use of process monitoring data, and the option of periodic draining of inventory to key tanks. Preliminary results show that the addition of measurement technologies can increase the overall measurement uncertainty due to additional error propagation, so care must be taken when designing an advanced system. Initial results also show that relying on a combination of different NRTA techniques will likely be the best option. The model provides a platform for integrating all the data. The modeling results for the different NRTA options under various material loss conditions will be presented.
Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.
Next generation nuclear fuel cycle facilities will face strict requirements on security and safeguards of nuclear material. These requirements can result in expensive facilities. The purpose of this project was to investigate how to incorporate safeguards and security into one plant monitoring system early in the design process to take better advantage of all plant process data, to improve confidence in the operation of the plant, and to optimize costs. An existing reprocessing plant materials accountancy model was examined for use in evaluating integration of safeguards (both domestic and international) and security. International safeguards require independent, secure, and authenticated measurements for materials accountability--it may be best to design stand-alone systems in addition to domestic safeguards instrumentation to minimize impact on operations. In some cases, joint-use equipment may be appropriate. Existing domestic materials accountancy instrumentation can be used in conjunction with other monitoring equipment for plant security as well as through the use of material assurance indicators, a new metric for material control that is under development. Future efforts will take the results of this work to demonstrate integration on the reprocessing plant model.
The reprocessing and recycling of spent nuclear fuel can benefit the nuclear fuel cycle by destroying actinides or extending fissionable resources if uranium supplies become limited. The purpose of this study was to assess reprocessing and recycling in both fast and thermal reactors to determine the effectiveness for actinide destruction and resource utilization. Fast reactor recycling will reduce both the mass and heat load of actinides by a factor of 2, but only after 3 recycles and many decades. Thermal reactor recycling is similarly effective for reducing actinide mass, but the heat load will increase by a factor of 2. Economically recoverable reserves of uranium are estimated to sustain the current global fleet for the next 100 years, and undiscovered reserves and lower quality ores are estimated to contain twice the amount of economically recoverable reserves--which delays the concern of resource utilization for many decades. Economic analysis reveals that reprocessed plutonium will become competitive only when uranium prices rise to about %24360 per kg. Alternative uranium sources are estimated to be competitive well below that price. Decisions regarding the development of a near term commercial-scale reprocessing fuel cycle must partially take into account the effectiveness of reactors for actnides destruction and the time scale for when uranium supplies may become limited. Long-term research and development is recommended in order to make more dramatic improvements in actinide destruction and cost reductions for advanced fuel cycle technologies.The original scope of this work was to optimize an advanced fuel cycle using a tool that couples a reprocessing plant simulation model with a depletion analysis code. Due to funding and time constraints of the late start LDRD process and a lack of support for follow-on work, the project focused instead on a comparison of different reprocessing and recycling options. This optimization study led to new insight into the fuel cycle. AcknowledgementThe authors would like to acknowledge the support of Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project 125862 for funding this research.
The resurgence of interest in reprocessing in the United States with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has led to a renewed look at technologies for transmuting nuclear waste. Sandia National Laboratories has been investigating the use of a Z-Pinch fusion driver to burn actinide waste in a sub-critical reactor. The baseline design has been modified to solve some of the engineering issues that were identified in the first year of work, including neutron damage and fuel heating. An on-line control feature was added to the reactor to maintain a constant neutron multiplication with time. The transmutation modeling effort has been optimized to produce more accurate results. In addition, more attention was focused on the integration of this burner option within the fuel cycle including an investigation of overall costs. This report presents the updated reactor design, which is able to burn 1320 kg of actinides per year while producing 3,000 MWth.
Energy demand and GDP per capita are strongly correlated, while public concern over the role of energy in climate change is growing. Nuclear power plants produce 16% of world electricity demands without greenhouse gases. Generation-IV advanced nuclear energy systems are being designed to be safe and economical. Minimizing the handling and storage of nuclear waste is important. NIF and ITER are bringing sustainable fusion energy closer, but a significant gap in fusion technology development remains. Fusion-fission hybrids could be a synergistic step to a pure fusion economy and act as a technology bridge. We discuss how a pulsed power-driven Z-pinch hybrid system producing only 20 MW of fusion yield can drive a sub-critical transuranic blanket that transmutes 1280 kg of actinide wastes per year and produces 3000 MW. These results are applicable to other inertial and magnetic fusion energy systems. A hybrid system could be introduced somewhat sooner because of the modest fusion yield requirements and can provide both a safe alternative to fast reactors for nuclear waste transmutation and a maturation path for fusion technology. The development and demonstration of advanced materials that withstand high-temperature, high-irradiation environments is a fundamental technology issue that is common to both fusion-fission hybrids and Generation-IV reactors.
Due to increasing concerns over the buildup of long-lived transuranic isotopes in spent nuclear fuel waste, attention has been given in recent years to technologies that can burn up these species. The separation and transmutation of transuranics is part of a solution to decreasing the volume and heat load of nuclear waste significantly to increase the repository capacity. A fusion neutron source can be used for transmutation as an alternative to fast reactor systems. Sandia National Laboratories is investigating the use of a Z-Pinch fusion driver for this application. This report summarizes the initial design and engineering issues of this ''In-Zinerator'' concept. Relatively modest fusion requirements on the order of 20 MW can be used to drive a sub-critical, actinide-bearing, fluid blanket. The fluid fuel eliminates the need for expensive fuel fabrication and allows for continuous refueling and removal of fission products. This reactor has the capability of burning up 1,280 kg of actinides per year while at the same time producing 3,000 MWth. The report discusses the baseline design, engineering issues, modeling results, safety issues, and fuel cycle impact.
This report summarizes the work conducted for the Z-inertial fusion energy (Z-IFE) late start Laboratory Directed Research Project. A major area of focus was on creating a roadmap to a z-pinch driven fusion power plant. The roadmap ties ZIFE into the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) initiative through the use of high energy fusion neutrons to burn the actinides of spent fuel waste. Transmutation presents a near term use for Z-IFE technology and will aid in paving the path to fusion energy. The work this year continued to develop the science and engineering needed to support the Z-IFE roadmap. This included plant system and driver cost estimates, recyclable transmission line studies, flibe characterization, reaction chamber design, and shock mitigation techniques.
The Z-Pinch fusion experiment at Sandia National Laboratories has been making significant progress in developing a high-energy fusion neutron source. This source has the potential to be used for the transmutation of nuclear waste. The goal of this research was to do a scoping-level design of a fusion-based transmuter to determine potential transmutation rates along with the fusion yield requirements. Two ''In-Zinerator'' designs have been developed to transmute the long-lived actinides that dominate the heat production in spent fuel. The first design burns up all transuranics (TRU) in spent fuel (Np, Pu, Am, Cm), and the second is focused only on burning up Am and Cm. The TRU In-Zinerator is designed for a fuel cycle requiring burners to get rid of all the TRU with no light water reactor (LWR) recycle. The Am/Cm In-Zinerator is designed for a fuel cycle with Np/Pu recycling in LWRs. Both types of In-Zinerators operate with a moderate fusion source driving a sub-critical actinide blanket. The neutron multiplication is 30, so a great deal of energy is produced in the blanket. With the design goal of generating 3,000 MW{sub th}, about 1,200 kg/yr of actinides can be destroyed in each In-Zinerator. Each TRU In-Zinerator will require a 20 MW fusion source, and it will take a total of 20 units (each producing 3,000 MWth) to burn up the TRU as fast as the current LWR fleet can produce it. Each Am/Cm In-Zinerator will require a 24 MW fusion source, and it will take a total of 2 units to burn up the Am/Cm as fast as the current LWR fleet can produce it. The necessary fusion yield could be achieved using a 200-240 MJ target fired once every 10 seconds.
Recent interest in reprocessing nuclear fuel in the U.S. has led to advanced separations processes that employ continuous processing and multiple extraction steps. These advanced plants will need to be designed with state-of-the-art instrumentation for materials accountancy and control. This research examines the current and upcoming instrumentation for nuclear materials accountancy for those most suited to the reprocessing environment. Though this topic has received attention time and again in the past, new technologies and changing world conditions require a renewed look and this subject. The needs for the advanced UREX+ separations concept are first identified, and then a literature review of current and upcoming measuring techniques is presented. The report concludes with a preliminary list of recommended instruments and measurement locations.